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C::HAPTER I
Introduction and Purpose
On the evening of May first, 1945, Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels
climbed the steps leading out of the Fuehrer Bunker and walked a
short way into the Chancellery garden in the heart of Berlin.

There

he paused a moment to survey the shell-pocked landscape, raised a gun
to his head and shot himself.

It was a last act of propaganda, a

fitting climax to the carefully contrived pageant he had labored for
over twenty years to create.

It was intended to seal the covenant he

had made with legend, in his own mind and hopefully in the mmnds of
the German people.
A few hours later a contingent of Russian troops found his
staff still at their desks in the Ministry of Public Enlightment and
~

Propaganda, attending to the ongoing neeqs of the German mind amidst
the flames and bursting she~ls.

They had received no orders to stop

their work.
The end of the man and his Ministry indicate the amount of
dedication Goebbels possessed.

Whether he can be considered a

failure is a question one must ask when one considers his fate.
Goebbels died believing he and his Fuehrer had been betrayed by
others in the·Nazi hierarchy.

Throughout his career he believed

that his efforts to implement effective propaganda programs were
being undermined by Nazi officials without expertise and understanding of the requirements of such programs.
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While his Ministry had extraordinary influence over the .. Gennan
public at large, Goebbels .neve.r·.really enjoyed coll\Plete control of
the German media.

He did not absolutely control the:·press, and was

constantly at odds with those·,who did.

He lamented for years the

authority of the Wehramacht over military news releases, an
authority which caused much trouble in efforts for unified and
effective propaganda.
His protests to Hitler brought fil:eeti_ng mollification, promises
and sometimes rebuke.

While he lost faith in Hitler towards the end

of the war, he never lost his impassioned loyalty to the image he
helped to create.

•
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Hitler, however held Goebbels at armslength

almost to the end.

The Fuehrer maneuvered Goebbels, contended with

him and guided the little Doktor along the paths he saw fit.

He

never lost sight of the fact that Goebbels was an extremely complex
and forceful person.

Hitler saw to it that Goebbels remained in a

constant state of conflict with those around him to insure that he
represented no threat to his own political security.
If Hitler had accol!)2dated the Minister of Propaganda, reduced
the conflict, and granted the desired authority at the right times,
the result of the pr_ograms in the Ministry might well have been
different.

Had Goebbels been able to rally support for his projects

and gather about himself the cadre he sought, he might have placed
himself in a position to be much more effectively heared by both
Hitler and the German.people.
_Again, if Goebbels himself had .been able to contravene the

3

effects of his passionate affection for the person of the Fuehrer he
might have acted more reasonably towards the end of the war,

As it

was, his work and his efforts were markedly impeded by circumstances
out of his control, politically, and personally.

According to such

an argument, it might be said he failed in his endeavor.

But one

should consider his accomplishments and philosophy before assuming
failure on the part of Joseph Goebbels.
Before his death he created a system of evaluati.ng and
disseminating information to a state, and later, to a continent
which, in theory, might have worked had it not been for the inability
of those around him to appreciate it.

In his early career he

mastered the art of political activism on a scale that has yet to be
effectively equaled.

He first grasped the true value of radio as a

means of warfare and exploitation.· While he publically professed an
acute contempt for the German masses, he successfully manipulated the
thinking of some six_ty million people for many years.

His philosophy

and policy has been studied as a supreme example, alb£!:t Machiavellian,
of the art of psychological manipulation of a mass using the most
modern techniques of his day.

His procedures in the exploitation of

subdued cultures through mass media w~ effective in the case of
France and Holland, and for a time even E.ngland under siege.
It is the aim of this thesis to explore the structure of the
propaganda organization in Nazi Germany under Goebbels, illustrate
his technique, specifically in radio, relate both to his philosophy,
and in doing so to ascertain the nature of his efforts in relation
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to the efforts of others with whom he had to contend, and with whom he
came into conflict.

Finally, as an adjunct, to illustrate whether he

actually succeded or failed in his calling.
In the light of these aims, the following questions will be answered
in the course of this thesis:
1.

What characterized the organizational structure of the
Propaganda Ministry?

2.

What characterized Goebbels' technique?

3.

What was Goebbels' philosophy of propaganda and was it
consistent with his techniques?

4.

What is the measure of Goebbels' success and- failure?

Some rather extensive efforts were made in the course of
research on this thesis.

The author, for instance,·checked the

Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. for a comprehensive
listing of English and German information on Geobbels.

In some

cases there was a wait of up to five months in obtaining certain
materials.
It is perhaps in order to remark that some biographical
information is included not as romantic generalization, but rather
to provide an insight into some of the early experiences and
influences that played a large and significant part in Goebbels'
development.

Such information is essential in understanding the

unique environment, upbringing and education out of which Goebbels
arose.

This information may serve to provide some basis for

examining the psychological constitution of Goebbels.

CHAPTER II
Procedure and Criteria
The sources utilized in this thesis are primarily the surviving
texts of Goebbels ' own diaries, the minutes of his secret conferences,
and the diaries of ~udolph Semmler , his press chief of many years .
Goebbels believed himself to be the curator of the official Nazi
history and wrote copious accounts of his day-to-day activities and
impressions throughout his career.

He would dictate these accounts

to a stenographer for hours at the end of each day and they would be
transcribed and bound.

He did so with the intention of utilizing

them after retirement in the composition of historic memoirs which
he believed would be the standard work on the founding and development
of the Thi rd Reich.

They are at once candid and embellished and

obviously written with public and scholarly consumption in mind.
Actually , most of his c reative work was written in the diary
format , i . e . Michael, a semi-autobiographical novel .

His earlier

diaries, which he beg an as a student , are much more candid, not
having been written necessarily for public consumption, and are very
poetic.

He fancied himse lf an activist, revolutionary and a martyr .

The official diaries, however, have come down to us only in
part .

They were found in rubble and preserved, having been translated

by Louis Lochner, a wire service correspondent in Germany during the
war .

These diaries run for about seventeen months , with gaps of up

to a month at points .

It is believed that the diaries survived in
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toto and were found by the advancing Russian armies who neither
deny nor confirm possession.
Those that remain are sufficient, however, to provide a clear
insight into the method, technique and philosophy of the propagandist.
They depict a callous, but sometimes remorseful, attitude toward the
aberant form of journalism that the Nazis developed.

They also

indicate clearly that Dr. Goebbels worked in an atmosphere of
continuous conflict with the other strongmen in the Nazi upper
echelons.

Goebbels pulled no punches in his descriptions of his

confederates and, as an educated man, showed great contempt for some

-

of his less enlightened collegues.
A German peasant, working in the Chancell.!::Y area happened upon
a stack of carbon copy minutes among piles of waste paper he was
intending to gather and sell as fuel shortly after the surrender.
He glanced at the top sheets and realized what he had found and took
the stack to the allied headquarters in Berlin.

A translator was

hastily summoned and the papers were found to be duplicates of the
minutes of Goebbels' daily staff meetings for about five and one half
years.

Goebbels met daily with the chiefs of all departments in the

Propaganda Ministry to discuss tactics, the day's news, cultural
activities in the arts, cinema, and song, along with specific
propaganda programs.

Minutes were kept of these meetings by an aide.

They are often rather cryptic and presented a far more difficult task
in translation, as much jargon and quirks of phra::5:logy were used at
the meetings as a matter of course.

These minutes were definitely
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not meant for public consumption and are c learly a very vivid
picture of how the inner corp of propagandists functioned and interacted in the disposition of the dail y requirements of the Ministry .
Nazi policy and technique are described here in such a manner that
much of what is found in a similar vein in the diaries , is con£irmed .
These minutes also fill in many gaps found in the diaries and run
from nineteen thirty-nine to nineteen forty-four .

There is less

-

critism of Goebbels ' collegues to be found in the minutes and far
more of the callous, cavalier treatment of the journa listic field .
This cavalier treatment of journalism , as well as other ploys
utilized by the Third Reich were not lost on one Rudolph Semmler , who
acted as Goebbels' press aide for many years .

This document comes

down to us through his widow who received the document shortly before
the fall of Berlin.

Whether Semmler wanted to publish these diaries

before or as he wrote them is not certain , but they do provide a
valuable insight into the mannerisms , presence , and countinance of
Goebbels as a man, and a forceful evaluation of Goebbels the
propagandist.

Semmler remained an a ide to Goebbels throughout many

of Goebbels ' significant quarrels and caustically acknowledged the
breakdown of the Ministry ' s credibility toward the end of the war.
It is through these sources and many historical works on the
Ministry and Goebbel s that the questi ons of success or failure will
be approached.

Unlike most of the Nazi leaders, Goebbels unwavering

devotion to his diaries serves to provide an on- the-spot l ook at the
issues surrounding the question .

The minutes serve to confirm the
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assertions made in the diaries and Semmler's records provide an
excellent alternative viewpoint from which to assess the foregoing .
This study will be augmented by other resources which will p rovide a
p i cture of the overall composition of the propaganda machine

in ✓

additi on to providing a personal perspective on Dr . Goebbels life .
It is impossible to prove that what Goebbels did was a lways
effective since evidence is overwhelming that in many cases he fai led
dismally, but the failures were in specific instances, as will be
shown .

While it may indeed be true that Dr . Goebbels lost some

battles, the issue of whether he lost the war remains to be seen .
The principal concern of any determination of success or failure
is the propaganda itself .

This thesis attends to a specific man in

a specific system at a particular point in history.

Even so, in

order to make any judgement about the mission and the execution of the
mission , the term, the idea, that is "propaganda", must be c l arified
at the onset.

The word "clarified" is used because , although volumes

of work have been done on the idea, the term "propaganda" has not
adquately been defined and there is no consensus on what the term
encompasses actual l y and totally.
The terms necessarily utilized in attempting to c l a rify the idea
of propaganda are as cumbersome in any general sense as the term
propaganda itself.

One must speak of the "ideals" i n a given

"society", which a r e represented in the discernable actions of its
citizenry , or its "public ".

The reader may explore t housands of

sources where attempt ed definitions of terms are much more ably set
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out than could possibly be done here.

Let it suffice to say that

the reader can locate discussion on these terms anywhere from Plato
to Webster as best sui ts his or her needs in eval uating the
description of propaganda furnished here .
Rather, it is more to the descriptive needs o f any discussion on
propaganda to deal with specific questions that are commonly found
on the subject .

For example , one inevitablely finds some attempt to

place the term in the general category of an art or a science .

No

argument exists that irrefutabl y places it excl usivel y in either
categor y .

This is because propaganda apparently shares the qualities

of both .
Whil e propaganda, more and more , in utilizing the scientific
methods found in demography, polli ng and a host of social sciences it
is also , according to some of its prominent practit ioners , as we shal l
see l ater , a largely intuitive and subjective activity .

It includes

the evaluation of fact and construct in its psychol ogical
applications and in that vein is becoming infinitely more
sophisticated in the results it brings .

But the ver y nature of the

pursui t and the e l ements involved , ~e ., society, the determination of
ideals , mores , legend, folklore, opinion and others , must involve an
intuitive judgement that , often as not , comes straight from the hip
of even the most scientific practitioner .
It is necessary to view propaganda and the propagandist in the
context of the kind of state that spawns either.

The parameters

within which a propagandist operates will differ , say , between a
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totalitarian or police state and a democracy.

The totalitarian

propagandist enjoys greater freedom from restraint of the demands of
the individual's right to know, from the inherent viability of his
government's official position, in the eyes of the governed, and even
from the access the people have to alternative positions as permitted
by the government.
In a democracy, hopefully, there is more substance to the
potential enlightrnent in the p~ople.

The government is in a position

to influence the tliinki_ng of the people, but ideally from the standpoint of the popular welfare of the people rather than the government.
It is incumbent upon a democratic government to factually represent
its position to its constituents and therefore the propagandists
must, to a greater degree than in a totalitarian environment, work
with the facts as they are given to him.

As Huxley states,

"In a Democratic state the propagandist will
have rivals competing with him for the support
of the public. In totalitarian states there
is no liberty of expression for writers and
no liberty of choice for their readers. There
is only one propagandist-- the state."l
Propaganda involves the pass_age of ideas from a source to a
repeptor.

As such, the process includes several elements.

An

originator or communicator, must have an idea to pass on and must do
it through some kind of medium or means of communication.

Such a

li Huxley, Aldous, "Notes on Propaganda 11 , Harpers Magazine,
Vol. 174, December, 1936, pp.31-42.
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medium can be the printed word, or electronic media.
of course, reach some kind of audience.
some kind of effect on the audience.

The medium must,

And finally, there must exist

While these elements are grossly

oversimplified they provide a basic framework within which the
prop.aganda process can be discerned.
Who is the propagandist?
considered a propagandist?

What qualities must one possess to be

Again, it is a matter of inconclusive

debate as to what one must be.

It is best to :try and broach this

line of inquiry by attempting to describe the aims of the
propagandist.
audience.

As mentioned above the propagandist tiries to reach an

It is a matter of dispute whether propaganda is an

exclusively deliberative process.
can be accidental.

Arguments exist that propaganda

It may be possible for even the most avidly self-

proclaimed objectivists to propagandize without realizing it.
It is safe to assume, however, that most propaganda occurs as a
result of some design.

An aim must be pres's'nt.

As we shall see

later, many scholars and practitioners assert that in order for
prop.aganda to truly exist there must be some predd,lected result.
This necessarily implies a consciously desired goal on the part of
the propagandist.

He must have previously discerned a problem,

condition, or state of affairs which he desires changed or
re-affirmed.

There must be a will or desire to effect a compulsion

of some kind.

As he designs his polemic approach he must be

sensitive to the constitution of his intended.audience or he will
not reach them.
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Dispute arises in discussion on the subject of whether the
propagandist tries to reach a specific public or a mass.

A specific

public is a group which shares a discernable common interest while a
mass is simply a group of unrelated individuals .

To reach either

requires a different approach.
The propagandist may be an educator as the educator may be a
propagandi st.

It is not reasonable t o presume that they are mutual ly

exclusive, as both share the qualities of the other , incidently or by
design.
Jacques Ellul wiJ.'i provides an adequate summary of what
propaganda may incl ude and attends to.

First he indicates that

modern propaganda must include research and scientific analysis in a
sociological and psychological manner.

Second , propaganda must

intend to establish a set of rules that are possibl e to test .

W

Third,

propaganda must i nclude a study of the man and his environment.

Finally that the propagandist must try to measure and define the
effects of propaganda in order to effectively contr ol its use. 2
So far the reader has been introduced to some of the basic
questi ons i nvolved in the ongoing discussion on propaganda .

There is

a bibliography furnished to provide resources for further
investigation of this illusive and fascinating subject.

2 Ellul , Jacques , Propaganda , The Formation of Men's Attitudes
(Vintage Books , New York) 1973 , pp.4- 5 .
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The Nazi experience is included as an element in this general
discussion in many works and appears as a specific stage in the
development of the art or science o f propaganda.

For the purposes

of this paper it would be insufficient to simply examine the general
nature of arguments a nd theory in propaganda.

The Nazi ' s basic

approach was formulated at a time wh en technology advanced to the
point of world wide extension of the human communicator to a popular
mass .

World communications had been in the process of development

for some time but only a limited f ew who possessed the technological
know- how could actua lly participate i n it.

With the advent of radi o

as more than a seri es of dot- dash means of communicating , the public
found that they could sit at home and bear witness to events that
occurred on another contient at the t ime t hey occurred .

This was

not lost on the Nazis.
In a late r c h apt er the policy toward radio broadcasting,
manufacture and use will be described in detail .

Their visions

concerning radio were rather singular in nature .
Propaganda in the Third Reich will be presented here in a
s ummary manner only t o qualify it in light of the ge neral references
made above.

Hitler wrote extensivel y on the subject and in his earl y

career compiled his thinking in Mein Kampf .
Hitler stressed psycho logy not as a scientist but as an
activist.

He did not concern himself with psychology as an

instrument by which one could gain knowledge of the human mind for
its own sake .

He desired whatever axiomatic precepts he could glean
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that produced effects favorable to the advancement of his aims .

He

uses the term "psychological" often in his discourse on the subject
of propaganda but only in the context of differentiating a thoughtful
evaluation of man from simple unthoughtful guesswork, or outmoded
European reliance on social archetypes.
His evaluation was largely instinctive, predicated upon his own
observation of human behavior and constitution .

He held adamantly,

for instance, that the German mass was capable of only elemental
education through propaganda .

Their capacities did not extend

beyond rote memory, and that, only at great effort and stimulation
on the part of the informing agent .

They were most susceptable to

basic primitive sentiment and most access~le through emotions.
As he believed this, his propagandistic principles were
accordingly formulated.

He held that effective propaganda must be

first and formost , extremely simple.

No compound or complex ideas

must be asserted in any attempt to propagandize .
could attract and hold the attention of the mass.

Only simple ideas
As such , the

purpose of propaganda was to simply attract attention.

As he

believed that the masses were slow to learn he also asserted that
they were easy to forget.

Given this low retention capability on

the part of his audience, Hitler proposed that effective propaganda
must be repetitive .
He cited the need for carefully contrived and sus tained
continuity in propaganda of a simple , emotional and ongoing nature
as a cardinal must in any formula.

To break the continuity the
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propagandist sacrificed all efforts to implant'ideas in so
unreceptive an audience.

If the continuity breaks, the attention is

wost and the propaganda fails.
Hitler also lamented the German failure in their propaganda
efforts duri_ng the first World War.

He mentioned the caricatures

of ~llied troops found in German funny papers during that time,
depicting the allied troops as fools and incompetent morons.

When

the German soldier\ conf~onted the real foe on the field of battle he
was, acco:ildi_ng to Hitler, disscl>lutioned by the lack of his government's
awareness of the real foe and the cavalier manner in which they
prepared their soldiers to meet him.

IJ

Hitler also landed the American

efforts, as well as the British, for the manner in which they prepared
their boops to meet the German Soldruer.

The Allies depicted the

German soldier as the "Hun" and the "Barbarian 11 , imbued with hostile

charactaristics and brutality.

This was very successful according

to Hitler as this kind of propaganda served the Allies very well.
He indicated that they did not bandy about with possibilities, but
saw to it that their interests were well served.
He goes on to assert that propaganda must serve the interests
of those it attends to, first.

It is folly to present objective and

impartial accounts to the people at your expense.

Propaganda must

support only your side.
He saw propaganda as essentially a means rather than an end.
He differentiated, in the context of political organization, between
supporters who simply accepted the particular doctrine advocated,
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and members who participated in the furtherance of the doctrine,
actively.

A supporter was passive, simply accepting.

Propaganda

attends to the acquisition of supporters while the organization draws
members from the host of supporters.
further propaganda.

The members, then, precipitated

Propaganda, in this context, did not necessarily

need to concern itself with each and every individual in the mass,
but rather to the mass itself, from which grew support.
Hitler, for reasons which have been disputed by most, if not all,
biographers, seemed to possess an aversion for academics and
intellectuals.

Whether this was due to his own lack of recognized
f,

education, or some personal insecurity, it not of major importance
here, except to illustrate the following precept in his propaganda
philosophy.

He completely discounted the necessity for trying to

sway the intellectual through propaganda.

He continually desried

attempts to generate propaganda aimed at the intellectual and the
aesthete.

Whether he simply discounted their political value or

realized that they were, at that time, simply not susceptible to the
kind of psychological approach utilized in Nazi propaganda is not
known.
To grasp some of the general precepts of the Hitlerian philosophy
in propaganda is to understand Nazi propaganda and the foundation of
Joseph Goebbels' approach.

As will be seen later, Goebbels, on the

event on his first encounter with Hitler, believed he had discovered
a genius at the endeavor.

Most of his own formulations in the area

were well educated, sophisticated, extrapolations of the Hitlerian

\
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concept.
It remains then to tell·of.the.~an before we can.really grasp
the aubtitles of his phi.losophy·. -

CHAPTER III

Goebbels the Man
The town of Rheydt, in the Ruhr Valley, has best been described
as dismal.

It is a smallish industrial town which, at the time of

Goebbels' early childhood was dominated by manufacturing and textiles.
It was in a small but respectable house on Odenkirchener Strasse that
Joseph Goebbels was born on October 29, 1897.
The street was narrow and the houses cramped.

The back view,

with which young Joseph was to become very familiar in his childhood,
overlooked a barren lot.

The little room, which he would call his

refuge, commanded this view and he was to come to hate and love the
grim solace offered here.
His father, Friedrich Goebbels was the son of a manual laborer.
He longed for middle class respectability and projected his fierce
longing into his son for whom he had great hopes.

Friedrich spent

his life worki_ng for W.H. Lemartz of Rheydt, a manufacturer of gas
lamp mantles.

In later years he rose from a clerk position to that

of a minor director.
of the lower classes.
to Friedrich.

In doing this he cast off the bare vestiges
It was a small victory but very significant

The Goebbels family lived 6n a salary of about six

hundred dollars per year.
Friedrich married Katherina Maria Oldenhausen, of Dutch origin
who later became a naturalized German citizen.

She was the daughter

of a blacksmith, a simple woman who has been characterized~ by many
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biographical accounts as a person o~ great faith and exceedingly
strong character .

Her stalwart, Catholic approach of life was to

figure meaningfully in her son's later conception of the German mass .
Goebbels recal led to his close colleagues on several occasions
that she was like a rock in the face of calamity and that her faith
seemed pull her through many trials .

He would speak of a specific

experience when his father was overcome by some affliction and she
gathered all her children about her and told them to pray for their
father ' s safe recovery , which seemed to be very unlikely.

Her faith,

said Goebbels, was the reasons for Friedrich ' s recovery and was a
lesson not lost on the youth .
Joseph was brought into the world at a time when class
distinctions counted for a very great deal in central Europe and
h is father and mother hoped to see their young son c l imb to great
heights .

His brothers and sisters seemed not to have any particular

gifts and they were bound to follow their parents roles in the
culture .

Joseph, however , demonstrated an early penchant for

academics .
Hi s first experience in the p ublic schools was a happy one and
he appeared to be a bright, well- liked and well-ba l anced young boy .
At the age of five he encountered his first bout with a tough
reality in life.

The true meaning of being different.

and Fraenkel describe the scene ,

As Manville
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"One day •.• he was sitting on the sofa in the gute
Strube, the parlor on the first floor of the
house. Suddenly he began to cry so inconsolably
that the doctor was eventually brought to examine
him. He immediately ordered an operation. Joseph
had infantile paralysis." 1
The exact nature of the affliction was called Osteomelytis.
This is an affliction of the bone marrow that apparently retards the
growth of isolated areas of the body.
genetic abnormality are erroneous.

Claims that Goebbels had a

Authority claims were a pppular

-

mode of attack and the term "clubfoot" was inacurate.
The effect of the disorder was accute.

The operation was

completely unsuccessful and Joseph returned home with his left leg
some four inches shorter than his right.

If the effect was accute

upon his return home, his return to school was shattering.

It is not

generally the nature of five-year-old children to be syrnpathetic 1 and
the abnormality was made very clear to tqe child.

Ebermayer and

Meissner aptly describe the environment he had to contend with,
"The upbringing of his former sbhool friends
had hardly fitted them to deal with such a
situation. Joseph's crippled body and large
intelligent head ernbarrased them so they took
refuge in ridicule. From that day forward he
was teased unmercifully. His clumsy attempts
to walk were met with derisive laughter. They
wrote 'Joe Club-foot' and 'Old Limping Louse'
on the blackboard and yelled these and other
equally descriptive nicknames after him as he
limped down the street."2

1 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His
Life and Death (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.2.
2 Eberrnayer, Erfch, and Meissner, Hans-Otto, Evil Genius, The
Story of Joseph Goebbels, (Allan Wi.ngate, London) 1953, p.11.
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It is not the purpose of so graphic a description to be morbid
but rather to impress the reader with a circumstance that was to
affect the man throughout his life.

He was, at five years old, in

a position to deal with these taunts only as five-year-old children
might.
His whole psychological constitution was wrenched by this ongoing experience from the earliest periods of his formulative years.
He was "different".

As Manville and Fraenkel point out,

"So Joseph's earliest recollections were of
unhappiness and abnormality. It was obvious
to him that his condition pained his parents
and from his early childhood self doubt was
i_ngrained in his nature. 113
The self-doubt was a destructive and prohibitive element in his
personality.

It was. destructive in that he was never in his life

capable of really accepting love from the women he encountered, his
wife, and even himself.

It was prohibitive in that he never had the

capacity to rely on his own worth in the measure of his accomplishments.

He was always an element in someone else's plans and in some

greater scheme.

This, it seems is why Hitler filled such a void in

him, as we shall see later.
Young Goebbels was not popular and became more and more
reclusive.

This is not suppising in light of th~ social environment

he had to contend with in school.

He began to withdraw and concentrate

on his internal drives for satisfaction.
3 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His
Life and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.3.
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During his elementary education he discovered that he
possessed an exceedingly quick mind and an able memory.

His early

academic success bro,ught him a measure of sorely needed acceptance
and rec,ognition, not necessarily from his peers, but from his
instructors.

He came to thrive on this and began to devour literature.

His parents had a copy of an out-dated edition of Meyer's
Konversationslexikon, an encyclopedia.

He used this to extend his

horizons and found that his knowle.dge surpassed his peers,

-

imeasurably.

He would leave the jeers that came through his bedroom

window and read voraciously.

He read Virgil, Caesar, Goethe and

many other authors at a very young age.
The development of his mind was not lost on his parents.

They

began to re-evaluate their opinion of Joseph and decided to commit
their meager funds to send him to the German equivalent of high
school, the Gymnaisum.

Such a commitment on the part of a minor

director's family was major indeed.

High School at that time, was

not under the public school system and was available to those who had
excelled and who's family had the means to enroll promising young.
It should be pointed out that Joseph's academic experienee was
only an element in his development.

His intellectual prowess was

sometimes given to a snobbishness and he tended to flaunt his knowledge in school.

He was over enthusiastic in his school work and he

often created resentment when he corrected his fellow students and
even his teachers.

Ebermayer and Meissner assert,
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"The fact that he was invariably right added
to his unpopularity. His school fellows called
him "Mr. Knowall" and the teachers were
infuriated by what they chose to call his
intellectual snobbery. Had they known it,
the boy would more often than not remained
silent when he could have answered some
questions correctly because, despise his
companions as he might for their ignorance,

deep down in his heart he longed for their
admiration and respect." 4
He was given the nickname of "Ulex@'; which meant the sly one.

He

actually rather liked the name, and would recall it later in life
with fondness.
Goebbels passed through the Gymnasium at the top of his class.
The school provided a classical education which culminated in the
administration of a college entrance exam called the "arbiturium"
or "matura<iii; taken at the age of eighteen.
The young man desired to continue his education and sought funds
for fees from the Catholic church.

His vague ambition was to be a

priestpbut upon being interviewed by a member of the Albertus
Magnus Society, a scholarship foundation, he was told that while he
would receive funds, he was not to study theology.
He was given a scholarship for two years and matriculated to
Bonn University.

From there he studied at Heidelburg, Freiburg,

WUerzburg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich and back to Hiedelburg
where he took his Ph.D. in 1921.

It was not unsual for a college

4 Ebermayer, Erich, and Meissner, Hans-Otto, Evil Genius, The
Story of Joseph Goebbels, (Allan Wingate, London) 1953, p.12.
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student to study at many universities but Goebbels was largely
unclear about what he wanted to take his degree in and studied
Philosophy, History, Literature, Art, Latin and Greek.

He

specialized in Goethe and later wrote a dissertation entitled,
Wilhelm von Schultz, A Contribution to the History of Romantic Drama.
His degree, while most intellectually elevating, prepared him to do
absolutely nothing.

It had no practical value and Goebbels found

himself faced with the prospect of unemployment.

Things were none

too good for post-war Germany as a whole and lean years awaited the
yo~ng Doktor.

He applied for positions at several newspapers,

having submitted numerous articles, none of which were published.
The aspiring writer produced an autobiographical novel entitled,
Michael which was not published until his rise to power.

He then

wrote two plays, The Wanderer, a lyric work on the life of Jesus and
another entitled, The Lonesome Guest, also a lyric piece.

Neither

qs

were produced until his rise to power and nei~her had a very long run
when they were produced.

Like Hitler, Goebbels underwent the

experience of the frustrated artist.

His lot was not happy,and he

often returned home in desperation for food and shelter.

His

parents, none too happy about the dead-end their son faced after all
their sacrifices, took him in a circumstance which Goebbels detested.
At a political meeting on June 22, 1922, Hitler spoke in Munich's
Circus Crone before an audience of eight thousand.

Goebbels

attended, although he was undergoing a deep period of depression.
His political and social sentiments were bordering upon Nihilism.
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At this point he was absolutely ready to embrace something,
some idea, that would fill the void in him.

Every where he turned

he had met with dissilusionment and rejection.

Bursting with mental

energy, all that was needed was a spark to set everything inside him
in motion.
Standing in the crowd, he waited for the meeting to proceed .
Riess cites Goebbels' recollection of what happened next ,
"I hardly realized that suddenly someone was
standing up there and had begun to talk,
hesitantly and shyly at first, as though
groping for words adequate enough to express
thoughts whose greatness would not fit into
the narrow confines of ordinary language . Then
suddenly, the speech gathered momentum. I was
caught , I was listening ... I didn 't know what
was happening . .. I was beside myself. I was
shouting hurrah! The man up there looked at
me for a moment. His blue eyes met my glance
like a flame. This was a command ! At that
moment I was reborn. Now I knew which road to
take. 115
For the next year he would begin to follow politics voraciously.
While he continued to ido lize Hitler , some tennants of the Nazi
manifesto were not to his liking and he vascillated from party to
party in the right- wing segment of the German politi cal spectrum .
Goebbels found meager work at one hundred marks per month with
the right-wing pat:ty the Voelkische Freiheitspartei, under Franz von
Wiergershaus, a Reichstag Deputy .

Through the meeting held by this

party he came into contact with some of the members of the Nazi party
5

Riess, Curt , Joseph Goebbel s , (Ballantine Books, New York,
New York) 1948, p . 12 .
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who espoused similar views.
Rhine-Ruhr district.

He met Karl Kaufmann, Gauleiter of the

Kaufmann introduced Goebbels to Gregor and

Otto Strasser, strong men in the northern sections of the party and
he secured a position as an editorial assistant under them in the
'publication of the Geistiges Fuehrungsorgan, the organ of spiritual
leadership.

He replaced .a young poultry farmer by the name of

Heinrich Himmler, who had just vacated '!!he job.

This was lin 1924.

The Strassers noted that Goebbels had an excellent voice.

In

addition to his editorial duties he was given the position of
business manager of the Rhineland-Nord Gau.

Actually this included

Al--

the principle duty of maki_ng speeches and organizing meetings.
became proficient at the small audience address.
11

He

Riess says,

He became a forceful agitator; necessity

de~eloped him. He was able to step onto
the platform and deliver a speech to a
public loudly proclaiming it's distrust ...
He soon realized ..• that the very same words
said over and over again had the effect of a
sledge hammer (a truth which Hitler also
discovered) . 6
It was in this early days that his technique and style were honed to
a fine edge.

He spoke everywhere in his district.

Goebbels'

talents became more in demand and, as his experience grew, the
crowds grew.

Ultimately he would have to develop a very complex

technique to accomodate both a live and radio audience.

Manvell.

and Fraenkel point out,

6 Riess, Curt, Joseph Goebbels, (Ballantine Books, New York,
New York) 1948, p.20.
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"He •.. had to master the most difficult of
techniques, the art of addressing a large
audience from a platform while ·at the ·same
time using a microphone for transmission of
the speech over the radio. For the skilled
orator, direct address to an assembled audience
is a matter ofestablishing the correct level
of vocal projection that will give him complete
mastery over his hearer's attention. Goebbels
was, of course, thoroughly experienced in this
largely instinctive technique. But to effect
the right degree of projection to suit a
microphone only two feet from one's face while
at the same time endeavoring to reach out with
his voice to the boundries of a packed hall is
a matter of highly skilled technical
compromise. 117
Meanwhile, the Strassers were preparing to publish the National
Socialist Brief which Goebbels worked on.

In these weekly

publications he espoused socialist theories and spoke of an alliance
with the Soviet Union.

This was the main line of the northern Nazis.

Such a line was not consistant with the line the southern party
elements were holding under Hitler.

Hitler had just been released

from prison and was back at the helm of the party with the reluctant
acquiesce of the Strassers.

He was courting the nobility for some

funds and was against the idea of state appropriation of royal land
holdi_ngs.

The northern segments were in favor of the idea as it was

consistant with the more pure socialist line they followed.

Goebbels,

eager to please his employers, spoke ardently _against Hitler at a
meeti_ng of conciliation called at the height of the internal party

7

Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His
Life and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.117.
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strife on the issue.

Hitler was not present at the meeti.ng and it is

doubtful that he heard exactly what Goebbels said about him.

He had,

however, heard that Dr. Goebbels was exceedingly effective in
motivating the mobs.

He had also heard that Strasser had remarked

that Goebbels was easy to bribe.

Hitler, after the meeting, invited

Goebbels to Munich for the purpose of making a speech.
He was received royally and acco~dated in fine hotels.
lent his party his personal car.

Hitler

For Goebbels, who was earning some

two hundred marks per month, this was undreamed of luxury.

He was

used to the grim, spartan, worker-oriented attitude of the Strassers
in the north.

Hitler, in Munich, was a public figure of notoriety

and substance and courted the rich for funding.
Hitler spoke at length with the bedazzled young Doktor and so
impressed him that he returned to sing Hitler's praises in the north.
He abandoned the Strassers and accepted Hitler's inference that he
might make Goebbels his propaganda chief.

He was to be dissappointed,

however, as Hitler made Strasser his propaganda chief.

Hitler had

other things in mind for Goebbels.
On October 26, 1926, slightly less than four years after he had
first heard Hitler speak, he received a letter appointing him
Gauleiter of Berlin.
assignment.

There were two major drawbacks to the new

One was intennal strife in the party there, with tough

rowdy factions at odds with one another.

The other was that the Nazis

were a minute organization in Berlin where the communists held a great
majority and what they didn't hold, the Social Democrats did.
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Upon his arrival he was even less impressed with the conditions
of Nazi operations .

The office where the "work'' was done was a filthy

basement on the Potsdamerstrasse.

The bookkeeping was done by one

man who did so largely from memory .

The party was in debt and most

of the one thousand members were out of work.

Goebbels went through

the lists of membership and proceeded to weed out the dissident and
unhelpful.

He expelled over four hundred members , keeping with Hitlers

precept that while propaganda may attract followers , organization must
attract members who are willing to work rather than simply advocate .
The party was almost anonymous in the huge city and to establish
some public awareness Goebbels rented a Communist meeting hall on
February 11, 1926.
throughout the city .

He had large red posters printed and distributed
They looked like the 0:>rnmunist posters.

To

create further incitrnent he staged a parade through the ~ommunist
section of the city on the way to the hall .
Upon their arrival thousands of Communists and Socialists were
waiting and the meeting started with a hugh brawl.
precisely what Goebbels had planned.

This was

When the poli ce arrived he had

the i ngured storm tmoppers placed on the platform i n front of him and
spoke to the audience as they moaned beneath him.
beginning of the Nazi pageant and it was effective.

It was the
The press

covered the event , albeit unfavorably , but in three days the little
office in the basement called the ' opium den ' received twenty six
hundred applications for membership and five hundred for the S.A .
The party continued to incite riots and disrupt meetings of

30

other parties .

Goebbels was ruthless and demonstrated great personal

courage in some of the battles .

The Berlin government cracked down

on the Nazis, forbidd~ng them to operate or hold meetings .

He then

began to create subversive organizations and went underground.

After

a period of time the restrictions proved ineffective and were
rescinted .
Goebbels established a small newspaper called Der Angriff ,
through which he could voice his opinions without r estriction .

While

the paper had a long run it never really amassed a notable circulation.
Goebbels continued to play upon the insecurity of the people and
the unstable conditions of the government in Germany.
in the established government was a boon to the Nazis .

Any instability
Membership

grew and it became appearant that Hitler had made a wise choice in
the appointment of Goebbels in Berlin.

He had overcome great

-

obsticles in establishing the M. S . D.A . P. city and when Hitler came
to power Dr . Goebbels was made the Minister of Propaganda.
On March 14 , 1933 Goebbels was created Minister for National
Enlightment and Propaganda .

He assumed the post after a period of

fright and great worry that he would be left out of the distribution
of spoil s that his collegues were participating in since the
appointment of Hitler as Chancellor.

8

Hitler had at first been vague

8 Ebermayer, Erich, and Meissner, Hans-Otto , Evil Genius , The
Story of Joseph Goebbels , (Allan Wingate, London) 1953 , pp . 94-95 .
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about Goebbels' future role and had left the little Doktor wondering
if his time as a valuable member of the inner circle of the new
regieme had not come to an end.
It had not, however, and the New Ministry placed him solidly in
the cabinet of the new Reich.

He did not have the kind of power over

the active elements of the government that the other, already
established Ministerial posts did.

He had a unique kind of influence

or dominance, rather, over the minds of the people; over what they
read, what they heard and over what they tho.ught.

We will delve into

the structure of the Ministry in a later chapter when we illustrate
the inherent conflict that the structure caused.
At this point it will be interesti.ng to note the kind of

---

beaurocrat that Goebbels became.

Even at the onset of the

establishment of the Ministry, Goebbels had problems with his peers
in the other Ministries and he found that they had become very
ambitious and ruthless amongst each other in their lust for power.
Rudolph Semmler, in his diary entry for April 22, 1941, aptly
illustrates Goebbels' frame of mind,
Goebbels is full of distrust of the men around him,
even of those closely connected with him. He
maintains that this puts him in good company with
Frederick the Great, Bismark and Hitler himself,
all classic examples of the suspicious nature of
great menn .•. Goebbels himself watches the scene
around him like a watchman on a tower with a
telescope, always suspecting that somewhere
intrigues are going on that may threaten his position. 9
9 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse,
London) 1947, p.29.
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This kind of attitude was to contribute to his downfall.

The

attitude, itself, was not entirely a beast of Goebbels' imagination
or even totally the result of his own actions in relation to others.
By the start of the war there was an active movement underway to
unseat him and to destroy the credibility of the Ministry.

Being

aware of this he came to lose some of his faith in the staff of the
Ministry.

As Semmler points out,
"Goebbels secretly distrusts all his staffi He
sees the worst side of every human being and
admits freely that he has become an uncompromising
misanthropist. Moreover, he always believes that
important matters are concealed from him, or that
people are trying to cut him off from the outside
world, If he is left undisturbed for more than an
hour - that is to say if an hour passes with~ut him
seeing a press message from abroad, or having made
some rapid decision or being called from his room
for some urgent telephone conversation."10

The effect on the Ministry that this kind of attitude had was
damagi_ng as it precluded much valuable input from his subordinates.
As we saw in.the introduction, the fact in the Ministry when Berlin
was captured, indicates that Goebbels' attitude was not wholly
founded on reality.

Indeed, Goebbels had closed his mind off to

much in the way of help and true human value by the very philosophy
he had toward politics in general.

Semmler quotes Goebbels on

April 26, 1941,

10 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse,
London) 1947, p.29.
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"Politics ruin the. character; they develop the
worst and .mean_est·.quc1lities _by forc;j,ng into the
front of men's minds.their ambition, their vanity,
their competitive spirit,and their passion for
influence and cheap popularity. The cause they
are serving is pushed into. the bac_kground. Too
many of their politics are only a means to
eliminate competitors, to conduct vulgar intrigues
and to attain personal power."11
Goebbels' image of those who worked around him might have been
low, however highly he thought of himself.

It is apparent that his

aides and subordinates had to sit in conference every now and again

--

and listen to the Doktor luad his accomplishments as Semmler points
out,

"This evening Goebbels told us what he reckoned
to have been his chief services to the National
Socialist Party. In four decisive ways he had
vitually strengthened the movement; 1) Brought
National Socialism from middle class to the
workers. 2) Winning Berlin and preparing the
way for seizing power in the Reich. 3) He
worked out the continuity and choreography of
ritual in mass meeting and Party public
ceremonies. 4) His fourth contribution had been
the creation of the Hitler myth. Hitler had been
_(given) the halo of infallability, with the result
that many people looked askance at the Party after
1933 had complete confidence in Hitler. That was
why even now millions of Germans drew a distinction
between the Fuehrer and the Party, refusing to
support the latter while believing in Hitler."12
In the ten years since he had taken over the Ministry,
Goebbels had established himself as a competent worker in the cause

11 Semmler, Rudolf; Goebbels~The Man·Next To Hitler, (Westhouse,
London) 1947 1 p,31,
12 Ibid., p,56
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of the Third Reich .

He had demonstrated a great prowess for both

peacetime and wartime propaganda insofar as he understood the
German people .

His position was still influencial rather than

powerful and his entry in the Diaries for March 13 , 1943 seems almost
an attempt to justify to himself that his work was as important as
those Ministers who enjoyed true power,
"At midnight Funk suddenly rose to extend his
congratulations upon the tenth anniversary of
my taking over the Propaganda Ministry . Yes
indeed , t en years have passed since I created the
Propaganda Mini stry as a new instrument for
leading the German people . I believe I needn ' t
be ashamed of my ten years of labor . A Ministry
that seemed like a blank calling card has meanwhile
become one of which have been written very legible
and clear letters , easily readable both at home and
abroad . I believe nobody in the world would deny
the tremendous importance of the Propaganda
Ministry to the German state in the shaping of
policy during the last ten years . 1113
Semmler seems to confirm the idea that the Mini stry was of only
negligable value in the eyes of the Minister and the eyes of those
whom took exception to Goebbels' influence over the German mind.
Goebbels took great pains to protect himself from becoming overshadowed or engulfed in the aura and deeds of those directl y connected
with the mechanics of running the state and the war effort .

He had

great fear of becoming somewhat of a has- been in they eyes of the
publi c he sought to influence.

13 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P ., The Goebbel s Diari es , (Doubleday &
Company, Inc . , Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner , 1948 , p . 297-8 .
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His efforts in response to his a.)?prehensions are discussed by
''
Semmler in a Diary ent):"y of·March:13, 1943,
"If Goebbels did not 90::out of his way to find extra
work, his routine·tasks at.the Ministry would only
fill four or five hours a·day. Hence the· idea of
fillinglhis
day by writing
weekly leading
articles
.
I
•
•
in the Reich, (they were read verbatum on radio as
among the most important policy statements} and so
bringing himself more prominently before the public.
Nothing ·is worse for a man in public life than to be
forgotten, said Goebbels a few days ago. This is why
Goebbels is always careful to conduct skillfullythrought-out personal publicity. In cautious doses his
name is_ given to the public several times a week
through 1the newspapers. Every Friday evening he has
a regular date on the wireless. Press notices that
look quite short and harmless, mentioni.ng some quite
unimportant reception, have for him the function of
keeping the public's imagination busy and giving the
impressi?n that he is nearly snowed under with work." 14
Even his public appearances, which are carefully orchestrated
and preplanned in ~very detail, are to create the effect of a man on
the go and full of: purpose.

By the time the middle of nineteen forty -

three rolled around there was a curious absence of public statements
being made by the hierarchy of the now foundering Third Reich and
Goebbels took full advantage of this set of circumstances.

Semmler

points out,
"His frequent speeches in Berlin and other towns therefore have three purposes: to satisfy his own urge for
work, to•help the war, and to recall himself to the
people's memories in new and interesting ways, to make
himself a center of conversation, and to command the
headlines in the newspapers ..• They have the impression
that he is rising fast, in short that he is the coming
man.vl5
.

14 Semmler•, Rudolf; ·Goebbels"The ·Man ·Next 'To •Hitler, (Westhouse,
London} 1947, p.74
15 Ibid., p.74,
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Goebbels was , during this curcial time in the war , to become
sort of a gadfly to Hi tler .

He would be the one who pointed out the

weaknesses of Party positions in the face of the people .

He created

the concept of "Total War n which Hitl er came to a dvocate.

To t a l war

was the idea of mobilizing all human and material resources to turn
the tide for the Nazi cause .

While Hitler bought the idea, he

appointed , much to Goebbels chagrin , some of Goebbels adversaries in
the government to administer the new campaign under the guidelines
of the i deas .
to mollify him .

Goebbel s was £urious and it took much of Hi tler ' s part
As he began to ful fill his appointed role in the

picture he began to realize that his Ministry was losing touch with
the public at large.

Two significant entries in h i s Diaries indicate

his l oss of insight.

On May 12 , 1943 he writes ,

"Total war i s giving me a lot of work to do , but
matters are progressing accordi ng to rul e and
program. I have reviewed a gr eat number of
letters - more than 1 5, 000 in but a few weeks .
All of these letters testify to the unqual ified
agreement of public opinion with my views , as
well as to the great confidence of the letter
writers in me - a thing about which I am very
happy . I must try to j ustify this confidence;
in ot her words , in case errors are committed in
the realm of total war, I simply cannot fade out
of the picture . The people identi fy the idea and
conception of total war with my person . I am
therefore i n a certain sense publiclt responsible
for the continuation of total war . 111

16

Goebbels , Dr. Joseph P ., The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Gar den City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P . Dochner, 1948 , p . 373.
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It is very evident that Goebbels is quit'e satisfied that he has
the public exactly where he wants them and is ready to continue his
efforts in their good faith.

However, just three days later he

writes,
A lot of criticism is contained in the letters
reaching us. Morale among the masses is so low
as to be rather serious. Even people of good will
are now worried about the further developments.
The man in the street no longer sees any way out of
!:he military dilemma. As a result there is
critisism of the leaders, in some cases even of the
Fuehrer himself." 17
11

It is important to note that Goebbels does not single himself
out as an object of the peoples dissolutionment.
he was not their object.

And it may be that

The leaders, orchestrating the total war

campaign were so incompetent that they received all the blame.
Goebbels made sure that he was publically visable.

He went to the

bombed areas and walked the streets with the victims.

The people

responded to this with great enthusiasm and focused well on the
person of Goebbels.

As the German military situation grew worse and

worse, Goebbels made more efforts to reach the people.

Again, he

was adopting this policy while the other leaders were becoming
strangely reclusive.

While the people were watching their meat

rations gnaw smaller and smaller, men like Goering were feeding the
animals of his private zoo with fresh meat killed especially for that
purpose.

Goebbels, on the other hand made it publically known that

h±s rations were coincedent with the masses.
17 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.380.
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Such tactics were not lost on the public and were also noticed
by the allied propagandists.

They.even showed some grudging respect

for the little Doktor, as Semmler points out in July of 1943,
"The enemy, as well as the Neutral countries, have
been following very closely the internal political
develOpments in Germany.

They note certaiil changes,

and record above all how the reputations of the
leading personalities stand. At the time of
Stalingrad the Swiss paper Weltworke first began
to single out Goebbels as the man who kept his head
in a crisis and to compare him to those who in
favorable times excite themselves with parades and
outward show. Goebbels, on the contrary, is said to
show his capacity as a leader only in times of
difficulty and danger. Comments of this kind, to the
effect that Goebbels is at the moment the most
important- but not the most powerful - man in the
Germany leadership, are quite common now a days.
Peterson on the B~±tish wireless at six o'clock
this morning in the German Workers Programme, says,
'Goebbels, is the present situation, is the only
leader in the regieme who has the courage, will and
ability to speak to the people about it. He is the
only one who really tries to answer the questions
the nation is aski_ng, the only one who seriously
tries to defend the regieme and fights for it's
existance' 11 • 18

Why should the foreign press single out Goebbels, a man without real
power as the most effective member of the German hierarchy?
was his special quality?

What

Perhaps his commitment to the German state

had a depth that was not to be found in his contemporaries.

Goebbels

was the one leader who could have left Berlin in the closing hours
and yet choose to stay and die with his Fuehrer.

His conviction ran

so deep that he took the lives of his children and his wife wit:h his
own.

In order to understand the measure and mettle of his convictions

we must examine his philosophy.
18 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse,
Ilondon) 1947, p.

CHAPTER IV
Goebbel 1 s Philosophy
Goebbels' own testimony on the philosophical precepts he
embraced serves as a sound description of his position on the field
of journalism.

He provides us with a brief, cogent, and

uncompromising statement that seems to provide a basis for all
further assertions,
"News policy is a weapon of war. It's purpose is
to wage war and not to give out information. nl
He made this statement during the period when Germany had begun
to falter in the face of Allied advances.

It was at this time that

the news for the German people was becoming less and less glorious.
Until the first winter in Russian the Germans had been treated to a
barrage of military successes and the facts were positive on the
international front.

Domestic news co~erage had, for some time, been

carefully orchestrated and controlled.

Often in the morning

conferences, issues that arose for Goebbels' consideration were

treated within the framworlc of "polemics", the act of taking a single
position in a conflict or controversy.
The war situation changed a great deal in the attitude toward
what the German people should know about what the government was

1 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.210.

39

40

doing.

Necessary polemics were established so that all.news would

benefit the Reich in some way • . This policy was official and Goebbels
justified the policy in his Diary.entry of March 14,. 1943,
"During a war news.should.be given out mainly for
instruction and not for info.rmation. Not every
item of news should be published; rather must
those who control news policies endeavor to make
every item of news serve a certain purpose.
Unfortunately we do not always keep this in mind. n 2
That the policy mentioned above was not kept in mind was the
source of great trouble for the little Doktor, as we shall see later.
Goebbels' infusion of political utility into the presentation of news
was founded upon his idea of the relationship of news and government.
This relationship superseded even the relationship news might have to
the Party and was a natural part of the state.

He so states:

''I consider it absolutely essential that the news
bureaus be owned by the Reich. New policy is a
soverign function of the state, which the state can
never renounce. News policy is a cardinal political
affair, and political matters of this character must
be in the hands of the Reich, and not the Party.
The Party is in no position to establish a real news
service. In a news service ninety nine point nine
percent of the items deal with news about state
leadership and oniy the remaining small percentage
deals with the work of the Party."3
Goebbels influence over the state news was always precarious, as
will be shown.

He was in constant conflict with the Wehrmacht, the

Foreign Office, the state news organ, and many other elements of the

2 Goebbels, Dr, Joseph P,, The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Coil\J?any, Inc,, Garden Ci,ty 1 New :<o;i:kl Edited and Translated by Loui.s
P. Lochner, 1948, p,299,
3 Ibid. , p. 73 •
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government,
substantial.

This is not to say that his influence was not
He would operate on the basis that he, as Minister for

Public Enlightment and Propaganda, was the curator of the collective

=

German mind and asserted this as a basis for what control he had,J.•
In specific instances he could shift the whole emphasis, _direction,

and even content of the news.

For example he writes in his Diary

in May of 1943,
"I issued instructions to the press to pay more
attention to domestic than foreign questions
during the comi_ng weeks. The Foreign Office is
always eager for questions of foreign policy to
take precedence. The present period, however,
is so critical that it seems more important to
me that we concern ourselves with the worries of
the man in the street rather than with foreign
policy. The Foreign Office cannot see the point
but I regard myself as responsible for the morale
of the German people. From that fact I derive
the right to keep out of the German press everything that is harmful or even fails to·be useful. ,,4
While Goebbels might have felt some personal satisfaction from
such a justification, he found the members of the press quite
difficult to keep under control.

In domestic news coverage the press

corps had to be constantly monitored and guided by the Ministry.

It

was next to impossible to maintain absolute control because Goebbels
could not be everywhere at once.

He could not, in many cases,

prevent publication and found himself having to react to publications
after the fact.

It was in this manner that much of the policy

concerning news coverage was formulated.
4 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York} Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.392.
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News had to reflect the best interests of the society as
Goebbels perci~ved them.
tolerated .

Not to do so was failure and could not be

It was especially difficult to convey the best interests

of Nazi society where their system of justice was concerned .

Goebbels

lamented the fact in May of 1942 :
"Embarrasing consequences have resulted from the
irresponsible and unpsychological publications of
various court decisions. Hereafter I am having all
court verdicts of any national importance released
jointly by the Ministry of Justice and ourselves.
Our courthouse reporters don ' t have the necessary
feel for selecting and p ublishing verdicts according
to psychological considerations. The publication
of court decisions is not a question of mere
publicity but of public education . In connection
with every verdict we must ask ourselves whether
publication at this moment will have a favorable or
unfavorable effect. This is a matter which only
our Ministry can decide in the end. 5
11

Not only did the public have to live with the fact that it would
not receive unrestricted news of the decisions of the courts but the
idea of public trial was absolutely lost.

The treatment in the

coverage of the courts was not exclusively suppressi ve .

As will be

elaborated upon later , the publication of certain verdicts was made
to convey fear and to stop undesired practices .

The issue of

listening in on forbidden foreign radio broadcasts was countered, to
a certain extent , by enforced publication of heavy criminal sentences
made for such violations .

5
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Goebbels' domestic policies concerning news cover.age were
bitterly contested by many others in the Reich hierarchy as were his
military and foreign policies were.

At the onset of the war the need

for consistant coverage of military activities was.readily apparent.
The Propaganda Ministry established a precarious liason to coordinate
coverage in the form of the Prop_aganda Company or "P . K. " •

The P. K. 1 s

had three tasks; first, home propaganda, second, front line
propaganda, and third, propaganda directed against the enemy.
The first consisted of the regular work of the war correspondent,
the second, with a stiffening of morale and "ideological attitude"
of the fighting men, and the third involved leaflets, trench loudspeakers and, as the war progressed, the operation of army transmitters broadcasting to enemy troops.
In 1939 a P.K. consisted of two "light platoons" (each of six
press correspondents and four photographers), one "heavy platoon"
(comprlsed of correspondents, photographers, a radio section and a
film section)

one platoon composed of a leaflet staff, a loudspeaker

section, a film projection section and the editorial staff of the
army newsheet.

There was a fifth platoqn which was responsible fort

the preparation and evaluation of the materials produced by the
company as a whole.
As it was, the P.K.'s functioned primarily according to the
directives of the Wehrmacht.

As the war progressed the conflicts

between the Wehrmacht and the Prop_aganda Ministry increased.

The·

nature of those conflicts will be explored later for the purposes of
describi_ng the treatment of journalism by Goebbels and his staff the

followi.ng example .is appropriate.

In December of 1939 Goebbels told

his staff in conference,
"Letters from the front and conversation with
soldiers suggest that there is a widespread
belief at the front that the fighting at the
Western front is tho.ught in the home country
to be relatively easy for the troops. The
propaganda companies in the army are instructed
to depict the fighting on the Western front from
a more serious ·angle. 116

Goebbels was never satisfied with the coverage of the actual
fighti.ng.

He did not trust the acumen of the General staff in dealing

with what he continuously terms as "psychological" considerations.
He was constantly making complaints to the Wehrmacht about the
handli.ng of this story or that.

He received a steady stream of

reports and evaluations on the propaganda and news coverage in the
field and by the end of 1942 he was disheartened enough to write in
his Diary,
"The latest reports of the SD and the Reich
Propaganda Office were presented to me. In
both of these, as well as the reports of the
Gauleiters, there is sharp criticism of our
news policy regarding the situation at the
front. I feel absolutely not guilty of this
obvious fizzle. I have always urged greater
frankness in news. 117
Whether he believed that last statement is impossible to prove.
It is a suprising statement for one who had expounded the policies

6 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.10.
7 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.239.
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previously mentioned and will appear more surprising as the theme of

his philosophy is developed further.
As the war progressed and the situation for the Nazis worsened,
the task of ful filling the public ' s need for real news deteriorated
for Doktor Goebbels.

Unable to effectively coordinate his input of

news and disseminate it for the already wary populace, he lamented in
his Diary in May of 1943,
" It is quite natural that the people look for a
scapegoat since the facts themselves can ' t be
changed . The scapegoat , as has always happened
in the past, is the press and the radio. The
smallest tactical mistake that we chance to make
in press and radio are chalked up against us .
~tis high time that one of my articles be
devoted to this theme . 11 8
If there were problems with the coverage of the front, there
were problems of home coverage as well.

Goebbels had much difficulty

with the maintanance of competent staffs at each of the papers and
radio stations .

The war was taking a terrible toll on the home front

and the morale of the people was reflected in the kind of coverage
the reporters and editors were abl e to general .
Goebbels dealt with editors in a very formal and sometimes
belittling manner.

He did not really have to contend with the

regulations he imposed and therefore lacked the insight into the
problems editors had when faced with a seemingly unending flow of bad
news or no news at all.
8
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In November of 1943 Goebbels wrote:
"OUr German Press is,. generally speaki.ng, not in top
form. Our editors have somewhat lost cou~age or
have gone stale writing about the problems of the
war so much in recent years. Perhaps some editors
ought to be recalled from the front and others sent
out in their place. In other words, a change of
personnel should be brought about to inject fresh
blood into German Journalism." 9

What was "German Journalism"?

What kind of men did it attract?

To be a German journalist was to receive information from the
government on how to handle information received from the government.
Major news events were screened as a matter of course.

If any

semblance of objectivity existed in the Weimar government it was lost
when Hitler came to power.

It had to have been exceedingly

disheartening for journalists to see their work reworked to meet the
arbitrary specifications of the Propaganda Ministry, year after year,
and be powerless to do anything about it.
As a result, those who could, left the field.

Rudolph Senrrnler

reflected on the matter in March of 1941, after a conversation with
Goebbels,
He is interested in .•• what types of journalist
Germany should be provided with in the future.
I mentioned ... I had noticed a .considerable
movement of men out of journalism into political
and administrative posts. He personally would
find it intolerable and for any person with
intellectural powers undignified, to attend daily
the official press conference to have the ten
Commandments, all beginning, 'thou shalt not',
handed out by Hans Fritzsche.nlO
9 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.500.
lO Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse,
London) 1947, p.22.
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Goebbels apparently was not insensitive to the needs of the true
journalistic ethos and, it seems, hoped for a change in the future,
perhaps after the war.

Semmler continues,

" •.• Goebbels went on to say that the work of the
daily journalist had become quite unsatisfyi_ng.
He had to find his way through a mass of
instructions, bans, and political considerations
and the results were boring, flat phrases. Real
journalistic talent could not be stimulated by
the daily journalist's round. Through the search
for the sensation of the hour, men's views of the
broad shape of events and the ultimate objective
were distorted. The great art of journalism was
to point to the objective and make clear the way
to it. ull
It is here that the remorse felt about the field of journalism
is evident.

He did not fail to see that the course the field was

taking was debilitating to the effective passage of information to
the public.

Two years saw no real improvement in the lot of the

daily journalist.

Personal changes, for reasons mentioned in

Goebbels' November 1943 Diary entry, had to have taken their toll in
the continuity of first level management of the press and radio.
The editors were not able to effectively justify all the
restrictions to the staff they had to immediately preside over and
found themselves in a quandry.

Some just continued, disgruntled

and ineffective, while others were vocal as Goebbels states in
April of 1943 ; ·

11 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next ~o Hitler, (Westhouse,
London) 1947, p.22.
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"The chief editor of the Deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung , Silex, has written a report on the way
the press conference is run. While the tone of
this memorandum is very impudent, he hit the nail
right on the head. Any decent journalist with any
feeling of honor in his bones simply cannot stand
for the way he is handled by the press department
of the Reich Government. Journalists are sat on
as though they were still in grade school. Naturally
this will have very serious consequences for the
future of j ournalism. Any man who has a residue of
honor will be very careful not to become a
journalist. 111 2
I f any remorse is evident , it was not made manifest in any
policy to contravene the serious consequences Goebbels foresa w.

No

real effort was made to upgrade the caliber of news because news was
a government function and the government was not in a position to let
the host of journali sts run free with information that might damage
the government's position .

This was increasingly true as the war

worsened.
As mentioned in previous chapters , Goebbels, f or reasons of
wanting to fill his own time and to assert his opinion or counteract
negative propaganda, wrote extensive articles.

He could not, it

seems , demand publication in all papers.
H~s topics were concerned with both internal and international
themes.

The tone of his articles were often exceedingly biting and

sarcastic and he became renowned for those qualities .

He also had

staff writers in the Ministry who would write on assigned topics to

12 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P ., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc . , Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p . 327.

counteract adverse Allied publications.

When his or his staff's work

wasn't used at a time he felt it should have been, Goebbels became
enraged
"I am havi.ng some trouble with the press because it
doesn't take my s.uggestions as I should like •.•
Why, the press should howl for joy at be¢ng given
such excellent material for commentary.· •• I therefore
consider it my duty to keep exhorting and goading
them on. If you don't constantly build a fire under
the people responsible for informing the public, and
if you don't constantly push them on, they gradually
become dull and t±red. nl3
·
Commentary in the radio sector was even more frustrating for
Goebbels.

Most commentary had two purposes; either to address the

domestic audience or to address the enemy,

The techniques used were

satisfactory to Goebbels at first but a year into the war it became
apparent that little imagination was bei.ng used in the style and
delivery of the commentary or "talks" aimed at the foreign
populations in Europe.

These talks appeared in the regular newscasts

and during entertainment shows.

Goebbels saw that response to the

talks was marginal and compared the Nazi efforts to the allied efforts
in his conference of April 11, 1940
"At a time when the enemy is flooding the world with
rumors, it is pointless for the press and radio to
to in for commentaries and talks. What matters is
news. If due to a lack of communications we have no
news of our own then such news must be written up from
reports from other countries - which is what Britain
and France are doing. nl4
13 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The·Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.91.
14 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.31.
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The use of for~ign news sources, even enemy sources, was to

become more and more of a factor in the role of the journalist in
later years as will be shown.

The commentaries and talks became less

and less effective and by 1943 were almost without impact according
to the Prop.aganda Ministry.

Goebbels was sure that the British and

American news efforts were far superior to the German system because
of the volume and accuragy of the reports.

He felt that at a time

when the Axis powers were in serious trouble, the people had to start
listening to what they said and not their enemies.

He wrote in his

Diary in May of 1943,
I discussed with Fritzsche and Winkelnkemper the
question of commentaries in the foreign broadcasts
of the .German radio. These talks are, if possible,
to be eliminated altogether. I shall, however,
permit very brief comments. In the main our
broadcasts are to consist exclusively of-news. It
is much more difficult to invent argument-provolking
news whose bias is not noticeable; it takes more
brains to do this then to read tedious commentary.
By forbidding talks I shall compel! the collaborators
in our foreign radio service to increase our stock

of news. 1115

It is reasonable to assume that by the time the war started
Goebbels had a hearty respect, personally, for the allied news and
propaganda resources.

As mentioned in the introduction, Hitler had

lauded the Allied efforts in thse areas in World War One
implementation.

Foreign public opinion was more difficult to affect

15 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.390.
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than domestic opinion,

For this.reason Hitler directed.Goebbels to

insure that the German foreign·language·papers abroad.be examined
carefully at the end of 1939",

At.the·December-9, 1939 meeting of the

Proi;,aganda Ministry staff Goebbels issued the followi_ng directives:
"The Minister reports the Fuehrer•s attitude to the
treatment of the foreign press. The followi.ng have
to be applied in the following order of importance:
a) safeguarding our strength at home bl safeguardi_ng
the strength of the Reich abroad. For this reason
there must be a ban on all German-language papers
which might undermine the countries strength at home." 16
If the Reich Government was wary about what the German press was
saying about Germany, it was more worried about what the foreign press
was saying about Germany.

Foreign correspondents in the Re±ch were

subjected to surveillance on an intensive scale and their personal
lives, friends, and behavior were carefully scrutinized.

By the

first quarter of 1940 plans were formulated to expell certain foreign
journalists who were reporting in a manner deemed harmful to the
interests of the German government and people.

such operations were,

if possible, to have no ill effects on the Propaganda Ministry and
on March 14th the following directives were given by Goebbels:
"The Minister gives his approval to the tactics
proposed by Herr Bomer whereby unwelcome foreign
journalists are to be pushed across the frontier
by police as undesirable aliens; in this way the
Foreign Press Department can be kept out of such
affairs as much as possible. •• 17

1 6 Boelcke, Willi A, 1 'The.Secret Conferences of·Dr; Goebbels,
(E,P. Dutton & Co,, Inc., New· Yorkl 1970 1 p.9.
17 Ibid,, p,23,·
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By 1942 Goering's Lu~twaffe had begun to lose e~fectiveness over
Western and Central Europe due to the unreasonable commitments in
Russia .

Germany had begun to feel the bite of air raids in the way

Britain had done in the earlier part of the war.

The Allies had much

greater accuracy in the reporting of bomb totals and the measure of
destruction wrought in Germany while the Germans had great difficulty
in assessing the damage they had done in Britain.

For this reason

the following policy was adopted by Goebbels and stated in his Diary
on May 2 , 1942 :
" I have ordered official censorship to be exc:.@!cised
on foreign correspondents reports on the air s tuation .
The English are naturally making frantic efforts to
obtain information about the results of their air
raids. We cannot be expected to support their
efforts . nl8
The rai ds continued throughout the duration of the war and by
1943 Goebbels was still unabl e to stop the f l ow of bomb result
information from reaching the Allies , only this time the problem was
reporting from the domestic , state controlled press .

On March 13 he

gave the following directive, found also in his Diary:
"I gave instructions for greater restraint in reporti ng
air rai ds . We reveal too much and thereby encourage the
English to continue their attacks from t he air. The
English are very reserved about their own air warfare .
We have to date not been able to make a halfway accurate
estimate of the effect of our raids on England, whereas
the English know almost everything about the results
of their 1 s on Germany . 11 19

18
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The foreign journalists that remained in Germany were interned
shortly before 1942.

They were kept in a ramshackle hotel under guard

and permitted to venture out only occasionally with an armed escort.
Their food was plain and scanty and the atmosphere was one of
imprisonment rather than the way th~ Americans handled the situation
at home.

Fore.ign journalists in the U.S. were inte,med in a resort

and played golf and ate well.

Their biggest complaint was not being

able to obtain more than two or three periodicals per day.

In May

of 1942 the Allies and the Axis powers agreed to return their
respective journalists to their homes.

The transfer was made and

Goebbels wrote this rather amusing account of the operation and world
coverage of it:
" ... the American diplomats and journalists returning
from Germany have also issued statements that make
exactly claims about the Axis countries that our
diplomats make about America. On the whole, therefore,
there isn't much to be expected of these interviews
from both sides. I was especially on the lookout
that all sentimental remarks be taken out of the
interviews given by our representatives. It wouldn't
make much of an impression on the German people,
for instance, to have our spokesmen deplore the fact
that they were allowed only one newspaper per day
duri.ng their internment. You have to report something
:~r: ;:~!~~sw~a~a~a:0

!: :~~~g~ot:::: ;:a!:P~:s:!~~ .. 20

It is ironic that Goebbels had to manuver his returning heroes
in such a manner that their remarks had to be withheld from the

20 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.219.
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German people for their own protection, .Even more amusing was.the
;r-eaction Goebbels has to the:.i;eleases of those who. had ·just returned
from internment in Germany, .
''The ·American journalists·:who were transported from
Germany and Italy to Lisbon have issued the·funniest
reports about internal.conditions in the Axis
countries, They are completely harmless for the
simple reason that of oourse all promptly disagree
with each other."21
Goebbels' conception of the style with which English and
American journalism was presented was a curious mixture of respect
and patronization.

While he lamented the lack of hard news in German

reporting as shown before, he assumed a very pompous and righteous
position concerning the Allied use of details and color in their
reports.

It is apparent that while he lamented the lack of vitality

and objectivity in German reporting and envied it in the Allied news
cove~age, he took every oppottunity to demean the Allies in his own
eyes and in the eyes of his staff.

In April of 1942 he wrote,

"I sent a couple of robust journalists into occupied
France with an assignment to give proper journalistic
treatment to undertaki.ngs similar to that of Boulogne.
our reporters hitherto have been too dry and therefore
could not compete with the flowery reports of Reuters.
To impress the English you must represent events like
that more like a sports event. You must not limit
yourself to a mere rehersal of acts but must
compliment the data by details to which the English
and especially the Americans are known to be very
susceptible. n 22
21 Goebbels, Dr, Joseph P,, The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Coll\Pany, Inc,, Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948 1 p,222,.
22 Ibid., p.186,
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An interesting reflection on the manner in which the Allies and
Germany handled the reporting of the Teheran conference in December of
1943 is provided by the Doktor.

The Teheran conference was the first

meeting of Roosevelt , Churchill and Stalin .

There the three leaders

agreed to jointly defeat, disarm and control Germany and also discussed
a world organization possible after the conclusion of the war.
Press coverage in the Allied countries was spectacular and the
conference was said to signal the end of the Axis powers.

Goebbels

was , at this time , starting to become a bit worried about the
possibility of defeat.

It was also at this time that the concept of

total war was being falteringly implemented in Germany.

Goebbels '

reaction to the press coverage, of the conference appears in his
Diary ,

e

"The enemy press naturally accompanies t he conference
of Teheran and the communique with the obligatory
anthems of jubilation . . . When Reuter declares that
the communique is tantamount to a military death
sentence for the Axis, the obvious reply is that
military verdicts of death are written not in the
conferences but on the field of battle . .. The German
press and radio go after the Teheran conference in
a big way. Our reply is biting and insolent; we
empty buckets of irony and derision over the
conference . Our sarcasm is superior and I must say
German propaganda has reached the very heights of
what can be achieved in publicity. 11 23

It was at this period of the war that the acquisition of real
news was

not only sparse at home, it was nearly impossible to get in

the various theatres of combat. Policy was established as early as
23
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1939 dealing with the use of foreign news services as sources of home
news.

In July of that year the members of the propaganda staff

decided not to jam British signals and radio pr.ograrns as sometimes
they were the only source of news available to the Ministry. 24
By the end of 1944 the situation in Germany was generally
deteriorating and the ability to conduct an effective news gathering
operation was completely gone.

The German papers were publishing

drivel which was proclaimed by Goebbels himself to be such.

Semmler

recalls in his diary, entry of September 29, 1944:
"Nowadays our newspapers are fed on the news mat.era.al
which the British and American press and wireless
provide. We have to be content with accounts of what
is happening on the enemy side because the German
government is no longer able to provide facts which
speak for themselves. Nothing impressive ever
happens· on our side, that is why the editors fill
their pages with stupid diatribes of a kind which
the reading public long ago grew tired of
Surprisingly enough, Goebbels agrees with tais point
of view but can see no remedy yet."25
What news that came in was very dismal indeed in 1944.

The

German position was one of extreme weakness and there was no real
concealment of the fact from the people of either side.

Policy had

been formulated as early as 1940 to insure that proper handling
of difficult or harmful news was planned for and carried out.

This

policy was one of denial, ld!es and later, "poetic truth".

24
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The policy of denial was instituted in May of 1940 by Goebbels
in conference with the Propaganda Ministry staff.

The German press

and radio had previously been given instructions to the effect that
there must be absolutely no discussion of German war aims .

This is

probably because there has never really been articulated a German war
aim .

It was mostely a muddled appearl for more land and the

supremacy of the aryan stock.

Without such discussion the Allied

press and radio could only speculate on the aims o f the Nazis, and
German retorts could state as much.

The German press all egedl y acted

accordingly to the policy of denial which ran thus:
"The Minister formulates the principle for the
immediate future that in enemy reports that are
not correct or even anything that coul d be dangerous
to us must be immediately denied . There is no need
at all to examine whether a report is factually
correct or not - the decisive point is merely
whether the enemy ' s assertions could in any way be
damaging to us. For this reason care must be taken
for denials to be issued promptly. In drafting
such denials the wording ' does not correspond to
the facts ' will probably prove too weak in a tense
period; it will be nedessary to make ' sweeping ' or
' wholesale ' denials or whenever enemy assertions
touch upon our honor , to retort in the sharpest
terms . 11 26
This "principl e " was utilized throughout the r est of the war
rather and just immediately after it ' s proclaimation .

As the war

situation worsened and the truth became more than simple denials
could cope with from a polemic point of view, a policy of outright

26 Boelcke , Willi A., The Se cret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels ,
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., Inc ., New York) 1970 , p .40.
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lying was instituted based on certain formulations created in
directives of April 1940.

The policy is first articulated here and

elaborated upon later in a most interesting manner.

The first part

however is ve~ specific on just who may direct lies to be published
or broadcast.

This was called the Directive for the Drafting of

Tendentious and Disruptive Information and was dated July 1942.
Some of the elements a£ this formal directive appear in the verbal
directives of April 1940 as found in the minutes of the conferences,
"From the lies launched by the Allies during the past
few days the Minister draws the conclusion that, a)
lies must be used only as a defensive measure and not
for making a false show of successes; b) no official
apparatus, news agency etc., must ever be used for the
launching of lies; the source of the latter must as a
matter of principle, be camouflaged at once; c) radio
and press in Germany must never be saddled with such
lies at all; these must only go through channels
ab:voad. " 27
·
The final directive is almost ludicrous in its scope and aim.
It is not the directive of a man who is in control of his Ministry,
the field of journalism or even propaganda for it is given in
November of 1944, a few months before the end of the war.

Semmler,

who at this time was about to take his leave of the Ministry and
join a fighting outfit for the final defence of Berlin, wrote this
cryptic and contemptous recollection of Goebbels' new policy on
lying:

27 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.32.
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"Goebbels has introduced a new expression into the
vocabulary of propaganda, It is for internal use
only! He is now using the phrase 'poetic truth'
in contrast to-or rather in amplification of- the
•concrete truth'. Whenever we know only a little
about some event or plan or operation of enemy
then - so Goebbels says - we shall not be violating
the truth if we add something to the story to fill
in the gaps. We should describe things as they
might have happened or as they probably did happen.
To put it in Goebbels own words, •we are only
helping the public when we call imagination to our
aid in certain cases when the record of the facts
is for some reason incomplete!'

Many events in

international politics, he said, could not be
understood unless we embroidered them a little with
the 'poetic truth' and so made them understandable
to the German people. n 28
It must have been an extraordinary experience to have been a member
of Goebbels' staff and to have sat in the room and watched the faces
of those present while the little Doktor expounded the values and
utilities of his new concept of 'poetic truth'.

At that juncture,

in that room, the fields of propaganda and journalism were, indeed,
indisoluable and indivisible as fields of human activity.

Goebbels'

synthesis of the two had taken twelve years and most of a continent
but in the last months of the war, the kind of atmosphere that
prevailed in the German government must have been conducive to the
ready acceptance of such ideas as the 'poetic truth'.
It is at that juncture that the mind of the propagandist and the
administrator of national journalism must be examined as a composite

28
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thing.

we have looked at the journalist in Doktor Joseph Goebbels.

Now let us look at the propagandist.
If there was any remorse concerning the inability to perform
truthfully in the journalistic sense, Goebbels insured that it did
not insinuate itself into the realm of propaganda.
attempt to objectify it's aims and means.

He scorned any

He was completely and

unreservedly opposed to the notion that propaganda must express
certain qualities of dignity, honor or national integrity.

It was a

dirty business and he was a genius at it.
His was the discipline of asserting the position of a party that
actually had no other aim but the acquisition of power.

The Nazis

never really formulated any aims, as mentioned before, and pursued
their objectives thro.ugh the media in vague and circumlocuitous forms.
They considered their direction in the short term, for the most part,
and became adept at meeting immediate situations through their
propaganda machine.

They were reactionary in their approach and

embraced, basically, the axiom that the end justifies the means.
Manvell and Fraenkel state in their biography,
" •.. certain prin~iples underlie Goebbels presentation
of the Nazi case in their relentless pursuit of power.
Goebbels says significantly that it is always necessary
to be, 'strict in prin~iple' but, 'elastic in application'.
'tactics•, he explains elsewhere, 'are more a matter of
intelligence and instinct than of character. One
sometimes has to go a roundabout way to attain a great
goal ... Most people', he goes on, 'do not understand the
difference between strategy and tactics.' What he seems
to mean by this is that you must as a tactician use any
means you can devise to gain your ultimate objective as
a strategist." 112 9
·
29 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Henrich, Dr. Goebbels; 'His·Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.107.

6l
Goebbels embraced the propaganda philosophy of Adolf Hitler to
the letter.

He owned , as did Hitler, that the best medium for

propaganda was the spoken word and pursued the development of a corps
of speakers through rigorous training a nd the establishment o f high
standards of technical proficiency .

Goebbels had a personal stake in

this concept because of his own talents.

Again, to quote Manvell and

Fraenkel ,
"Goebbels s till realized that speaking , not writing ,
was the ess e nce of effective propaganda. Hitler had
said so in Mein Kampf , as we have seen, and it was
indeed fortunate for Goebbe l s that hi s personal
ambitions were equally devided between recognition
as a great orator and a great writer . The Nazis
were never t o succeed with the printed word to the
extent that they succeeded with the spoken word ,
whe:i:e the situation was totally different . .. 1130
It naturally f o llowed that the extend the r ange of the voice was
t o eM!tend the r ange of e ffective propaganda .

Loudspeakers were a

popular means to that end but were cumbersome and didn ' t recreate
the subtleties of the human voice to the extent necessary to establish
the nuances needed .
The instrument that would be the deciding factor in the
p r omulgation of the Nazi message was the radio.

Upon his assumption

of Ministerial status, Goebbel s made the following statement to hi s
staff,

30
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"As an instrument for prop_aganda on a la,rge. scale the
efficacy of·radio has not.yet been sufficiently
appreciated, In, any-· case, :·our adversaries have. not
recognized its:value. All'.the·.better; we shall have
to ·explore its.possibilities'. •• 31
Indeed the radio wa:s explored.and exploited to its.;f;ullest
extent and on a scale that has.been.utilized as a model for the
popular dissemination of propaganda in.many studies of the field.
But the use of radio will be explored later in greater detail.
Goebbels' philosophy was not definitive in the context of
propaganda per se.
another thi_ng.
didn't, wasn't.

He did not call one thi_ng prop_aganda and exclude

That which worked was propaganda and that which
It i 9 best to allude to his own manner of description·,

"There is no theoretical way of determining what kind
of propaganda is more effective and what kind is less
effective. The prop_aganda which produces the desired,
results is good and all other propaganda is bad, no
matter how entertaining it may be, because it is not.
the task of propaganda to entertain but to produce
results •.• The,:efore it is beside the point to say
your propaganda is too crude, too mean, too brutal or
too unfair, for all this does not matter ... The moment
I have recognized some truth or other and begin to
speak in the streetcar, I am making propaganda. This
is the moment when I begin to reach for others, who,
like myself, have recognized the same truth. Thus
propaganda is nothing more than the predecessor of an
organization. Once there is an organization, it
becomes the predecessor of the state. Propaganda is
always a means to an end •.. You either are a propagandist
or you are not. Propaganda is an art which can be taught
to the average person, like playing the violin. But
then there comes a point when you say, 'This is where you
stop. What remains to be learned can only be achieved by
~ genius. '11 32
.... ) 1 .. Manville, Roger,and Fraenkel, He;inrich; ·or, ·Goebbels; ·H;is ·Life
·and ·oeath, · (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.100.
32 Ibid., p.80-1.
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It is not difficult to discern the hauteur in the statement
above .

Goebbels was not without great pride in his achievements.

As mentioned in the i ntroduction , his precepts were basicall y from
ideas e xpounded by Hitle r in Mein Kampf .

His effectiveness was in the

implementation of the precepts and the extraordinary skill in which he
judged the tide and substance of the people ' s convictions on any given
issue .

In doing this he abided by the idea that the mass was not

really able to digest anything very compl ex .

Goebbel s was an

exceptionally well educated man and a very well educat ed Nazi as Nazis
went .
It would seem that he had great trouble relating to his audience
with the development he had undergone .

Such was not the case , however .

The axioms he operated under were , as hi story indicates, very effective
for his time a nd in the soc i ety in which he operated.

They can be

found ably set out in Mein Kampf ,
"The art of propaganda consists precisely in being
able to awaken the imagination of the publ±c through
an appeal to their feelings , in finding the appropriate
psycholog ical form that will arrest the att ention and
appeal t o the hearts of the national masses . The
r eceptive powers of the masses are very restricted , and
their u nderstanding i s feebl e. On the other hand, they
quickly forget . All effecti ve propaganda mus t be
confined to a few bare essentials and must be expressed
as far as p ossible i n stereotyped formulas. These
slogans shoul d be persistantly repeated until the very
last individual has come to grasp the idea t hat has been
put forward . If this principle be forgott en and if an
attempt be made to be abstrac t, and general , the
p r opaganda will turn out to be ineffective; for the
publi c will not be able to digest or retain what is
offered to them in this way . Therefore , the greater
the scope of the message t hat has to be presented, the
more necessary it is for the propaganda to discover the

plan of action which is psychologically most
effective. u 33 ·
Hitler had an aversion to the academic classes and it seems
that, while the aversion did not ~ffect Goebbels, the Doktor did
_agree that propaganda was wasted on them.

He sought to transform the

common man, the man who could be easily led and moffided and who would
permit his children to be molded.
Germany and abroad,

This policy was followed in both

The political techniques of the mass meeting and

beer hall brawl 'would
have been lost on the learned anyway so the time
.
and energy were spent where they would produce the most desired
effects.

Goebbels told his Ministry staff in October of 1942,
" •.. National Socialist propaganda has always
addressed itself to the common people and has
never attempted to convert the intellectual.
The popular language of National Socialist
propaganda appealed to the man in the street
and brought him closer to the National Socialist
idea. It is thus a mistake to conduct propaganda
in such a way that it will stand up to the
critical examination of the intellectual. ,. 34

It has never been exactly proven just how Goebbels and Hitler
were able to maintain such an acute grasp of the way in which the
people would respond to a given stimuli, especially when such acuity
is in the realm of politics.

The unnerving ability of both men to

react with procedures in spur-of-the-moment circumstances, with little
planning, and be effective, has puzzled scholars for three decades.
33

Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p,69.
34 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of'Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.293.

65
Goebbels often spoke of the masses like children.
and inwardly contemptuous of their behavior.

He was outwardly

Yet he assumed the

role of a protector and guardian of their soul s and thoughts with a
passi on that did not falte r even at the end.
As menti oned in the brief biographical sketch preceeding this
chapter , Goebbels has an immense l ove and respect for his mother.
They would speak often on the telephone and he visited her regularly .
He permitted himself to trust her and he held her views to be highly
illustrative of the manner in which t he masses would r eact .

He

menti oned in his Di ary in January of 1942 that which illustrates this
fact ,
"In the evening I had a long talk with my mother who,
to me, represents the voi ce of the people . She knows
the sentime n ts of the peopl e better than most experts
who judge from the ivory tower of scientific inquiry ,
as in he r case the voi ce of the peopl e itself speaks .
Again I learned a lot ; especial ly that the rank and
file are usually more primitive than we imagine.
Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple
and repetitive. 1n the long run only he will achieve
basic results in influencing public opinion who is
able to reduce probl ems to the simplest terms and who
has the courage to keep forever repeati ng them in
this simplified form despite the objections of the
intellectuals . "3 5
As policy, the idea of concentra ting on the masses became quite
clearl y articul ated.

The radio wa s not to be used as a tool to try

and convince the intellectual leaders of foreign countries.

35
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as in Germany the Prop_aganda Ministry adhered to the . cqncevt-. t.ha,t. the
power lay in the masses and . the:, S!lPJ?Ort ·of . the common. peoi?le or the
fear of the common people was. the·.,aesired goal,

We shll,11 see the·

means in which fear was caused· later. in this chapter·.

The· policy was

set forth in the daily confierence in March of 1940,
"Herr Brauweiler is to see to it that the Cradi.oJ talks
presuppose less on the i?art of the listener, t.ha,t the·
main points are more clearly emphasized, and thll.t they·
address themselves more to the mass and class instincts.
In this form - i.e. not as talks fior the intellectuals,
as practiced by Britain - the talks may be continued."36
This directive was elaborated upon and clarified a week later in
the conference of March 26,
"We must always avoid the danger of the foreign language
service getting too intellectual. The broadcasts ·mus·t
unleash auger, and not just touch the intellect of the
few. n37

Another point in support of the above policy is that.it was far
easier to fool the less educated and less intellectually gifted.
we have seen the lie was not a tool that the Nazis abhorred.
was used cautiously in the field of journalism.
in the field of propaganda.

As

The lie

It was used flagrantly

Truth was to be used only when the truth

served the needs ·of the state.

Otherwise the state suffered in the

use of truth in a manner that was non-supportive of its aims, no
matter how nebulous they may be.

If the propagandist presented truth

36 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Gcebbels,
[E.P, Dutton & Co,, Inc., New 1opkl 1970, p.24,
37 Ibid., p.24.

6f7

in a way that depicted justice of any kind in the enemy camp, the
justice of the propagandist's side·may well be held to account and
that was counter-productive as propaganda goes.
,Goebbels .again took his cue from Hitler in the o.ngoing
implementation of that concept.

In his chapter on war propaganda

Hitler states,
"The function of propaganda is, for example, not to
we.igh and ponder the rights of different people, but
exclusively to emphasize the one right which it has
set out to argue for. Its task is not to make an
objective study of the truth insofar as it favors
the enemy, and then to set it before the masses with
academic fairness; its task is to serve our own
right, always and unflinchingly.n38
This the Nazis did.

The propaganda campaigns waged internally

and abroad, before and after the Nazis came to power and for and
against what they believed or disbelieved were harsh and uncompromising.
Often they had no particular solution to the problems they were
inciting the masses about.

More often than not, they were simply

g~ad that the problems existed so that their propaganda could be
focused on something that would either hurt their opponents or help
them through publicity.
Goebbels took Hitler's precept and extended it in conference in
August of 1942,

3B. ·Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston)
Translated by Ralph Manheiiµ, 1971, p.182.
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"We do not want to make an objective judgement when
our existence is at stake or when questions of
national life are in the.blanace; then we are all
party, all prejudice, all blind and stubborn bras.
Let no one object that this is not Gennan. Maybe
the opposite is Gennan - but if so, it is a bad
and dangerous side of our character, and one which
we must fight." 39
In 1943 the situation for the Gennan military forces was such
that the public Goebbels had to control through his Ministry no
longer seemed to accept what he and his staff were telling them.

The

bias and the prejudice no longer effectively masked the facts of
defeat.

The problem of foreign radio attracting large numbers of

German listeners for real facts was an impediment that Goebbels never
overcame.

As we shall see later, the people, by the end of the war,

almost completely discounted anything the Nazi government put out as
official news.

Goebbels was very aware of this and indicated his

worsening position to Hitler,
"I developed my ideas concerning the nature of
propaganda to the Fuehrer. I believe that when
a propaganda ministry is created, all matters
affecting propaganda, news and culture within
the Reich and within the occupied areas must be
subordinated to it •.. I emphasized that I insist
upon totalitariansim in carrying out the
propaganda and news policies of the Reich. He
agreed with me absolutely and unreaservedly." 40
Goebbels was also referring to the growing conflicts with other
elements of the government on the subject of propaganda control.

39 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.273.
40 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.476.
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Ideally he would have desired that the Reich and the occupied areas
be encapulized somehow and be completely shut off from the influences
of undersirable foreign news and prop.aganda systems.

The people, he

asserted, could be conditioned in time to respond. to almost anything
the government felt warranted.
Early in his career he had espoused a kinship with the Soviet
ideology which was quelled by the influence of Hitler and his policies.
Although Goebbels later denounced the Soviet political system, he felt
some grudging ~espect for the ability of the Russian government to cut
off their populations from undesirable foreign or non-Soviet news and
propaganda.

In an article on the subject he lauds the domestic

propaganda of the U.S.S.R. but, as will be shown shortly, he was
contemptuous of their foreign directed techniques.

He states,

"It is a matter of taste to admire the accomplishment
of a propaganda which, by sealing them off hermetically
from the outside world and by reiterating its empty
phrases about salvation, universal happiness and so on,
has succeeded in bamboozling the peasants and workers
into believing that this state of affairs constitutes
paradise on earth. One can arrive at independant
judegment only by means of comparison. Here such.
possibilities are totally lacking. The peasant or
worker resembles a man who has been imprisoned in a dark
cellar; after many years of captivity he can easily be
convinced that a burning kerosine lamp is the sun ..• A
national intellegence which might fight against this
system no longer exists. The system itself possesses
every means to smother such intelligence - from its
inception. 1141

4l Rli!ess, CUrt, Joseph Goebbels, (Ballantine Books, New York,
New York) 1948, p.93.

1:0

Goebbels 1 conception of. the prop_aganda motives of other nations
was relatively uninformed.

He held a number of mistaken ideas about

the nature of British and American governments and the nature of the
relationship of their_ governments to the populations.

For years he

refused to believe, like Hitler and other top Nazis, that the
American production capacity was as effrucient as reported in the world
press.

Both he and Hitler never understood why the British continued

to hold out against the air onslaught and the continued German public
position that Germany never wanted war with England and always desired
to make peace.
If Goebbels' conception of the British and American governments
was wro_ng, it follows that his propaganda directed toward these
countries was based on a sound foundation and was clearly misdirected.
As such, it was ineffective.
His misconceptions were articulated in that daily conference as
a basis for the handling of propaganda directed toward foreign
countries,

"After all, the speeches of enemy statesmen are made
not to conduct any factual argument but merely to
make propaganda for their policies." 42
Goebbels' disbelief concerning the American production capacity
was not as harmful as the errors he found concerning German war

42 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.277.
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production .

Many times he was informed that some new weapon was in

the offing and he would publicize it only to find later that he had
been completely misinformed.

It was very difficult to recover from

such blunders , which were not entirel y his fault .

At the end of 1942

he wrote in his Diary ,
"Donald Nel son has issued a report on American
production. It exceeds a ll previous American
exaggerations . We simpl y must do somethi ng t o
offset this American munitions propaganda .
Unfortunately our own propaganda about armament
production has had a serious setback because of
the unfortunate news item about two German weapons
that hadn ' t been put into actual use. At present
all who had anything to do with this press release
have cold feet and don ' t want to venture on this
decidely s lippery pavement again . I shall do
everything , however , to get new impetus t o our
munitions propaganda, for after a ll we must not
let the Americans ride roughshod over us merely
because of propaganda dogmatisms. 1143
That Goebbels failure to realize that German politics under the
Nazis were not analogous to the politics of the U. S. and Britain was
harmful in that he coul d not operate in a society where the government
answered to the people for it ' s actions or even that i n those
societies such a fact was an essential part of the national
consciousness .

The manner in which information was transmitted to the

people was based on a kind of mutual trust and respect that was
totally absent in the German at that period in German history .

His

government operated on t he basis of constant suppression and watchful ness over the p eople under its influence, both at home and in the

43 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P . Lochner , 1948, p . 251.
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occupied territories.

It is easy to understand why he was puzzled

by the lack of fear and animosity.in the British system as illustrated
in this Diary entry,
"Appearently the English people don't make their
government responsible tomonrow for what it said
today. It is extremely easy to lead the English
people. The German people are much more sensitive
about these matters. Even today utterances of
leading men of the Reich dati_ng back to September
and October of 1939 are thrown up at us if things
have not come off as prophesied."44
What he failed to understand was that most of the prophecy made
to the German people was emotive, illusive and radical.
on the whims of a few men who had no'real aims save war.·

It was based
He-could not

grasp that the statements made by British statesmen were based for the
most part on sound.fact and the facts had proven themselves, not the
statesmen.

r

He missed the point that the British were easy to lead

because they led themselves.
If Goebbels failed to understand his enemies, he at least had
some respect for them, especially the English.

Unlike Hitler, who

had called the British people a nation of shopkeepers, Goebbels
understood that he was dealing with a state as old as Germany herself
and that the English state had become organized much earlier than
Germany.

He dealt with the British people in a much different manner

than even his own people.

In evaluati_ng German propaganda directed at

Britian he made the following observation in a morning conference in
1941,

44 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New Y6tk) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.65.
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"One of the biggest mistakes of the German radio is
its tendancy to ridicule the British reports as a
matter of principle , instead of dealing with them
seriously . The British public is entirel y acce~ble
to reasoned arguments but these must be put forward
calmly and factually. German propaganda misses its
purpose a nd becomes downright counter- p r oductive if
it claims that all British radio reports are
invariably lies . 1145
Goebbels was to re- affirm this attitude with definite policy
almost a year later.

In reflecti ons on the developments in propaganda

over the years he had been involved in it as a fiel d he returned to
the theme that the British public was no longer accesabl e through long
and val edictory editorials and commentary .

They had to be reached

factual ly,

m

"The English pay more attention to news than to
argument . I conclude from this that al l our
foreign broadcasting , but especially those beamed
at England , must be changed fundamental l y . Times
are no l onger suited to l ong d i scussi ons . Just
as during the fight of the National Soci alist
movement against the Republ ic there was a stage
when the handbi ll was no longer effecti ve because
it was outmoded , so there is a stage now when
argumentation is no longer effective. I slant our
foreign- language broadcasting services chiefly in the
direction of news but see to it that the proper
tendancies are mixed with the news items . 11 46

The above was a Diary entry made in t he mi ddl e of 1942 .
concept came too late.

The

I t was prompted by the decl ine of public

interest in German propaganda and the ineffective methods utilized .

45
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The problem seemed to be insufficient effort and thought on the part
of the Ministry staff responsible for the formu lation of public
information.

Near the end of the year, Goebbels commanded his staff

in conference ,
"The Minister makes more fundamental observations about
the inadequacies of German propaganda methods. On the
basis of a number of reports submitted to him, he
remarks that the publ ic at home , but also abroad, no
longer accepts German propaganda for the reason that
it's expressions and style have become so worn and
shabby that they produce a sense of distrust in the
listener or reader . The Minister issues a mandi tory
instruct ion to all propaganda bodies . . . to move away
from thi s method of cliche- r i dden and unthinking
repition of propaganda terms and to make an effort
from now on the prevent any further decline of public
interest in information, announcements , articles
lectures , etc. 47
11

It was not enough .

The bottom had fallen out of the war effort

and there was no news at all , let alone good news, for which t he
Mini stry s t aff coul d make use .

By the middle of the next year the

Germans were getting their news from the enemy and the home population
no longer regarded their own gove r nment a viable source of information .
The enemy populations had long since given any credi bility to the
German broadcast services or print media .

Goebbels was aware of this

and sorely lamented stories that were appearing in the Times of
London and other Allied media,

In April of 1943 he wrote in his

Diaries,

47 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels ,
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"The Times has.suddently discovered that our.)?osition

is exceedingly weak and,our,proJ?.aganda•e<;(Uc1lly.so,
As a matter.of fact.in.tecent.weeks we have limited
ourselves too much.to a.defensive proJ?.aganda, This
must be changed at once.: I have given suitable orders
to the pres·s and radio ,',;4 8
·
If those orders were carried·out, they were done so in a
completely ineffective manner.

Having admitted that the situation

was hopeless in the western sector of the war, Goebbels turned· to the
Russian front which was in worse shape militarily.

The Russians were

beginning their advance and Hitler had begun to announce the first of
many "strategic re-alignments of the front".

Total war had not

produced much in the way of results under the direction of those whom
Hitler had chosen over Goebbels.
At the end of 1943 Goebbels, without real support from the
government tried to put the Ministry in order for_the eastern
campaign.

He wrote in his Diary,
"I have at last reorganized my prop.aganda machinery in
the occupied areas on the east. Unfortunately the
decision in this matter came to late, almost too late.
But I try to save what I can,n49

There wasn't much left to save.

The German policies in the east

had been brutal and the pppulations who had lived under German rule
were completely hostile as a result of the atrocities committed
there.

Goebbels faced a public that was totally unresponsive to the

48 Goebbels, Dr, Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Comp£lI1Yr Inc., Garden City, New ):'orkl Edited and Translated by Louis
P, ·Locohner, 1948 1 p,339,
49 Ibid., p.508.
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faltering efforts of the propaganda machine .

The Russians were

advancing and the taste of a possible victory over what once seemed
like an invimcible military onslaught was starting to permeate the
area.
This part of the chapter has concerned itself with the philosophy
of Doktor Goebbels.

While he failed as a result of many misconceptions

about the opponents he faced , his success can best be illustrated by a
description of some of the actual operations of the Propaganda
Ministry.
Thus far the picture of Goebbels' philosophical positions on the
fields of journalism and propaganda has been a gloomy one in that
most of his recorded observations on the subject were made in times
of crisis and imminent defeat .

The record of his application of the

philosophy is less so .
This chapter concentrates mainly on radio propaganda as the most
advanced form of the pursuit.

Audio media was considered the most

potent form of mass manipulation.

As stated before in numerous

references,the Nazis believed more in the spoken word than in all
other media.

The German technological capacity in the audio field

was and remains very well developed .
Programming technique was based upon the

function of furthering

the aims of the government and all other emphasis was subordinated to
that priority .

There are numerous references which describe the

attitudes of those concerned with radio on what kind of music should
be played and when.

The approaches taken were so taken with the

effect the music would have on the listening public at any given time

7Z

in the source of the war.

Public opinion played a great role in the

formation of music programming and continuity.

Taste played a minor

role.
The atmosphere in the music department was decidedly conservative.
New forms of music were originati.ng thro_ughout the world and the
German people clammored to hear some of the innovations.

German

music, for the most part, was folkish and martial sounding.
jazz was performed at the nightclubs while they were open.

Some
There was

of course the full compliment of classical music that could be heard
in concerts.

The Nazi radio service provided some classical listening

but on a generally limited scale as the mass appeal was not that
great.

Goebbels, according to his records, never seemed to establish

what he wanted in the way of music with any great consistancy.

He

chose to drift with the mood of the times.
He was appearently not one for modern music and even disliked
jazz.

In his conference on January 29, 1940 he instructed his staff,
"The radio should not allow itself it be used for
experiments in the musical field; it is no£ a trailblazer of new art. New music must be tried out at
the Philharmonic or at the Bach Hall, but not over
the radio. Care should be taken to insure that the
standards of the Request Concert are not lowered.
The marun purpose of the R~questCConcert should be
to give the people very fine music. They are not
to be turned into a family affair, and all talk
during the Request Concerts should be cut down." 50

SO Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York} 1970, p.17.
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As can.be seen from the.above the German people did have some
input into the radio programming of .music but subject to the tastes of
the radio chiefs and·Doktor Goebbels.

He was not always pleased with

the people he put in charge of the musical selection.

As in the case

of propaganda, he rejected the ivory-tower manner of the experts whom
he had to rely upon in these matters.

By the middle of the war he had

replaced several of them and never really got a foothold into the
means of consistant music programming.
He was to eventually select the music himself and made some
programming changes in 1941.

At that time were three main programs.

The first was the Reich Program which was broadcast from five a.m.
until two' a.m ..

This contained the news and commentary along with

feature coverage and interspersed with music.

The second was the

light entertainment pr.ogram which was broadcast from eight fifteen
p.m. to ten p.m., each night from the Luxemburg and Alpen transmitters.
Thirdly there was a serious music program which was carried duri.ng the
evening hours over the Deutschlandersender transmission facilities.
It consisted of orchestral, operatic and chamber music.

Boelke, who

translated the conferences, tells .his readers that programming was
envisioned that would further define the facets or elements of
overall transmissions.

He describes the three shows as bei.ng the

Beethoven, Johann Strauss and the Goethe programs.

The first two

were appearently adopted but Goebbels never really accepted the idea
of the Goethe program as a'total spoken word format and cancelled
it's implementation.
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The decision to change the radio programming was in response to
the military forces who called for more light entertainment .

The

change was met with some resistance and Goebbels decided that letters
to that effect would be turned back with an expl anation that light
programming was needed and the decision was final.
The change was carried too far and in 1942 he wrote in his
Diary,
"Unfortunately our own radio, by its seemingly
sentimental programs , contributes to the
depressed state of our morale . I shal l have to
take a hand. It won 't do for sadness to be placed
on the program in this the saddest of al l months. 1151
The overall picture of the German radio program was described by
Manvell and Freankel as consisting ,
" ... of little but long stretches of music , (mostly of
high quality) punctuated with news bulletins, talks,
interviews, eyewitness reports and outside broadcasts
connected with the war. 52
11

We have already seen that Goebbels himself was an able broadcaster
who out-performed Hitler himself.
Friday night with commentary.
wi:itten.

Goebbels appeared on the radio every

They were completely rehearsed and pre-

Manvell and Freankel continue to say ,
"Goebbels spoke in a relaxed, easy manner of the trained
professional , his beautiful voice pronouncing with
assurance every word and phrase of his carefully composed
script . Fritzsche attracted attention by developing an

51 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company , Inc., Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner , 1948, p.520 .
52

Manville , Roger , and Fraenkel, Heinric h, Dr . Goebbels, His Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.180.
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ironic styl e with the heavy, underlined humore
appreciated by th~ great lower-middle class
public for which his star broadcasts were
intended . His prime function was to jab the
unheard enemy news, views and statements of
the allied leaders. 11 53
Hans Fritzsche was one of Goebbels ' chief aides at the Ministry
for many years and will be discussed in more depth later.
The radio personnel were carefully selected and highly trained
as speaker before being allowed to go on the air .

Their manner of

delivery was supposed to conform to bhe highest standards of the
German language.

Germany had and has , however many clearly

discernable dialects.

The idea of a standard German pronounciation

was realized and in the conference of April 8 , 1941 , Goebbels made
the following asserti ons,
"The Minister states that complaints have been
coming in from various quarters about the new
radio announcer , on the grounds that he has too
strong an Australian accent . The radio , the
Minister says, must speak the purest , clearest
and most dialect free German because it speaks to
the whol e nation. As a matter of principle , there
must be a standard language just as t here is a
standard orthography. What Luther's translation
of the Bibl e has done for written German , we on the
radio must do for German speech; fix a standard
language which, even if it does not sweep away the
dialects, i s val id throughout the Reich . 1154
It is interesting to note that Adolf Hitler spoke with a thick
Bavarian accent and was the object of some ridicule on that point and
53 Manville , Roger, and Fraenkel , Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels , His Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p .180 .
54 Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels ,
(E . P . Dutton & Co., Inc ., New York) 1970 , p .140.
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the fact that he often used very poor grarnmer .
The home service was only an element of the scheme of German
radio .
war.

The most important utilization of radio technology was in the
Here we have the use of a new technology in forms that were

unprecedented in any other war.

Radio was viewed by Goebbels as an

element in the evolution of propaganda .

He felt that the radio had a

clear role in propaganda and described his attitude toward such
developments ,
"On the subject of l eaflet propaganda , the Minister
declares that he does not expect much from a leaflet
campaign in Britain since the effort involved would be
quite out of proportion with the result. The British
masses can be reached much more easily by radio . If
Britain for her part is operating with leaflets in
Germany , then this is due to the fact that Britain
cannot reach the German listener by radio to any
appreciabl e extent . Besides , the spoken word has a
more magnetic effect than the written word. The
Minister admists that the leaflets most recently
dropped by the British are a little more dangerous
than the early ones . He wishes to be informed at
once about any new publication and its exact wording . 1155
Radio was to have a valuable effect in that leaflets , while not only
considered obsolete, were dangerous to drop as the luftwaffe had to
keep all planes for combat duties .
Audio technology in the Reich was advanced enough to permit the
duplication of speeches in tape or record form .

Such capacities were

55 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels ,
(E.P. Dutton & Co. , Inc. , New York) 1970 , p.73.

utilized extensively by the Nazis and later the Allies.

Goebbels,

during the fight for power in.Gerinany, challenged Bruening to a debate
which Brueni_ng refused.

Goebbels went ahead and rented a hall and on

the appointed night walked in the hall with some large cases full of
apparatus and some smaller cases.

Manvell and Fraenkel relate,

"The cases contained large disc recordings of Brueni_ng 's
speeches, and from then on Goebbels conducted a debate
with the absent chancellor by switching the recordings
on and off. This kind of performance del_ighted the
audience and scored a propaganda victory as sheer
entertainment. Incidentally, the BBC was to adopt the
same device later in its broadcasts to Germany during
the war, using recordings of Hitler's propaganda
speeches and broadcasts against him with interpolations
of the truth. u 56
Germany, under the Nazis also utilized this technique throughout
the war.

In 1940 Goebbels, in anticipating the advance into Belgium,

gave the following orders to his radio monitoring staff,
"The radio is to make immediate recordings of the
announcements by Brussels and Hilversum radios,
so that the voices of the regular speakers can be
used if, in some special circumstances we put
ourselves on these enemy wavelengths." 57
Goebbels' greatest victories in the earlier part of the war was
his ruthless and cunning use of fear over the radio.

He established

a sequential system of intrusion into the minds of foreign adversary
populations through radio that in the case of France, Belgium,
Austria, Czechoslovikia and other countries, many people tho_ught the
56 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life
and Death, (Simon·& Schuster, New York) 1960, p.101.
57 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.41.

83

situation was hopeless before the first weapon was fired.
his technique is an intriguing and sobering experience.

To examine
He was

possessed of a devious cunni.ng that was virtually unmatched in the
Nazi heirarchy.

His attention to the details of foreign intrusion

had the Allies very worried for the first few years of the war.

His

staff received great and constant direction from him personnaly on
most, if not all, fore.ign polemics •
In addition to the specific campa~gns which sall be covered in
some detail shortly, there was the ongoing broadcasts to the foreign
countries which required very careful orchestration and supervision.
These broadcasts were carried out under the joint supervision of the
military, diplomatic and propaganda elements of the German Government.
While they were later hindered by internal squabbli.ng over priority
and authority, they proved very effective in the first years of the
war.

In 1940 Goebbels established specific policy concerning these

broadcasts:
"The Minister hears a report on the question of the
censorship of foreign language broadcasts by
foreigners and decides that, contrary to the present
practice, a script of each planned transmission is to
be submitted in good time and in triplicate; this
practice is to take effect immediately. Censorship
will be exercized by: a) the Wehrmacht, b) the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, c) the Foreign Press Department.
Attention is to be paid to the person of the speaker
to make sure a harmless text is not made to produce the
opposite effect by a mocking delivery. When the censors
do not agree, the decision will not be made by a majority
vote, but by the most determined opinion." 58
58 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr; Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.33.
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As mentioned before the.Minis½ry.adopted Goebbels plan for the
opening moves . in the intrusion of . German radio in fore_ign countries.
This sequence took place before an armed advance was to be made.

The

purpose of the sequence was to prepare the enemy population for the
advance by posing as a benign force, forced to advance by the stupidity
of the enemy government, to damage moral in the enemy ga_rrison and to
weaken the government image in the eyes of the general population and
therefrom a present a benevolent picture of the German government.
After this_ groundwork was laid, threats of violence would be
made in response to supposedly unsound positions of the enemy
government and a call for capitulation onthe part of the people of
the enemy country.

This was followed by the deliberate introduction

of confusing information before the actual advance and takeover of
the nation's broadcasti_ng.
Again, this sequence was established for use prior to the actual
invasion of German armed forces.

After the country was subdued

through those means, the Doktor had a plan for the takeover of the
enemy media.

Manvell and Fraenkel pelate a story about the takeover

of the Hilversum transmitter in Holland, which was mentioned earlier,
as told to one Charles Rollo by a broadcaster who was there,
"Berlin radio reporters arrived at Hilversum, thirty
strong, the day after the Dutch army surrendered.
They came to repair any ~quipment that might have
been smashed and, if necessary, to install new
transmitters, With them were transcribed programs,
in Dutch, to last two weeks and printed program
schedules ready for distribution. After some
though, however, they decided to let the Hilversum
anriouncers carry on as usual, except that all music
by British, French or Jewish composers was banned,
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and for a few days all newscasts were suspended .
When the news was resumed, the Dutch announcers
were told they might say anything they pleased;
guard with loaded revolvers in their hands sat
around to discourage untoward cornrnents. 11 59
Manvell and Fraenkel conceded that this policy was "Brilliant"
in that the Dutch population were greatly re-assured when their
familiar broadcasters were heard once again .

Also the Nazis brought

in the trucks with them a series of programs enough for two months
intended for use against the English.
Without a doubt the most effective use of radio as a means of
propaganda was the secret transmitter.

In the first two months of

1940 the Germans established secret transmitters for use against
England and France.

The French station was called "Humanite ' ".

The British station was "The New British Broadcasting Station " and
also known as the "Concordia Services ".

Others included Concordia H

- the "Voice of Free India" and Concordia A, • the Voic e of the Free
Arabs".

In addition there were East Transmitter V, "Radio of

Lennin ' s Old Guard" , and the "Voice of Hellas" or Fatherland radio
aimed at Greece.

Finally there was the "Free American Radio" .

There

were radio stations that transmi tted in short wave frequen cy to other
parts of the world but did not figure prominently in the basic radio
propaganda scheme .

59 Manville, Roger , and Fraenkel, Heinrich , Dr. Goebbels , Hi s Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960 , p.177 - 8.
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It should be interesting to examine the manner in which the
secret transmitters were used against various countries in the course
of the war .

Fear a lways played a great role in the treatment any given

country received over the airwaves .

In the case of Greece , which the

Germans concerned themsel ves with as a r esult of I t aly ' s failures
there , a specific polemic was established with the of the royal
appeal s for help .

In the conference of April 21 , 1941, Goebbels

instructed his staff to undermine the credibility of the Greek throne
throuqh broadcasts :
"On the subject of Greence , the Minister states that,
following the Greek appeal put out over the radio,
the King t o o (but not the royal house) should be
attacked . over the secret transmitter , f or instance,
it should be said : Has it anything to do with Greek
honor that , merely for the sake of offering resistance
for another 24 hours, we should let all our bridges be
smashed and all our oil depots be burnt? Patriots,
we call on youf Has the King any right to speak any
l onger on behalf of the Gr eek people? This King, who
has already had the Greek crown jewels shi pped to
Egypt , whose ministers are on the point of flying o f f
to Istanbul and who , as soon as German troops appear
within a hundred kilometers of Athens , will board his
aircraft to escape . 11 60
Such a polemic , if delivered under the guise of a local radio
transmission would have t o have had a ha rmful effect on an already
alarmed population .

Such broadcasts were designed to arouse fear by

pointing out the weaknesses of government under unstable circumstances .

GO Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels ,
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., Inc., New York) 1970 , p . 148.
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It was also the fact that the Greek throne had not really done much
to prepare for the Nazi onslaught·. that it found itself in an already

weakened position.
The case of the French was different in some ways.

France's

military leaders had demonstrated their indecisiveness in that
battles of Belgium and Holland and by the time the Germans turned
their attention to France, the population had little faith in the~r
military.

French air weakness also played an important factor.

The

Maginot Line, which had been erected as an eternal defense against
further German aggression after W.W.I had proven to be completely
worthless in.the face of the new Blitzkrieg technique and the French
fell in less than two months.

The manner in which the French

population was handled by Goebbels' secret transmitters showed a
clear grasp of psychological advantages gained after the fall of
Belgium and Holland.

TThe government in France had been none too

stable in the "Twilight War" and continually demonstrated its
inability to maintain control of the worsening situation.
this as did Goebbels and played on it.

Hitler saw

The prepartions for war in the

French territory was carefully orchestrated and the directives for the
use of the secret transmitters were indicative of careful analysis,
"The secret transmitter must operate in a revolutionary
and hypernationalistic manner and, by suitable arguments
about the government's weakness, to oppose one government
after another to the point of its downfall. The Minister
desires the widest possible participation in this work." 61
61 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.47.
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Further modifications were made in policy toward the end of
reaching the backbone of the threatened populations , the peasants
and the small businessmen .

Goebbel s turned from the cities to the

countrysides i n his campaigns on t he radio and emphasized the need to
invoke pessimi sm and a sense of futility in the populace .

Hi s staff

received instructions in this vein in June of 1940,
"The secret transmitters i s to use all arguments to
spread the s l ogans, ' Lay down your arms , it is all
pointless .' The communi st transmitters ... must put
forward arguments of pure social agitation . (Everyt hing is being smashed up; who i s going t o foot the
bill; who g uarantees the pensions; the tax burden
will be c rushing; etc . ) u62
Goebbels had a cadre in France to ascertain the mood and
disposition of the common man.

He would capitalize on this in such

a way as to use French mannerisms on the radio and use the latest
gossip as qui ckl y as i t surfaces in the general popula tion.

As t he

time drew near for the actual invasion, Goebbels set his staff to
turning the nerves of the French population to a panic edge ,
"The task of the secret transmitter, from now on, is t o
use ever y means to create a mood of panic in France .
To that e nd it must work an a wholl y French platform
and display the greatest indignation and alarm in
protesting the ommi sions of the French government.
I n parti cul ar, the rumors buzzing around France are to
be picked up and d eveloped . The secret transmitter
must above all take up the rumors of the French
government i ntending to flee from Paris , and Reynard ,
62 Boelcke, Willi A. , The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels ,
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., Inc . , New York) 1970 , p.53 .
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who denied these rumors, is to be called a liar. It
must further utter an urgent warning .against the
dangers of a 'Fifth.Column' which undoubtedly
includes all German .ref.ugees. Furthermore, the
rumor is to be circulated that the first action of
the Germans in occupied territories is invariably
the confiscation of all deposits of money in the
banks, so that true French patriots should withdraw
their money now in the threatened regions. 11 63

Not only did the Germans put an onus on the German refugees, who
would undoubtedly be mistreated, thus giving the Germans fuel for
their self-righteous fires, but also they orchestrated an igenious
method of inciting the French people to add to the confusion by
destroying their own economic system!
Once the invasion was effected and the Vichy government was
established the Germans maintained their stations illegally to
preserve the stations as supposed underground transmitters to further
confuse the routed population with lies.

The population did not take

well to the stations and Goebbels was hard put to protest his transmitters.

An example of this trouble can be found in his Diary entry

of May 12, 1942,
In Paris an assault was made on our short wave radio
station 'Alois'. Unfortunately it was successful.
Two transmission plants were destroyed. As a result
very serious repraisals are necessary. The military
commander asked me whether he.ought to requisition
all radio sets in the entire occupied area of France.
I don't regard this as a happy thought, for thereby
we shall loose our own possibilities for propaganda.
He accepted my idea to requisition radio sets individually,
that is, to take them, to begin with, from enemies of the
state." 64
11

63 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret·conferences ·of Dr; Goebbels,

(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.42.
64 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.212.

Overall, the French invasion was well aug11
transmitters but the radio campaigns that follc
not all that effective .

The Germans were, it~

destroying governments than they were at establ
them .
The scenario was much the same for the bat __

~UJ..OS

were established in occupied areas along the coast and a battery of
programs were launched against England from the onset.

Although the

GeDllans never set foot on the British Isles , the same tactics were
used in anticipation of a possible attack .

The Germans were, however,

dealing with an internal situation altogether different than the one
they faced in France.

The British were much more unified in their

approach to the German problem and the taste of Dunkirk had solidified
the government ' s attitude toward the German danger .
Churchill had become a leading figure and proved to be a
propagandist equal to, if not far superior to Goebbels or Hitler .
Goebbels, as indicated before, had an unrealistic image of the
British politically, sociologically and militarily.

He also under

estimated the alliance between the British and the Americans.

His

radio scenario would have doubtless been modified to take these
factors into account had he realized it.

On July 20 , 1940, the word

went out to his staff concer ning England,
"The secret transmitters, on much the same l i ne as
before the opening of the western offensive , should
make clear what l ies in store for the British once
the offensive starts. Over the ' Workers ' transmitter
the first cautious attempts should be made to call for
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the formation of action committees against Churchill .
As a catchy slogan each single transmission should
be prefaced by : ' The Empire is ruled by a fool ;
Churchill i s a fool. ' The ' Voix de Paix' should
not only demand peace but might clearly emphasize
its poss i bility . Furthermore , Herr Raski n is to
get a Frenchman to Broadcast in English explaini ng
that France might well have been spared if she had
accepted the Fuehrer's offer in good time ."65
The network of stations proliferating in the British campaign
were diversified in their aims and audiences.

The "New British

Broadcasting Stati on " which had been among the first , was broadcasting over three shortwave frequencies .

Thei r transmissions were

directed against the government and in support of peace .
mitters also chanpioned

Trans-

the idea of Scottish independance

('Caledonia') and for Welsh separatists tendincies , ( ' Concordia W' ) .
"Concordia S" operated in a mobile unit and broadcast to the working
class employing social ist revolutionary sentiments.

Another trans-

mitter , "Concordia P" , transmitted on a pure pacifist format under
the supposed auspi ces of the church .
When on the offensive, Goebbels ', cunning knew few bounds.

He

was absolutely effective in the incitment of a populace against an
establ ished government .
case of Britain .

Absolutely effective except , that is , in the

I t was not that his tactics were not sound and that

they were not carefully considered .

He simply lost the impact of his

efforts because of h i s misunderstanding of the British people.

The

6 5 Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels,
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., I nc ., New York) 1970, p.68 .
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opening radio offensive he launched _against the E.nglish was masterly.
His tricks and ploys were pure artistry but they did not prevail
because the government simply had to renounce them as Nazi hogwash.
It is still interesting to examine the campaign against the British
over the airwaves as an example of the wav panic and distrust can be

incited.

In July of 1940 Goebbels told his staff,
"The secret transmitters must on no account unrnaSk
themselves as German. They must, therefore, as far
as possible, b.egin each broadcast with attacks on the
National Socialmsts. They must pick up and magnify
the themes also tackled by our official transmitters;
in addition, they are to invent political incedents
on the home front in clubs and nightclubs and protest
against them on behalf of the British people. In
particular, they must now spread horror by putting
out British eye-witness accounts from Warsaw,
Dunkirk, etc., and they must now use every conceivable
means to make sure the very first blows against Br±tiin
fall on psychologically well-prepared ground. n66

The exact manner in which the fear and horror was to be aroused
in the British Isles was a matter of timing and circumstance.

All

involved knew that the mamn part of the Battle of Britain was to be
fought, at first, in the air.

This emphasis was made clear to the

staff of the Ministry shortly before the first air strikes were
initiated.

As usual, Goebbels had been considering the matter and

had come up with a scenario he hoped would be adequate to meet the
needs of the moment.

Again, in July of 1940

Goebbels instructed

his staff,

66
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"It is the task of the secret transmitters to arouse
alarm and fear am~ng the British ~eople, But ~ince
the Ge;r:man Propaganda behind this campaign must not
be apparent, they must wrap up their real intentions
with moral t ales and good advice . Among other things,
they should not put out expertly prepared A.R,P . (air
raid precaution ) classes of whi ch all details must be
so accurately described that the civilian population
is seized with horror from the start . 1167
The air raid warnings had their effect and government measure to
quell the effect was not lost on Goebbels.

He went on to instruct

his staff that follow-up propaganda was needed along these lines .

On

August 5 , he told his staff in conference ,
"Propaganda against Britain must be stepped up over the
next few days even more than in the past, and the
secret transmitters in particular must try to achieve
the maximum effect. In this connexion the Minister
praises the ARP transmissions to date and suggests
that gas defence instruction programs should now be
broadcast , and fear promoted of incidents in connexion
with ARP classes . For instance, when the manufacture
of home made molotov cocktails has been presented as
a national duty, extreme nervousness must be aroused
for a few days among all owners of such irenades that
their devi ces might blow up any moment ." 8
The air raid theme was followed up as a means to blast the
credi bility of the members of the Bri tish government calling on the
citi zens to stay calm and continue productivity.

This was effective

against the French but the English people didn 't seem to fall prey
to such ploys to any appreciable extent.

The devices utilized by

Goebbels are interesting to note however and on September 4, 1940

67 Boelcke, Willi A. , The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels ,
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he instructed his staff ,
"The Foreign Lan~age Service and the. secret
transmitters should between them broadcast the
fact that the British want to abolish air""'1'.'aid
warnings for their industrial areas. It would
be explained to the British workers that they
are now doubly and tre.bly exposed to the risk
of bombing while the English Lords are s itting
in air raid shelters, having taken their families
to places of safety. The Minister of Information,
i n particular, who has sent his daughter to the
United St ates, is a fine person to call on the
workers to stay put in their factories. I n this
way the British measure should be divested of its
patriotic measure and given a plutocratic character . 11 69
As the preparations were made to open the act and the appoint ed
time grew near , Goebbels unleashed a real fear campaign on the British
people that dealt with the effects of actual bombings.

This kind of

propaganda was staunchly re.butted by the British government and
Goebbels went further to instruct hls staff in the summer of 1940,
"The important thing now is to intensify as far as
possible the mood of panic which is undoubtely slowly
gaining ground i n Br itain. The secret transmitters
and the Foreign Language Service in parti cular now
have the task of painting a picture of the magnitude
and volume of our attacks for that part of the
British population which has not yet experienced
the frightful effects of our air raids . The secret
transmitters, in particular should marshall witness
who must give horrifyd.ng accounts of the destruction
they have seen with their own eyes. However the l ast
stops of panic mongering have not yet been pulled out. 1170
As the air raids commenced the British government rallied the
people in the historic manner described by countless accounts and
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histories.

The efforts of Goebbels and his staff did , however make

the job much more difficult, alth~ugh it failed to rout the people
psychologically .

The campaign by radio became less and less

effective as the people grew to understand the source of the secret
transmissions .

Goebbels tried to counteract the loss of credibility

tb the secret transmitters at they were discovered and ordered his
staff,
"The Foreign Language Service is to issue an emphatic
denial of British allegations that the New British
Broadcasting Station is a German Transmitter . The
British government, it should be said, is trying to
saddl e German propaganda with broadcasts for which,
in ou r view , it is itself responsible. Besides it
is a cheap way of dealing with o~fosition by
ascribing it simply to Germans."
It was an ineffective counter effort1 though.

The secret trans-

mitter became less and less a factor in the war of nerves being
played by the Germans .
Perhaps one of the most interesting and most notable of the
propaganda ploys utilized against the British was the work of one
William Joyce.

Joyce was a British dissident who had embraced the

National Socialist concept in Britain for many years .

Shortly before

the war he went to Germany where he became a naturalized citizen .
He was won~

to refer to the British government and people with a

rather heavy humor and deep irony .

His famous, "that liar Winston

Churchill, First Lord of the Sea Bottom , Ha Ha Ha" was to win him

71
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some notoriety with the British listening public and even a kind of
morose affection for they knew where he was broadcasting from.
It is said that Goebbels liked Joyce and thought well of him .
Joyce ' s effectiveness, like so much of the German effort, started out
high and deteriorated .
Joyce, Born in New York of British parents and educated at London
University, had been a member of "Mosely ' s Blacksmiths " , a counterpart
of the Nazis in Britain.

He was violently anti-semetic.

been looking for someone like him for a long time .
wore off though when Churchill came to power.

Goebbels had

His effectiveness

This is when the

London Daily Express christened him "Lord Haw Haw" after his remarks
about Churchill.

But his irony and fun attitude were soon dissipated

in the face of Churchill ' s ability to rally the English people and
his presentation hardened.
Some of his characters portrayed over the airwaves were
"Orpington and Orpington" , two British lords who sat in an exclusive
club and lamented the war, "Sir Izzy Ungeheimer," who avoided his
taxes, "Bumbly Mannering" , a parson who made money out of mµnitions,
and "Sir Jasper Murgatroid", who gave away British scandals and
secrets .
He was captured by the British at the close of the war and
hanged .
The work of the secret transmitters and the regular radio broadcasts became l ess effective as time wore on .

By 1942 the work of the

secret transmitters had come under question as to whether they were
even needed any longer.

In the middle of the year Goebbels required
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this of his staff ,
As for the work of the secret transmitters , the
Minister requests an accurate exposition of existing
transmitters and their purpose and method of work .
He declares that , generally speaking, the secret
transmitters are no longer topical, just as in 1932 ,
for instance, the l eaflet had become outdated in the
internal German struggle . The work of the secret
transmitters should therefore be continued only in
cases where there are special reasons. 1172
Just as the leaflet was described as outmoded at the beginning
of this chapter, the secret transmitter was also falling by the wayside.

Goebbels realized that the s uccesses of the transmitters were

principly as me'bhods of disruption and incitement , he also realized
that he was no match for the British mentality he had fought so hard
to break.

Indeed, if Goebbels thought the secret transmitters were

absolute, the Allies did not.

On May 18, 1943 , Goebbels wrote

briefl y of a new turn in the worsening developments ,
"To intensify this war of nerves the Allied GHQ in
North Africa beamed a radio broadcast to the French
People and kept repeating it, to the effect that
Frenchmen were to sit at their radio sets until late
into the night and wait for important news. I think
this whole matter is a gigantic bluff . The English
and Americans won ' t stage an invasion at this time .
They haven 't prepared sufficiently for it and the
whole matter is still too uncertain. 1173
This cryptic entry seems to coincide with the surrender of
Rommel' s forces in Africa in the same period of the month .

Whatever
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the.event, the manner in which Goebbels took the ploy was defenseless,
unable to . really counteract.its i effects,

The invasion was more than

a year away but the German .mentality was beim,: geared up for it not by
prop.aganda, but by the facts.
Goebbels had the acuity and intelligence to launch an effective
attack .against·hfus adversaries and do it effectively.

If his own

illfounded conceptions were to blame in part, his peers at the
Ministerial level and 'at the General Staff level in the Wehrmacht
were also to blame.

The impact this discord had on the Propaganda

Ministry can best' be seen in a description of its structure and
composition.

CHAPTER V
Ministry Structure
The Germans were reputed to be masters of organization and
effeciency.

They systemtized

each function of the government with

the ideal in mind that such functions would work in harmony with other
elements in the government.
assumed power.

This was not exactly the case when Hitler

The Fuehrer realized the utility of conflict as a tool

for keeping his personal power and position secure against the formation of internal, adverse power blocs.
This was particularly evident in the structure of the Propaganda
Ministry.

As its influence and expanse grew, the conflict with other

elements of government grew proportionately.

As will be shown, the

Ministry came into almost constant conflict with the Reich Press
office, the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht-.
Before describing the conflicts, it will be necessary to understand the structure of the Propaganda Ministry and in particular the
structure of the Broadcasting Office.

The Ministry started out small

and compact when Goebbels assumed his post.

Originally he had hoped

that the Ministry would have been self-supporting through revenues
from the licensing and taxation of radio receivers, but this accounted
for only a small portion of his intake as the Ministry grew.
At the onset, the Propaganda Ministry had severn divisions.
First, a division which dealt with legislation and legal problems,
budget, finance, accounti_ng, personnel administration, the

ministerial library, the National Chamber of culture, the Council of
,~9
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Connnercial Advertizing 1 fairs and exhibitions; second, for coordi~
nation of propaganda and public enlightment, regional .agencies of the
Ministry, the German Academy of Politics, ceremonies· and demonstrations,
national emblems, racial questions, the Treaty of Versailles, youth
organizations, business and social politics, public health and
athletics, eastern and border questions and the national travel
connnittee.

Third, Radio and the National Broadcasting Company;

Fourth, for the National and Foreign Press, journalism, press archives
and news; fifth, for cinema, motion picture industry, cinema censo~ship, and youth literature censorship; sixth, for theatre, music, art,
theatre management, stage direction, design, folk art; seventh, for

protection against counter-propaganda at home and abroad.

1

As the needs of the Ministry grew the organization changed and
became more sophisticated.

The duties became more clearly delineated

and the re-organization reflected the specific spheres of activity
more readily.

By 1942 the overall structure looked much larger and

indeed, it had grown to eleven departments and fifteen sub-departments.
At the top, there was Goebbels as the Director of Party Propaganda.
He had a principle Aide-De-Camp and a Chief of Staff.
directly to Goebbels and troubleshot as he saw fit.
came the eleven departments or offices.

Both answered
Under Goebbels

The first (not in order of

importance) was the Reich League for National Socialist Propaganda.

1
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Th:ls office coordinated the efforts of all party sections.

The

"Deutschland" Reich motor column transported all scenic effects for
the demonstrations, rallies and mass meetings.

Next came the

Exhibitions and Fairs office which handled exhibits and stands for
such activities .. There was a Press Liason.office and a Liason office

for state and military elements of the government.

The head office

handled staff and budget needs and acted in an administrative capacity
in a general sense.

There was a training office for the speakers and

orators.

The last four offices were the largest.
handled

The Cultural Office

a) the artistic planning of badges, emblems and banners,

b) the section of music, and poems for party gatherings,
planning of rallies, mass meetings, etc.,
buildings and pavillions, etc.

c) the

d) architecture, party

The Mass Propaganda Office dealt with

the organization, instruction and assignment of trained party speakers,
posters, and the logistics and orchestration of mass meetings, rallies
and demonstrations.

The Film office concerned itself with; a)

organization of personnel;
documentaries,

bl technical research,

d) publicity for party films,

c) party

e) funding for films.

The Office of Broadcasting is the last department.

Its function was

more elaborate as the mission was the most expansive in the Ministry. 2

2
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The Ministry directly controlled the R.R.G. or the Reich
Broadcasting Company.

(Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft)

Before going into

the structure of the R.R.G . it would be useful to briefly describe
its history.

It was established in the early part of the twenties

and came under the control of the Post Office.

In 1933, when Goebbels

assumed power, he immediately decreed that all shares of the R.R.G.
were now under the ownership of the Propaganda Ministry.

He thus

acquired a monopoly on broadcasting in Germany.
At that time he also created the following organizations: The
League of National Socialists Wireless Listeners, which became the
administrative organ of the Office of Broadcasting.

This organization

promoted R.R. G. programming and advised it on content.

He also

created the Chamber of Broadcasting which concentrated on the
technical and professional areas of the field.

There was the Overseas

Broadcasting Service which is exactly what the title suggests.
In the realm of news there already existed the National German
Wireless Service and the Drahtloser Dienst A.G., more commonly
referred to as simply the A.G. which apparently supplemented the
N.G.W.S.

Both came under the control of the Propaganda Ministry when

Goebbels assumed power . 3
In March of 1933 Goebbels placed Eugen

Hadamowsky in charge of

the R.R.G. as he established the following organization.

3

At the top

Reiss, curt, Joseph Goebbels, (Ballantine Books, New York,
New York) 1948, p.94-5.

Hadamowsky had his offices.

Directly under hllll came the offices of

Aclministration, Engineering and the Central Division,
are self-explanitory.

The first two

The third, the Central Division played the

. major role in the broadcasting functions of the Party.

Central

handled incoming and outgoing matters for State and political broadcasting.

This was a direct function.

Another direct function was the aclministration of news. Ancillary
to this was the A.G. and the D.N.B •.(formerly the N.G.W.S.).

Here the

news was gathered through dispatch and psychologically adjusted for
dissemination.

The News division also participated in the coordination

of the activities of the Propaganda·Ministry Home Press Division.
The next direct function of Central was the Foreign Services
Division.

Here foreign news was gathered and disseminated.

Ancillary

to this was the Propaganda Ministry Foreign Division which coordinated
its activities with the Home Press Division.
Besides Central, Eng~neering and Administration, the R.R.G.
oversaw the activities of the Programs Division.

Here the non-

political commentary, music, drama, entertainment and variety were

programmed and presented.

This department also coordinated the

activities of the Propaganda Ministry Troop Entertainment Division.
The Troop Entertainment Division was also coordinated with the Home
Press Division and the Foreign Division. 4

4 Sington, Derrick, and Weidenfeld, Arthur, The Goebbels
Experiment (Yale University Press, New Haven) 1943, p.45.
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Internally there were a few sn~gs from time to time but nothing
major as Goebbels tried to keep a t_ight re_ign over his domain.
Occasionally some young and enthusiastic member would overstep his
bounds but this was not harshly dealt with.

Goebbels had a reputation

for letting talent actualize itself as long as it was consistant with
his own interests.
The real problems arose when systems and interests outside
Goebbels'.Ministry confronted him with conflicting decisions and
actions.

Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld, in their book, The

Goebbels Experiment indicate the exact nature of Goebbels' troubles
on this account,

"The Propaganda Minister's Broadcasting Division
however-- particularly in wartime - has to share its
influence over the broadcast output with other
ministries and with the High Command (Wehrmacht).
Talks, commentaries, and news items on world affairs

often seem to be inspired by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the High Command has secured a firm grip
on broadcasts on military topics. All news items about
military operations, as well as the daily communique
and the frequent special announcements, are broadcast
as 'from the High Command of the Armed Forces'". 5
Goebbels felt that his personal position, in time of war, was.
· becoming that of a fringe activist.

He was not involved in any major

policy decisions on the affairs of state, but rather, contended with
those decisions as a propagandist.

His role was to receive the

information from the real sources of action and create a palatable,

5 Sington, Derrick, and Weidenfeld, Arthur, The Goebbels
Experiment (Yale University Press, New Haven) 1943, p.46.
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psychol_ogically sound polemic upon which news releases would be based.
Hitler was relatively unresponsive to his continuous pleas for more
solidarity in the presentation of news and propaganda from the beginning
of the war as the Fuehrer didn't really have the time or the interest
to be bothered with matters that weren't of immediate concern.

Hitler

also had permitted himself to be surrounded by a cadre of intimates
that were very jealous of their proximity to the Fuehrer.

Hence,

Goebbels' arguments, when not presented in person, would go unnoticed
by Hitler.

Even in 1943 Semmler wrote,
"Goebbels is no longer satisfied with his present work.
He is tired of merely finding fine words for what others
are doing; he wants to intervene in the affairs of the
nation. I think people credit him with more power and
influence than he in fact has at the moment. Of course
he controls public opinion with his powers over the
radio, films and to a certain extent over the press .•.
because he has to share half the work with the Reich
Press Director (a spokesman of the Fuehrer's Headquarters), with the Foreign office and the High Command.
Many of the directives I pass to the press in Goebbels'
name are useless, because at the .same time the Fuehrer's
Headquarters (that is to say Dr. Dietrich) is putting
out the opposite directive on the same theme. And in
cases of doubt anything that comes from the Fuehrer's
Headquarters has Hitler's personal authority and takes
priority however trivial the matter." 6

Dr. Dietrich was to become more and more of a thorn in Goebbels'
side as ~he war progressed.

Dietrich was well aware of his edge over

Goebbels in his position at the G.H.Q. possessing the priority in the
form of Hitler's personal sanction.

6

From the record of Dietrich's
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releases, it is apparent that the man did not have the kind of
propaganda sense that Goebbels possessed.

Dietrich would make

announcements that were without even the slightest factual basis and
Goebbels would be expected to contend with them in a productive
manner.
In the critical campaign in Russia in 1941, the Germans were
waiting news of the ou tcome of the battles and Dietrich made an
announcement that the war in the east was already won.

He did this

witho ut even consulting Goebbel s who heard about it aft er the fact.
Semmler recal ls the incident,
"Goebbels thinks we have seen today the biggest
propaganda blunder of the war. Dr . Dietrich, at a
big press conference in the hall of the Propaganda
Ministry , made a statement to the effect that the
war in the east was decided , that the Soviet army
had at last been mastered . It made a tremendous
sensation; but , says Goebbels, it has been done with
unbelievable irresponsibility . He is foaming with
rage. Firstly because Dietrich has got himself qu ite
undeserved credit; secondl y because the impression
will be given at the front and among the people that
the war is really as good as over. They will say :
'That ' s the end of the difficulties and efforts . '
This is the biggest piece of news that the war has
produced . What dangerous illusions we are encouraging
in the peopl e . 117
Goebbel s realized the true ext e nt of the danger in s uch
illusions .

He went to the Fuehrer to pro test the announcement and

try to gain the authority to handle such information exclusively .

7
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Apparently word of his feelings and intentions reached Dietrich, the
Fuehrer ' s Press Chief paid a visit to the Minister of Propaganda to
avoid a confrontation with Hitler .

Goebbels writes in his Diaries ,

''Before my conversation with the Fuehrer I had a long
talk with Dr . Dietrich about our propaganda and press
departments in the occupied countries . He was agree able to having his public relations offi ces integrated
into the propaganda sections . If he were to start a
new organization for his public relations offices , we
would have two sets of machinery in the occupied areas
with resulting confusion . At present Dr . Dietrich and
I are collaborating splendidly. I su~pose he realizes
it's no fun to pick a fight with me."
What ever vain illusions Goebbels may have had about himself with
respect to the Fuehrer ' s Press Chief, they were soon put to rest .

Ten

days l ater , as the news of Italy ' s surrender surprised the Germans
and the Allies were preparing to another force on the west coast of
the country , Jodl , in conjunction with Dietrich, released some
erroneous information on the state of affairs their, much to Goebbels '
dismay .
The Allies had been over cautious in their estimates of German
strength in the area of Rome and decised to land troops at Sal erno.
Goebbels wrote in his Diary on the twenty first of September ,
1943 ,
"I had a very serious clash with Dr . Dietrich and General
Jodl about the news handouts concerning Salerno . The two
gentlemen felt very compromised . They would like, under
all circumstances, to prevent my reporting this matter
to the Fuehrer . I can refrain from this only, however ,
8 Goebbels , Dr. Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday &
Company , Ihc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.443 .
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if given binding assurances that incidents of this sort
won't be repeated, I have no mind to let my good name
be discredited by.the· journalistic amaturishness of
inferior officers. 11 9
The relationship was to grow worse.

Dietrich had the high cards

and remained virtually ensconced in his G.H.Q •. role.

He remained as

oblivious to the true propaganda needs of the Reich as Goebbels was
aware of these needs.

It seemed the Dietrich almost enjoyed baiting

Goebbels for some obscure personal reason.

Although there is no real

documentation of the circumstances that might have arisen over personal
reasons, Semmler points out the atmosphere was not productive and even
affected the day to day disposition of news discemination,
The endless quarrel between Goebbels and the Reich
Press Chief have been dormant for a while only to flare
up again and rage the fiercer. This struggle to dictate
the tone of the press has begun again, .• Although
Dietrich is State Secretary to the Prop_aganda Ministry
he refuses to take orders or advice from Goebbels. He
shelters himself safely behind Hitler whose Chief Press
Officer he is. The press section of the Ministry, which
took over the functions of the former press department of
the Reich Government, is formally not under Goebbels at
all, but under Dietrich as Press Director of the Reich
Government. The headquarters of this department is in
the famous Room 24, which is staffed d~y and night.
From here are issued all political directives to the
German press; all requests passed down from above, from
Hitler, from Goebbels, from the Foreign Office and from
the Chancellery have to go through his office. I myself
pass to room 24 the press instructions I receive,
dictated by Goebbels, so that they can be passed from
there to the newspapers. Now if there is some important
new material, like a speech by Churchill, it can happen,
or rather it is the rule - that at least three or four
pages of policy directives are produced. These are
supposed to assist our editors in their work. But it is
9 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. nochner, 1948, p.462.
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obvi ous to me that they deprive the writers of the
last vest iges of intellectual independqnce , Th.e
directives often contradict one anothey , ?ometimes
only on a few points but more often comp l etel y and
utterly, I n such cases . there are only two . courses
of action open to the wretched official in Room 24 1
who is a lmsot continua lly tal king over two t elephones
at once . Ei ther he can forbi d any ment ion of the
Churchill speech for 24 hours - in whi ch case the
Br i tish newspapers say the speech has given the
Gennans such a shock they don ' t know what to say or he will t ake the di recti ve points f r om the
Hitler- Dietr ich document and ignore the suggestions
of Goebbels and Ribbentrop . 11 10
I n the same entry Semml er illustrates one of the most f ascinating
quirks of the ongoi ng conf lict to be made mani fest i n the overall
e f fect of German news services , the difference in coverage in
different media .

He continues,

"Oddly enough , Dietrich ' s authority extends only to the
press , whil e Goebbels has exclusive contr ol over the
r adio and over i ts sour ces . So it often happens that
a speech by Church i l l i s comment ed on quite differ entl y
by the pr ess and by the radio. Gener ally t he
differences ar e sli ght but an expert can spot them at
once. 11 11
Semmler's observations were astute and timely .

Only two days

passed before Goebbel s decided to make the differences in the t wo
medi a all the more c l ear as a r esult o f hi s growi ng i neffectuality
in the printed e l ements of news .

Semmler recal ls the conf erence

meeting ,

lO Semml er , Rudol f , Goebbels- The Man Next To Hitler , lWesthouse ,
London) 1947, p . 111-12.
ll Ibi d . , p . 112 .
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"One result of the latest quarrel with Pietrich is that
Goebbels has decided to intensify the political use of
the radio. He is going to give special attention to the
development of its news services . The directive of his
11 o ' clock conference , not pnoperly used for the press ,
are to have all the more influence on the radio. 11 12
As mentioned in previous c hapters, the Propaganda Ministry had
close ties with the Wehrmacht and the German High Command in the
acqu isi tion and dis semination of news releases .

The military had set

up the P.K. 's or the Propaganda Companies which have also been
described previously.

Things did not r un smoothl y , however,

especially as the war began to turn for the worse for the Germans .
It was easy for harmony to prevail between the milit ary and the
Ministry when the war was full of German victories and the news was
mostly favorable.

When the High Command had to admit some defeat

and mistakes , the atmosphere changed measurably.
For reasons not maa e known to the Ministry , the military made the
deci sion to limit the scope of the P.K .' s and when Goebbels discovered
the order he became enraged .

In April of 1942 he wrote in his Diary,

"A new and heavy conflict with the OKH has started . The
successor of Colonel Hesse , LTC Schwadtlo- Gesterding , had
Lieutenant Mansfeldt, in private life a public relations
man for I. G. Farben , deliver a speech to the P . K. men which
is just about the limit . According to that speech, the
army reporters may report only about the army. If they
see anything in any theatre of war that has been done or
carried out by some other element of the Wehrmacht , they
are shamefully to be silent about it. I shall now become
12 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels- The Man Next To Hitl er , (Westhouse ,
London) 1947, p . 113 .

111

energetic and demand.that the OKH remove the two
o:f;ficeii; . at once,~because I have no intentions of
bothering with. nitwits: ;i,n .. the dif:f;icult ta,sk·of
collaboration between the:· Prop_aganda Ministry and
the various.departments:of.the.Wehrmacht,. I shall
require herea:f;ter ·, only- specially selected·. propagandists
be placed in key.pos;l,tions · s~nce otherw;i,se. I cannot
guarantee success for.our coIDlllon endeavor, 1113

Such problems were common for.over a year and :f;inally Goebbels
made another visit to the G.H,Q,, where Hitler had now all but
virtually cut himself off in seclusion to direct the war,

The

impression Hitler made on Goebbels was, once again, favorable but to
no real avail.

Promises were made and Goebbels appeared mollified.

Again, he had no great proximity to the Fuehrer and the problems he
presented Hitler were of no immediate importance beside the pressing
matters of the conduct of the war.

At the meeting Goebbels asked for

more authority and Hitler agreed in principle, asking his Prop_aganda
Minister for a written report and further arguments.

Goebbels wrote,

"The Wehrrnacht ••• should concern futself with the military
questions only. Questions of psychology are exclusively
the concern of the Propaganda Ministry. The press
section of the High Command, which has always created
a lot of trouble for me, is now being transferred to the
Propaganda Ministry. Keitel and Jodl are opposing this
with every means at their disposal but the Fuehrer asked
me to send him a report on this question, whereupon he
will issue the necessary decree. Propaganda, he said,
is a function of the Propaganda Ministry and not of the
Wehrrnacht. "14

13 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P, Locl,ner, 1948, p,116~7.
14 Ibid.,
•
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What Hitler said and what he actually did were two entirely
different things.

Goebbels was to wait for a decision to actualize

the promise which never came .
1943 was a year when the Nazis began to feel the reversals of the
war on all fronts , especially the home front.

Bombings had increased

and the production capacity of the German industry began to fall such
that the losses were irreparable .

The German people were put into a

constant state of near panic as the Allies embellished the bomb results
with propaganda similar to that used by Goebbels against England.
The bombing was also destructive to morale as the much feared
Luftwaffe had fallen upon hard times in Russia and was led by an
increasingly befuddled and inept Goering.
helplessly under growing attacks

So the population writhed

as the German concept of total war

came home to roost.
The panic had not been contained in the civilian population
exclusively. The German High Command began to leap at any information,
so poor was the capacity for intelligence and news gathering on the
part of the Nazis.

A clear example of what Goebbels had to contend

with is i l lustrated in his Diary entry of May 20 , 1943,
"The Americans have made another day raid on Flensburg
and Kiel. First reports were to the effect that they
dropped fountain pens and other articles filled with
explosives . After a few hours this report , which was
issued by the Naval Command at Kiel, proved unfounded . . .
Such events show how nervous the Wehrmacht cormnanders
have become under pressure of Anglo-American air raids. 1115
15 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc ., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P . Lochner , 1948, p.386 .
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The High Command , under great pressure to reassure the German
people that the destruction was only incidental, sought to flood the
papers with victories at the slimmest possibility.

For this Goebbels '

credibility was badly damaged when the reports turned out to be bogus.
The Salerno incident was a case in point , as mentioned earlier, and
Goebbels wrote of the damaging and debilitating effect such blunders
had on his machine and his person.

He wrote on September 18, 1943 ,

"I realize once again that our military propaganda
for foreign countries has failed completely . Despite my
earnest warnings it stressed German victory in Salerno
quite superfluously. The military news services under
General Jodl have been wri ting about a Dunkirk and a
Gallipoli, and the whole pack of enemy propagandists
attacks me and makes me responsible for this totally
faulty news policy! I can no longer accept such
responsibility and am going to take the offensive against
our discordant news policy . It won ' t do for my good
name to be dragged in the dirt by the world and, when
things have gone wrong, for those responsibl e to fade
away into the background , leaving me to take it on the
chin .. . I have always held that victories are to be
announced only after they have actually been achieved
and that the skin of the bear must not be distributed
until the bear has been killed. our mili tary public
relations officers have again sinned greviously
against this elementary principle of war- news policy . 1116
Again , Goebbels went to the Fuehrer and articul ated his positions
pointi ng out the disastrous results of the military handling of the
news.

Hitler again sought to mollify and placate Goebbels .

The

Gernerals , who had constant contact with Hitler, had no arguments in
support of their poli cies and again Goebbels appeared to have driven
home his points .

He wrote of the meeting a week after the military

publica tions,
16 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P ., The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday &
Comp any, Inc . , Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P . Lochner, 1948 , p.457 .
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'I told the Fuehrer in detail a.bout my diHiculti_es with
the press section of the o , K,W, (Wehrn\a.cht). The fuehrer
is simply flabb~gasted· that I should be hindered thus in
the development of TI\Y work. He had always been told by
the gentlemen of the O. K.W. that the press sections had
already been dissolved. He is now determined to wipe the
slate clean •.• The pro~aganda in the occupied areas is also
to be subordinated to me, not only in those with civilian,
commisars , but also where military governors are in char ge
of the administration . 11 17

It never happened.

Hitler, who appeared shocked by the discord

and made promises to wipe the slate clean, didn't really have the
concern to let the problem bother him once Goebbels left.

It is safe

to assume that the Generals didn ' t go overboard to recall the matter
to Hitler's attention either.
By the beginning of November of that year Goebbe ls began to
realize that Hitler was not going to make a move in his behalf due to
the pressing matters of running the war that so consumed the Fuehrer's
time and energy .

Calamity followed calamity and Goebbels wrote at

the end of the year in despair,
"The propaganda department of the Wehrmacht has fail ed
here completely. Oh, if only the Fuehrer would decide
to subordinate it to me I believe I could master this
relatively difficult problem in a short time. But
officers are not suited to propaganda , especially not
if they judge the situation from Berlin . 18
11

Goebbels never got on top of the discord between the military
and his Ministry.
the war.

He had to contend with the Generals to the end of

His problems with them, just as with the Reich Press Chief,

17 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company , Inc. , Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p . 475-6,
18 Ibid. , p . 499 .
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Dietrich, were only elements in the systematic inharmony that helped
to ruin his credibility.

Another was the.trouble he had with Herr

van Ribbentrop, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.· Like the state
offices and the military, the Foreign Office had its own propaganda
section which caused Goebbels a great deal of trouble.
Apparently, Goebbels and van Ribbentrop had been at each other's
throats for some time, since the beginning of the war.

Semmler

provides an insight into the relationship between the men and some of
the ramifications thereof,
"Goebbels and Ribbentrop are bitter enemies. They never
speak to one another, never see one another for cabinet
meetings with all Ministers present have not been held
for a long time. From time to time they send each other
insulting letters •.. Goebbels calls it a tragedy that
Hitler has such a dilettante as his advisor on foreign
policy ... Goebbels described his ministerial colleague from
the other side of the Wilhelmstrasse: 'His name he
bought (referring to the 'van' in front of it}, his money
he married, and his job he got by intrigue ... Psychologically
Ribbentrop is in the category of people who always finish
your sentence for you --yes man at all costs. He has no
firm convictions and always swims with the tide."19
Goebbels did not possess much more admiration for Ribbentrop's
news and propaganda services than he did for his person.

The issues

between the propaganda and news functions of the two Ministries were
similar in nature to that which existed between Goebbels and the
military.

In the case ·of the Foreign Office, Goebbels found a foe

that didn't have much closer-proximity to Hitler, in the wa~ years,
19 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse,
London) 1947, p.18.

than Goebbels himself did.
Goebbels wrote in roid-;I-942.,
"The news policy of the Foreign Office also leaves
much to be desired. You can.'t base news policies
on diplomatic viewpoints. It is simply unbearable
that one's own people alone in all the world know
nothing.about the success of military undertakings
carried out by their own soldiers.' A drastic example
of this is the sinking of Norwegian ships in the
service of the English, which left Sweden and had a
good number torpedoed in the Skagerrak. The Foreign
Office sits on this news and won't even condescend
to publish a perfectly neutral item. Meanwhile
even the last Bantu Negro knows that really happened.
The German people alone are not in the know. By that
sort of policy we are fairly compelling the German
public to listen to foreign and enemy broadcasts." 20
The situation, already bad, got worse.

The suppression of news

by the Foreign Office contributed greatly to one of Goebbels' most
vexing problems.

That problem was the intrusion of foreign propaganda

into the Third Reich through radio.
On September 1, 1939, the Supreme Defence Council of the Third
Reich passed a decree that absolutely prohibited the listening in on
and passing along of'±nformation acquired through foreign and enemy
broadcasting.

It was constructed such that the offence of passing

information acquired from enemy radio was graver than the simple act
of listening.

By 1942, however, both acts were punishable by death.

In 1940 this ban also extended itself to the members of the
Wehrmacht··and all echelons of the government.
20

Special permits were

Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.163,
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issued to.those people who had.to.listen.in for reasons 6£ their work,
These .permits were specific .about,:what could be listened·. to and when,
All such permits still prohibited::the:.bearers froll\ d:l.sSell\inating.the
infomation to others.outside,their line of duty,

For instance, a

top level writer was .permitted· to listen to the B,B,C, Geman la.nguage
pr.ograll\ to quote .Churchill but only .permitted to pass along those
quotes that were approved by the Propaganda Min~stry.
On January 26, 1940 Goebbels issued an all-encoll\Passing order·
prohibiting all government and 11\ilitary personnel f!l70Il\ listening in
on foreign broadcasts.

In it he made the observation,

"Any German soldier exposi.ng his soul and his spirit to
such enemy ..propaganda is committing psychological selfmutilation. This· is no less despicable than cowardly
self-mutilation; 021
The publication of sentences for such infractions were emphasized
as a means to combat the curiosity of the German radio listener.
Goebbels instructed his staff in conference in January,
"The Minister rejects as too lenient the sentences
passed by the courts for listeni.ng to the dissemination
of fore.ign broadcasts and dell\ands a few exemplorary
sentences; Sentences of less than four years penitentary
are no longer to be published in the German press. " 22
The first years of the war saw many foreign journalists remaining

in Gemany to report on the home lifestyle.

As foreign citizens with

some diplomatic protection, the Propaganda Ministry could not very well

.. 21 Boelcke 1 Willi A,; ·The Se."C;i:et ·conferences ·of ·pr; ·Goebbels,
(E,P, Putton & co,, ;r:nc, 1 New ):orkl 1970 1 . J?.14,.
22 Ibid. p.15.
1
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impose such r_egulations upon. them, - Goebbels provided· W.s sta;f;f with
the necessary directives:on.the:·inatter· in January of 1940.1
"Herr Bomer is authorizea·to inform the ;f;oreign
journalists in Gerinany·that they may listen to ;f;oreign
broadcasts.' However·, to pass on such news is ;f;orbidden,
Each foreign journalist·wtll be given a special warrant
card, made out in his narile,and containing precise

directives . -1123

·

A week later the DOktor had some . second tho_ughts,
"The Minister suggests to Herr Bomer that on a suitable
occasion ·he might see that a foreign journalist, who.has
been guilty of particularly damagi,ng and vile lies, is
arrested and subjected to prolonged _proceedi_ngs. This
might provide a drastic check on the atrocity propaganda
of certain foreign journalists," 24
Other tactics utilized were the individual terrorism of listeners. This was accomplished by the use of volunteer radio wardens in each of
the subsections of the Gaus.
Party regional offices.

The radio wardens were attached to the

Often they were members of the S.A. in the

early days of the Party and later political hack troops.

They

coordinated net functions and did demographic and ascertainment work. 25
Through the utilization of the ears of the radio wardens the
Ministry could effect terrorism on the individual quite effectively.
Goebbels instructed his staff in February of the same year,

23 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels,
(E,P7 Dutton & Co,, Inc., New York) 1970, p,18.
24 Ibid. r p, 21.
25 Sington, Derrick and Weidenfeld Arthur, The·Goebbels
1
1
· ·EXpe.riroent (Yale University Press,·New Haven} 1943 1 p,47,
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. "The Minister declares· himself in _agreement- with.- the
idea that more elaborate. rad;i.o rece;i.ye):':,, .-belong;i.ng
to ov=t eneinies·:of the·. state are exchanged.·. ior :small
receiv=s, even:· if. th_ere: is no more than justified-- suspicion that they· listen·to foreign broadcasts," 26
The publication of sentences for radio infractions-:was continued
at r,egular intervals of about tlu;ee .weeks starting ;i.n April of 1940.
It was not effective, however, and 'by the end of the year it becall\e
apparent that stiffer measures would be needed,

Goebbels tried to

coordinate with the courts some means of increasi_ng punishment for
offenders,

In October of 1940 he ;i.ssued the followi,ng directives,
"The Minister instructs Ministerialdirektor Gutterer
to make.representations with State Secretary Freisler
on the subject of heavy sentences of penal serviture
for radio offenders. Gutterer is to point out to hhe
S,D. and the state police that enemy radio is again
bei_ng listened to on an increasing scale. The Minister
demands heavy sentences for radio offenders because,
at this decisive phase of the war, every German must
be clear in his mind that listening in to these
broadcasts represents an act of serious sabotage. •• 27

The British were also very aware of the danger to the German
people that listening in to foreign broadcasts constituted.
were well prepared to meet the challa,nge in that respect.

They
Their

programming was directed not only at the civilian populace but the,
soldier as well.

Just as the Germans brought pre-produced prograll\s

into Holland, France and Belgium when they overran those countries
and took over their radio systems, pr,ograll\s des_igned for the British

- - 26 Boelcke, Will;i. A,, The Secret Conferences ·of 'Dr; ·Goebbels,
(E-.P. Dutton & Co,, Inc,, .New· Yo;,;kl ,1970 1 p,19,
27 Ibid,, p.108,
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capabilities.in both radio and·prop_aganda and issued.directives.on the
issue. in January of 1941, .
''The Minister points ·:out-: the··great danc,er .' frail\ Gepr\a.n
troops listening.in to·British transmitters. There are
indications that British·broadcasts, which·are now
being put out daily·from.London for the Gerll\an Wehrll\acht,
are being listened to on an increasi_ng scale -by members
of the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories. There is
a real da_nger of contamination by these enemy broadcasts.
The Minister refers to the example of France, which at
the moment of decision had already been totally broken
in her morale by Gerll\an radio transmissions, The
Minister instructs Major Martin to see to it that a
categorical order is issued by the Chief of the High
Command of the Weh=acht, on behalf of the Fuehrer,
prohibiti_ng once _again as a matter of general princiPle
the listening to enemy transmitters by members of the
forces on pain of heavy penalties." 28
At this point in the war, the threat of the foreign intrusion of
radio propaganda was so great that, in accordance with set rules of
manufacture, a notice was placed on all radio sets made in the Reich
which read,
"Listening in to foreign transmitters is an offense
_against the National Security of the people. By order
of the Fuehrer such listening in will be punished by
long terll\s of penal servitude. Remember this soldier!" 29
The civilian and military listener was considered to be of three
classes according to observations made in conferences in May of 1941.
These were the deliberate enemies of the state, the curious and the
"philistines" which were said to be most easily scared away from such

28 Boelcke, Willi A,, ·The Secret·conferences of Dr. ·Goebbels,
(E.F._Dutton & Co,, Inc, 1 New York) 1970, p,116,
29 Ibid., p.116-,
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practices by.the publication of sentences, 30

was to become

a

The·problen\ was.never

greater and·greater thorn in Goebbels~ side as the

news services of the Nazis deteriorated toward the end of the war,
In January of 1942 a Reich Minister quoted a broadcast in the
presence of Hitler and the E'uehrer·was so shocked that he· issued a
decree on the fifteenth limiting the number of people authorized to
listen in to Goeri.ng, Ribbentrop, Keitel, the commanders in chief of
the military, Goebbels, and some highly placed Prop.agenda Ministry
officials.
Goebbels made the decision known more specifically in his
conference of January 30,
''The Minister announced the Fuehrer yesterday
.again·gave·him the task and the full power to decide
who shall receive foreign news reports of any kind.
The Fuehrer has expressly named a few Reich Ministers
and Reichsleiters who may receive these, and he has
issued instructions that others, even those in the
highest positions, r.egardless of rank or influence,
are not to be supplied with them, and that the
strictest yardstick is to be applied in every respect," 31
A great clamor arose within the he±rarchy of the government from
every quarter.

The elate were first very jealous of their privileged

position and second, just as dependent upon foreign sources for the
truth as any ordinary citizen,

Goebbels received a stream of protests

30 Boelcke, Willi A,, The·sec;ret Conferences of D:r; ·Goebbels,
(E,F~..~':1tton. & Co,, Inc .. , New Yo:i;k) 1970, p.167.
I

31 :Eba:d.
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and appeals from officials and.commented upon the fact in his Diary
in.February of 1942,
'It is disgusti.ng. how mci,ny b.ig shots· are riow- try;i,n',f
to prove to.me that they·can•t continue their work
unless they.receive.permission to listen to foreign
broadcasts, In almost·all cases I deny their
requests. I agree to place at their disposal only·
such material as is essential for his special work,
The task and duty of listening to foreign broadcasts
must devolve on the political offices created for this
purpose. Administ:rzative offices have nothing whatever
to do with it," 32
1

From the tone of the entries Goebbels' position was well founded
by orders fnom the Fuehrer and his attitude was one of smug, self
satisfaction.

This must have. grated upon the nerves of his peers and

they went over his head to Hitler to obtain permission to listen to
the fore.ign broadcasts.

Goebbels recalls with some relish in his

entry of February 20, 1942 some specific instances,
"It is really amusing to see how all the Ministers now
approach the Fuehrer, asking his permission to listen to
foreign radio stations. The reasons they ass.ign is
nothi.ng short of grotesque. For example, the Minister
of Education declared he must. know what our enemies are
supplying in the way of anti-German news in order that he
may &ndoctrinate youth .against such reports! The Fuehrer
rejects such requests brusquely and encourages my efforts
to keep news distribution as restricted and limited as
possible ... 33
The list of persons entitled to; listen to the broadcasts must
I

have fluctuated as time wore on and more people got back to Hitler.
It is interesting to note that the greatest trouble had on the issue

32. Goebbels, Dr, .Joseph P,, ·The Goebbels •Diaries, (Doubleday &
Coll\Pany, Inc.,·Garden·city, New York) Edited and'Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.77"'8,·
·
33 . ,
Ibid., p.95.,.6,
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of fore.ign broadcasts came from the top of the Nazi. government.
Perhaps the officials knew that the only real news coverage came
from the Allies and depended upon them for a clearer picture of what
their own government was saying.
Semmler recorded that, in 1944, the list was further depreciated
by Goebbels,
"Goebbels recently cut down the list of people to whom
political and military news from abroad is sent. I was
told to produce a list of the recipients of the
con~idential DNB service and of the wirless monitoring
material. He crossed of four fifths of the names,
Rosenberg, Funk, Ley, many Party Of fices , departments of
the War office, editors, the Ministry of Justice and a
whole list of high officials are to see no more foreign
news material at all, except items which directly affect
them personally or are relevant to their duties. A
special editor has been appointed to select what they
shall receive in the future. There have been many
complaints about this drastic decision, some of them
made to Bormann and Hitler. Goebbels has himself
received many letters imploring him to go on circulating
at least part of the material. But Goebbels maintains
that many harmful rumors start with the officials who
read the stuff. By.:cutting down its circulation he
hopes to check the flood of rumors. He will not listen
to any objections and at the moment he is in one of his
radical moods."34
The danger lay not so much in the news getting around but how
the people of power were to interpret it.

The Germans had maintained

several agencies for the evaluation of foreign broadcasting.

Among

them was the Seehaus Service of the Abwehr, under the command of

34 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, {Westhouse,
London) 1947, p.155.

Admiral Canaris.

Canaris is a mysterious figure in Nazi history and

as head of the l\bw:ehr· (intell_igence) he played·. a s_ignificant role in
its £ormation.;

It b.as been said that he was a British agent and

assisted in the attempt of Hitler's life which.cost over a thousand
lives in rev~ge~

Canaris administered the Seehaus and its daily report to the
Government.

As early as 1942 his work came under suspicion by

Himmler, who was jealous of his intelligence operation and desired it
under his own control, and Goebbels was made aware of the potentially
dangerous Seehaus report.

The report was very popular in the

governmentand many valued it's appraisal of the foreign news services
and information.

By 1942, however, it began to assume a somewhat

cynical, though veiled, and defeatist slant.

Goebbels wrote~in his

Diary in January of that year,
"To a great degree the defeatist tendencies in the
O.K.W. and the O.K.H. arise from the altogether too
irresponsible distribution of the news material
especially on the part of the Seehaus. I am going to
not engage in defeatist propaganda. Admiral Canaris
has given me a number of hair raising examples showing
the irresponsible handling of confidential material.
These examples suit me fine. They furnish the basis
for taking severe and radical measures."3 5
Two weeks later Hitler would give his decree limiting the
distribution of foreign broadcasts.

From a list of over one hundred

35 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.43.

and eighty who received the reports: in the Fore.ign Office, only two
or three· would continue to.get:. thein;after· theccutbacks, · :only two
copies would. go to the Wehrmacht:. and . the rest to selected members of
the Prop.aganda Ministry. ~6·· '·After talks with Canaris and the· staff
of the service Goebbels concluded.that the Seehaus reports were

a

danger to the security of the.Ministry~ He wrote on January 26,
''I (have) spent considerable time today looking
into the so called Seehaus Service, and carefully
studied one day's output of this subversive office,
which is being financed by funds of its own. I
have arrived at the conclusion that this service
must be limited as much as possible. I hope the
Fuehrer will confer the necessary powers on me
to enable me to intervene rigorously. Everybody
who counts now agrees with me that the dangerous
manipulation of this service must be curbed to
prevent a collapse of morale in the leaders of
the state and the Wehrmacht." 37
Who the persons who counted were in the above pass.age is
difficult to determine because there arose a great clamor when the
Service was curtailed.

The outcry was eno.ugh to cause the attention

of Hitler to be turned personally to the distribution.

Goebbels took

the initiative and intervened in the continued operation of the
Seehaus and succeeded in reduci.ng its distribution to a few people in
the entire country.

This was on the agreement of Hitler.

The Foreign

Office protested to the Fuehrer but on this point, Hitler seemed
adamant.

The Seehaus ceased to become an organ for "defeatist"

* Canaris was hanged by the Nazis on April 9, 1945 for treason.
36 Goebbels, Dr •. Joseph P., ·The·Goebbels•niaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc.·, Garden City, New Yo;r:k) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p;48. ·
37 Ibid., p.50.

tendencies , but not without indicatins to the Ministry just how much
credibility it had lost , even by 1942 . 38
Goebbels ' credibi lity was lost for many reasons.
discussed in the final chc\,Pter.

They will be

First and finally it should be

interesting to note that some discord appeared internally in the
Ministry of such a nature as to ill ustrate how far down things had
gone s i nce the start of the war .
Ei ther he was having trouble with an over- enthusiastic underli ng
or a completely disgruntled one.

In the first instance one young man ,

a product of the Hitler Youth Corps , publicly disavowed certain
departmental decisi ons in the Ministry .

Goebbels wrote ,

"I had a sharp conflict wi th Cerff about the present
program of our broadcasting system . Cerff takes a
somewhat super- National- Socialistic attitude . If he
had his way music, for i nstance, would be made only
on lyres. You can ' t operate a radio service for the
masses that wa y. Broadcasts must have diversi fied and
manifold programs . Cerff just won ' t see this. I
strictl y forbade him to critisize the broadcast in
bulletins of the Reich Propaganda Office . I regard
it as simply impossible that one of my departments
should attack another publically. We haven ' t sunk
that low in the National Socialist State! We still
have enough power to remedy known defects . But under
no circumstances wi ll I tolerate bringing about changes
by stirring up the masses . 11 39
Such a restri cti on seems wholly inconsistant with the manner in
which t he little Doktor managed to assist ih the acquisition of power

38 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P . The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
1
Company , I nc. , Garden City, New iork} Edited and T~anslated by Louis
P. Lochner , 1948, p,50.
3 9 I bid. , p . 390 .

when.the Nazis were on the rise.

The introduction of change through

mass incitement was the stock in trade of Goebbels for many years of
his life.
Perhaps most reveali.ng of the deterioration of the Ministry's
effectiveness is the public allegation of one Colonel Martin during a
press conference in May of 1943.

Goebbels recalled the inc.ident in

his Diary,
"During my absence Colonel Martin made certain statements
in the (press} conference which I must challenge sharply.
He declared that the people no longer believed the German
news reports. He said we. were absolutely dis'credited, no
matter how .hard we tried; people no longer believed the
government. Even though I must admit there is a somewhat
critical news situation at the moment, Colonel Martin
must not mistake the attitude of the O.K:w. toward our
news policies for that of the German people. The German
people, as far as the broad masses are concerned, are

quite uncontaminated. n4Q
Actually, the "somewhat·critical•
C

itself try as Goebbels might._

.

news situation" never repaired

And the only people who were left

"uncontaminated" were selected members of the· Ministry staff and a
handful of people who were to end up in the Fuehrerbunker beneath the
Chancellery.
The German people were quite out of reach and in the closing year
of the war, there existed no propaganda in the Third Reich, if Goebbels
own criteria were to apply,

40 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday &
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York} Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948, p.387.•

128
" •. ,the propaganda which produces the.desired
results is. good and all other pro{>aganda is bad •.. ., 4 i
There was no propaganda that is, except the· enemy propaganda.

41

Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.80-1.

CHAPTER VI
Summary and Conclusions
At the beginning of this thesis certain questions were posed,
the answers to which were to be found in the course of the research.
It is the place here to report the answers to these questions.
Goebbels' technique was a manifestation of his philosophy.

He

was utterly ruthless in the pursuit of his aims and established a
policy for most of the extenuating circumstances that arose in the
presentation of the actions and policies of the Reich Government.
Doktor Goebbels utilized secret transmitters to intrude into the
minds of the populace of enemy and subjugated states.

He employed

fear and lies to achieve some of his ends, often very effectively.
He imposed a strict policy of domestic censorsnfep over the
Reich and many people went to concentration camps for violations
thereof.

His philosophy was that the German listeners committed

treason in the exposure of themselves to enemy contamination.
His philosophical positions on journalism and pro~aganda were
Machiavelian and completely discounted the notion that tlie German
people were capable of determining what was right and wrong, good or
bad, politically benign or destructive.

He accepted complete moral

responsibility for the formation of public opinion and news
dissemination.
The structure of the Propaganda Ministry was such that it was
exceedingly susceptible to the intrigue and caprice of outside,
adverse influences in the Reich Government and the Military.

Goebbels
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himsel f was susceptibl e to the whims of the various press and
propaganda sections of the Wehrmacht, the Foreign Office, and the
Reich Press Office .
Those in positions of influence in those particular government
elements were acti vel y trying to reduce Goebbels ' i mpact with the
Fuehr er , the peopl e of Gennany , and the world in general as has been
born out by the research .
It is not difficult to understand what the conflicts cost
Goebbel s in the end .
the German people.

They had depri ved him of his credibility with
The German people in turn, had turned to the

Alli ed media for thei r information .
At the end of 1943 the situation existing between Goebbel s ,
the O. K.W ., and the Foreign Office were so muddled down by infighting that effective coordination was absolutel y impossible.

In

the l ast entry that has come down to us from his personal Diary ,
Goebbel s wrote ,
"Lammers, at my request, reported the situation regardi ng
the propaganda in Paris to the Fuehrer and told him about
Ribbentrop ' s attempt to take it out of my control via the
O. K. W. The Fuehrer was in a rage and turned against
Ribbentrop , using very harsh and insulting expressions.
The Fuehrer described the report given me by Ribbentrop
through Minister Ritler as absolutely untrue and
mendaci ous ."l

1

Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday &
Compa ny , I nc. , Garden Ci ty, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis
P. Lochner, 1948 , p.547 ,
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It had.deteriorated into.a morass of pettiness and bitter backstabbi_ng which included. the·:Fuehrer·.
sense of mutual purpose.

There. was. no comeraderie or

All that.seemed to matter was the individual

and his particular aspirations or even his vanity.

Goebbels, however,

in his own way, was to have the last laugh - before he died.
Finally, what is the measure of Goebbels' success or failure~
What if the military had accepted Goebbels' propaganda strategy?
It is conceivable that the events of the latter part of the war would
have been borne more readily by the public.

The people of the

German Reich might have retained their faith in the reporting of the
government, which, however embellished, would hot have provided so
haphazzard
a picture of the military efforts.
(

As it was, Goebbels

was helpless to thwart the effects of the Wehrmacht's poor·and selfillusory depiction of its plans and efforts.

Goebbels cannot be

blamed for the military picture offered to the people.
What if the Foreign Office had accepted Goebbels' propaganda
strategy?

Perhaps the people of the subj_ugated territories might

have been kept a bit more docile, even in the face of the terrorist
tactics of some of the Nazi-appointed military and civilian governors.
The Reich could have gone much further with the propaganda technique
than it did with the strong arm technique.

While not a gentle man,

Goebbels saw that it was far more expedient to control the masses
through psychological means than thro_ugh purely martial means •
Goe.bbels cannot be held accountable for the ineptitude of Ribbentrop
and his staff in the handling of fore_ign proI>aganda.

132'

What if Dietrich,.the.~eich Press Chief, had.accepted Goebbels'
proi,aganda strategy? .Perhaps . the . populace would have. enjoyed a
consistant pres~ntation of the political position of the state.

There

might have been greater support for the total war efforts that came
too late in relation to public response to them.

There might also

have been less to hide from the people had the prop.aganda been
consistant.

These suppositions are not offered up as a denense of Goebbels
and his philosophy.

Goebbels was simply a proi,agandist who was

engaged by the Nazis to present the actions of the Party,,and:.J.ater
the. government
in the most positive, constructive and noble light
,
possible at any given time and in any given circumstances.

He was

ruthless, equivocal, a liar and in the case of the Jewish people,
merciless.

He was all of these thi.ngs but one thi.ng more, he was

absolutely loyal to Adolf Hitler.
What if Hitler had given more support to the man who had so
zealously served him from the earliest years of the Party?

All

sources examined indicate that Goebbels virtually created the Hitler
myth and the concept of Hitler's infallability.
that Goebbels believed his own handiwork.

The trouble was

We shall see the extent

of that belief shortly.
The question of Hitler's reciprocal support is <lmportant as
Goebbels assumed that it was always there.

He never doubted that

the Fuehrer was just consideri.ng his impassioned ;pleas in the clear
light of day before making a move to his aid.

Goebbels firmly

believed that Hitler, the proi,aganda master who had taught the
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Little Doktor so much, that Hitler had Goebbels' best interests in
mind and the interests of the Pro~aganda Ministry in mind as well .
It had occurred to him that his proximity to his Fuehrer was
less than other high ranking Nazis , especially the Generals.

It even

occurred to him that the Fuehrer was not quite himself after years
under the quack treatment of Professor Morell, who had administered
experimental drugs to Hitler during all that time .

Hitler irrationally

ordered imaginary armies to attack the oncoming Russians then ranted
and raved when his orders were not carried out.
of this .

Goebbels saw little

What he saw were the people who had fawned about the

Fuehrer for so many years deserting him like flies in a wind.
Hitler had led him right down to the last yard and Goebbels
was finally faced with the question of how he and his Fuehrer were
going to die in the eyes of history .

The question had been in

Goebbels ' mind for over a year as Semmler recalls,
"Nowadays Goebbels often has fits of deep pessimism.
He said today that he had always despised his fellow
human beings, but never more than he did now . From
many things he has said recently, and especially
today, one can see his complete contempt for men and
their behavior. This contempt sometimes rises to the
point of disgust with life itself. How else can one
explain what he said today in front of his wife: 'If
all our efforts, work and struggle should lead nowhere,
then I would not find it hard to die. For in a world
where there was no room for my ideals there would be
no room for me either. ' ' If it ever comes to that, my
dear,' his wife answered. 112
2 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels - The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse,
London) 1947, p.107.
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First, Goebbels had to insure that, despi te the crushing defeat
of National Socialism, his efforts had to lead somewhere .

Second ,

his contempt of men l eads one to believe that he needed more than a
man to believe in and honor .

Hitler , the wret ched , insane shell of

the man he helped to power, had to fulfill that need right to the
end .

In the last months of the war , activity in the government

sector of the German capitol of Berlin centered upon evacuation of
the last vestiges of the thousand year Reich.

After twelve years

the Nazi Party was being removed from the German scene through t he
most drastic and radical political means availabl e t o man;
annihil ati on .

The ranks of the mighty, began to thin as the mighty

sought refuge in other , safer quarter s than their capitol .
As the Russians drew near in the east and the American closed
in on the west , the last i nner cadre went undergound, beneath the
heart of the government , the Chanceller y Building in the Fuehrerbunker .

It was there that the last act of propaganda was perpetrated

by the lit tle Doktor f or a history of which he still felt he was the
curator.
Semmler recalls that those around Hitler begged him to flee and
head south , out of the Russi an/American pincer .

In Manvell and

Fraenke l it seems that Goebbels was of a much different mind for he
had plans of his own for his Fuehrer ,
"Semmler , however, records that Goebbels per suaded the
Fuehrer to stay in Berlin and remain faithful to the
oath he had taken on January 30 , 1933 1 when he swore
he would never l eave the Reich Chancell ery , and that
no power on earth could force hi m to abandon his
position . If a legend were to be established as Goebbel s '
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last.fulfillment of his:duty 1 the Leader must die
within the ·precincts o;f; , the:. building which was . the
symbol of his .a,utho.i:ityi ,, 3
·

If the war was lost, at the·very least and last, the proper
polemic treatment of the Goetterdaernerung must prevail.

A last act

of propaganda must insure that the Nazi legend remained intact for
future generations.

This was his end and the manner in which he

would serve German history.

On April 21, 1945 he told an aide,

"Mark my words, Naumann, what you are seeing here is a
historical drama.of such magnitude that there has been
nothing to compare with it this century nor indeed any
century unless you go back to Golgotha." 4
The Russians were continuing to she~l the central Berlin area
and the din of mortar fire was constantly in their ears.

Goebbels

was not sure how the people would react to the iropendi_ng defeat and
the thought of the welfare of those whose moral fibre he had assumed
responsibility for bothered him.
his aide Fritzsbhe

He tried to justify his anxiety to

without much success,

"In the final analysis this is what the German people
wanted. The great majority of the Germans voted in
favor of our leaving the League of Nations - in other
words, against a policy of appeasement and for a
policy of courage and honor. It was the German people
who chose war. 11 5

3 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels; •His"Life
and Death, (Simon·& Schuster, New Xorkl 1960, p.256-7.
4

Ibid. , p. 263 •

5 Ibid., p.266.
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.The aide tried to remind him.that the Nazis had.included.peace
as a strong plank-in.their platform,during their struggle for
power, but Goebbels would have none of it.

He was satisfied with his

position and absolved himself of an~ guilt for the destruction of the
German nation.

Events moved quickly during the last few days in April.

On the

twentieth of the month Goeri.ng and Ribbentrop informed Hitler that
they could better serve the Reich elsewhere than Berlin and left.
Hitler did not try to keep them, feeli.ng beurayed by their departure.
Himmler followed,. going north to meet an intermediary from Switzerland to try and achieve a capitulation.

Goering sent Hitler a

telegram saying that he was going to assume command of the Reich.
On April 29, 1945, Hitler issued his last orders.

They expelled

Himmler, Goering, and Ribbentrop from the government and made
Doenitz Reichs President, Bormann Party Minister and Paul Joseph
Goebbels Chancellor of the Reich.
Goebbels had only one more'thi_ng to accomplish.

Manville and

Fraenkel assert,
"He realized all that mattered now was a heroic
finish, that death should be proud to take him
and his leader." 6

6 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.256.
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Hitler had issued his orders as a prelude to.his own suicide
which occurred.only a . few.hours·later.

In the ordex;s.he.commanded

Goebbels to flee and assume control of the-government.

Goebbels

wrote his famous appendix to the orders and maintained in it,
"In the delirium of treachery which surrounds the
Fuehrer in these most critical days of the war,
there must be someone at least who will stay with
him unconditionally until death •.. In doi_ng this I
believe ! am doi_ng the best service I can to the
future of the German people. In the hard times to
come, examples will be more important than men. Men
will always be found to lead the nation forward into
freedom; but a reconstruction of our national life
would be impossible unless developed on the basis
of clear and obvious examples. n7
Hitler had killed himself and was joined in death by his brid~,
Eva Braun Hitler.

Their bodies were carried up the cement steps to

the Chancellery garden and there burned.

In the light of the flames

Goebbels raised his hand and saluted the pyre.

His next task was a

far more personal one and the grisly responsibility loomed massive
on his shoulders.

There was only the consolation of history as

Ebermayer and Meissner point out,
" ..• he must ..• s.ta.nd be:fore the generations to come as·
the only true successor to the Founder of National
Socialism. The last day of his life on earth crowned
his ambition - an ambition so infinite that death
itself was not too great a price to pay for its
fulfillment." 8

7

Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.276.
8 Ebermayer, Erich, and Meissner, Hans-Otto, ·Evil:Genius-; ·The
·story ·of Joseph Goebbels, (Allan Wi_ngate, London) 1953, p.240,
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His wife gave their six children a sleeping draught and laid
them i n their beds in the small rooms set aside for them in the
Fuehrerbunker.

When they were as leep she adminis t ered poison to them

all and they died .

Such was the end for them.

On the evening of

May 1, 1945 Goebbels and his wife c limbed the s t eps into the garden
and die d in sight of the flames and bombs, by their own hands.
I n the end Goebbels was brought l ow by h i s peers , his
adversari es , h i s Fuehrer and his own hate, blindness and contempt.
He did not, however, die a sickly r efugee, a hungry prowler in some
war t orn alley , o r an Alli ed prisoner , but r ather , Chancellor of the
Third Reich and above all, a propagandist .

APPENDIX I
I.t cannot be disputed that the· New York Times coverage of World
War II was arno_ng the most comprehensive, if not the most comprehensive,
of any newspaper in the Western World.

During the war the Times

managed to put out more than one-hundred twenty-five thousand words
on Sunday'l.

That's more than ten thousand words longer than Gone With

the Wind.
Publisher Adolph Ochs died in 1935, two years into the time span
covered by this paper.

He was succeeded by A.H. Sulzberger., who

remained as publisher through the end of the war.
The editorial page was headed by Rollo Ogden from 1920 to 1937,
four years into the time span covered here.

He was succeeded, after

his death, by Dr. John Finley, from 1937 to 1938.

Finley retired in

1938 and was succeeded by Charles Merz, who remained editorial head
until he became editor of the Times sometime after the war.

He was

replaced by John Oakes, who was given the new title of Editorial
Editor.
Generally, Merz and Sulzberger tended to favor a strong stand,
editorially, on vital issues.

This was a departure from Ochs'

philosophy of shying away from too strong a commitment which might
affect news coverage.

Both Merz and Sulzberger felt that the Times

had, over its one-hundred year history, established so solid a
reputation that no fear of news coloration was necessary.
The stand the Times took in editorial coverage of Joseph Goebbels
was consistent throughout the series of editors.
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It was one of
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contempt, derogation, and criticism, interspersed with some grudging
admiration of Goebbels' administrative and·organizational prowess.
The style of the editorials does cha_nge somewhat from editor to
editor in that, 1. the taste and technique of the editors differed
and 2, the gravity of the world situation was drastically different.
Generally, the coverage of Joseph Goebbels by the New York Times
was very comprehensive.
times.

Goebbels appeared on their pages over 900

Of these 900 appearances,30 were editorials consisting of

about 290 column inches over a period spanning from 1933 to 1948,
approximately 15 years.
Between 1933, when Dr. Goebbels first appeared in the "Topics of
the Time" (first started by F.C. Mortimer, September 8, 1896) and
1937, the overall tone of the_editorial coverage is exceedingly
sarcastic.

The general posture of the Times' implied position is

very caustic, self-righteousness in the face of Goebbels' blatant
disregard for the principles of free press.
Whether this was an effective approach to a man who succeeded
in, at least, establishing and perfecting the infrastructure for a
continental propaganda system, is an open question.

Goebbels never

made the slightest attempt to disguise his role or minimize the fact
that freedom was what the Nazis said it was.

He believed just that

and never made any bones about it.
It could be that the serious tone of the later editorials in the
Times realized the true impact Goebbels had on totalitarian thought
and recognized his residual affect on the Communist propaganda
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machine after the war.
His first appearance on the editorial p_age was on March 20, 1933,
(14:5}, in a five and one-half inch editorial entitled, "German Unity
Compulsory".

The main theme of this piece deals with the facade

created by Nazi government concerning national unity, or at least the

outward display of it.

Having won only 52% of the vote, Goebbels

spoke of the Nazi desire to possess one-hundred percent support and
alluded to the further "educational" processes necessary to achieve
that according to the New York Times.
form.

This editorial is assertive in

The sarcasm contained in the composition is illustrated by such

phrases as,

"Concerning the time schedule for making all Germans
think and feel as one, the Hitler government would
seem to have radically changed its mind within
twenty-four hours. 11

On January 22, 1934 in a five inch editorial entitled "Goebbels
Takes Over Sports", (14 :4} , the Times blasts Dr. Goebbels for
implemen.ting polemic and propaganda scenarios concerning the 1936
Olympic Games.

Goebbels' obvious ploy to place certain political

values on.a supposedly apolitical activity such as sports drew
scornful remarks from the editors.

The sarcasm still prevalent in

these early editorials is again amply illustrated by the following
phrases,

"From the Nazi standpoint a man can do one hundred
meters .•. in a manner that is beneficial to the state ...
jump twenty-four feet so as to affirm the spiritual
unity of the G~rman tribes ... toss the shot fifty feet
in protest against the iniquitous peace treaties •. :"
While this editorial is of relatively little substance there is value
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in a point taken so adroitly and lightly about a very serious
development ol; al;J;airs. ·
.Again on February 13 ,· •1934· in a J;ive inch editorial entitled
"Swastika and Purdah", (20:4), the editors,deplore Goebbels' position
on the domesticity ol; German women.

Purdah, apparently the custom ol;

keeping women subordinated in harems, is a concept employed by the
editors to demean Goebbels' assertion that women in the Reich are
better suited tor child-bearing, kitchen work and an overall domestic
role.

The analogy is rather l;limsy and the Times seemingly is content

with attacking Dr. Goebbels on a trifling point.
Goebbels, in his speech on the subject, indicated German men
would fight "tooth and nail" against female competition.

The editors

of the Times in response stated, "A hero who uses his teeth and nails
on his womenfolk is a bit hard to visualize."
flimsy rebuttal.

This appears to be

It is as though the editors have taken some kind of

personal position against Goebbels.
On April 24, 1934 in a five inch editorial entitled, "Goebbels
Resents Praise" the editors provide an informative/assertive
conrrnentary about Dr. Goebbels' negative attitude towards the
apparently all too laudatory posture of the German press towards the
NSDAP.

The Times' conclusion is that Dr. Goebbels feared that many

German editors were taki~g this tack with a tongue-in-cheek attitude.
Still the sarcasm pervades the style with passing reterences like,
"The director of the culture and conscience of the German peoole ...
turns uoon the editors and calls them cowards and toadies."

However
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the sarcasm is somewhat diminished here and this editorial is probably
the firs.t of the reallv serious a.rguments presenteff bv the Times about
Goebbels' propaganda theories. (22:4)
In an interpretive/assertive editorial of about five and one half
inches on May 10, 1934, (20:4) ., entitled, "Freedom is Prescribed",
the Times continues the examination of Dr. Goebbels' policies on
German journalism.

Goebbels' admonishment to the German oress about

the monotony of their coverage is taken to task by the editors who
redicule the orincinles of strict discipline found in the German
culture as applied to the stvle of the press.

Sarcasm still exists

as the editors guip, "Editors will be expected to display a certain
amount of manhood and judgement, whether they have forgotten how or
nota"

On August .29, 1934, (16:4) in a six inch editorial entitled,
"Goebbels Breaks the News", the Times attack a ploy on Goebbels• •
part that seeks to prepare the people of Germany for the hard winter
that is about to come.

Citing the difficulty the Reich government has

had in re-vitalizing the industry and agriculture of Germany, the
editors call Goebbels' request of the German people to forebear and
be proud of privation for the State, and excuse for the inability of
the German .government to cope effectively with the problems.

Actually,

every emerging government in the world has used this very old ploy,
including our own.
shaky ground.

As such, the ~rgument of the Times falls on pretty

If the editors had simply pointed out the ploy as a

classic one and not taken so pompous a position, the editorial would
have been far more effective.

The sarcasm is still present in remarks
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like, "Her;r Goebbels is oili.ng up his prop.aganda machinery ..• to prove
that poverty is more precious than prosperity."
The Times next attacks Dr. Goebbels in a nine and one-half inch
editorial, (18 :3r on August 7, 1935, entitled·, "German Catholics"·.
Here the contention is that the political activities of the Catholic
Church in Germany were justified, which they were.

The method of

approach and the style render this pie,ce very ineffective because of
the ridiculous assertion that some high-ranking German officials still
admire the old pagan gods, possibly.

Goebbels and Goering are cited

as using poster campaigns of which none are quoted.
have been very effectively.

They might

The editors pick up on the Pope's charge

of paganism in the Reich in a very flimsy manner.

over-all the

arguments presented do not adequately support the vital and important
point of contention they might have.
In a five and one-half inch editorial published on September 24,.
1935, (22 :4) entitled, "Bleeds for Minorities", refutes Goebbels'

position on minority treatment in an assertive manner.

The glaring

inconsistancy in the German assertion that German minorities in the

Memmel are entitled to humane treatment while Germany brutally
persecutes the Jewish minority, are picked up effectively in this
sound and cohesive argument on the Times' part.

Goebbels' statement,

"Fruitful collaboration among nations is possible only if an alien
people is respected just as is one's own'~,.is used at a point near

the beginning and not attributed to him until the end of the editorial;
after the inconsistancy of German policy is deftly pointed out.

Here
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is one of the few places in the early editorials where sarcasm is
used with some utility,
The editorial of March S, 1936, (20:4) entitled, "Streicher
Wears'. Tails", is of very little relevance to Goebbeis as he is
mentioned only in passing.

The Times seems to be taking some l_ight

jabs at Streicher and Goebbels for some statements concerning the
wearing of tuxedos by Storm Troopers.

It is fill, at outward

appearance, and presents no arguments of any real significance.
On May 18, 1936, (16:3) the Times takes Dr. Goebbels to task
for the policy he implemented concerning the criticism of plays in
German newspapers.

Here Goebbels is grudgingly given the benefit of

the doubt as he states that plays will not be criticized until the
next day in order to allow for contemplation and reflection.

Although

the idea came from Goebbels, it is really not so very bad when one
considers the frivolous; sometimes yiscious manner in which p;Lays were

and still are criticized.
"Critics Will Goose Step".

Sarcasm abounds in this editorial entitled,
The Times concludes, "Probably the only

advantage of this change to anybody is that it will help the evening
papers at the expence of the morning."
on October 27, 1936, the Times published a six and one-half inch
editorial entitled, "Just As, So--", (24 :4) which attacked the first
real public limitation of German writers and publishers.
is, accordi_ng to the Times.

First, that

Actually Goebbels had restrict!3d

publications in the Third Reich for many years but had never really
been in the position to_ go public with it without some loss of
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effectiveness.

The "just as, so--" kind. of a_rgument utilized by

Goebbels is very old, dati_ng back to Plato.·. The, editorial is almost
a rhetorical criticism which gets rather syrupy, albeit with some
cause, but goes too far, as in this contention,•

11

•••

so the whole

population must consult the latest official bulletin on when to think,
when to feel, when to hate, when to weep, and where, and how, and for
whom, and against whom. 11

The opening line of the November 29, 1936 editorial (IV, 8:4)
entitled, "Critics Must Think" is a six inch attack on the currently
stated policy that German critics must restrict themselves to
"description and contemplation" when evaluating a play, music,

literature and the other arts.

No real assertion is made save that

this is very restrictive which is eminently apparent.
cryptic, sarcastic and fortunately, brief.

The piece is

It is more a reflection

than an argument but concludes by asserting that perhaps such
restriction is not worth paying for.
The twelve inch editorial entitled, "Ersatz Government"; (18:4)
published on April 4, 1937 is one of the most significant comparisons
made by the Times.

Here the speech by Goebbels commemorating the

forty-eighth birthday of Adolph Hitler is reponded to by a comparison
of democratic and totalitarian governments as they relate to the
difficulty each has in ruling any given people.

Times' citation

of widespread dissent in Germany is sound. and the examples of .the lack
of internal cohesion in_ government circles are conveniently situated
in the a_rgument.

Authorities on Hitler's political techniques will

assert, however, that he permitted, and at times even fostered·, the
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disharmony in his government to prevent any power blocs from forming
against him.

This should have been·. considered in the editorial.

It nu.ght be that Hitler had not been in power lo_ng enough for a clear
picture of the nuances of his methods to be·perceived by his critics.
The editors also point out that Goebbels might'be misconstrued about
the positions democratic governments take regardi_ng the difficulty of
totalitarian rule.

Goebbels was.a firm philosophical proponent of

the totalitarian form, right down to the last day of his life.

The

Times was absolutely correct in drawing attention to the error of his
perceptions because Goebbels' diaries·revealed later that he was
pitifully ignorant about societies other than the German Reich.

It

can be said that, to the end, he never really understood,the British,
for whom he had great respect, nor the Americans, about whom he knew
very little.

It can also be said that inconsistancies exist in the

democratic form of government which do not arise out of the
enlightened discourse of the masses as the Times asserts.

Watergate

is a glowing example of this.
-Goebbels is caught in a very weak position in, "Uniting
Germany", a fourteen inch condemnation of his position on the growing
dissent in the German churches, published on May 31, 1937, (14:4).
It is apparent that the sarcasm is now becoming less desirable to the
editors of the Times and it is here that Dr. Finley assumes. control
of the editorial page.

The strength of the arguments are devastating.

as the Times rips Goebbels' attempts at justifyi_ng the on-going
religious persecution in Germany.

The attempts at moral justification

and appeals to decency are rebutted by reminders about the 1934 purge,
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the summary executions and the exploits.of Ernst Roehm, the.homosexual.

Goebbels would later determine how· the: rulh1gs of the German

courts would be reported in the.press and by.wham.

The close is the

most effective element in this piece which calls to the attention of
the reader the gross inconsistancies which are now becoming I().ore. and

more numerous in Goebbels' propaganda,
"In the same breath in which he proclaims that
religious wars divided and weakened Germany, Dr.
Goebbels warns of a new purge and declares a war
to the finish. This is a strange but now familiar
formula by which the Nazis propose to achieve
national unity."

The first mention of possible war is made in, "Calling All
Babies", a short, four and one-half inch comparison of_planned
population policy simultaneously announced by the Russians and the
Nazis published on June 9, 1937.

The Times states, "If we were sure

that Herr Goebbels won't start anything before he has his extra
twenty million and that Moscow won't start anything before she has her
one hundred and twenty five million ... "

It is a brief capitalization

on similar remarks made by governments of similar qualities and as
such is a sound vehicle.

It is the last time Goebbels will appear in

the editorial page for a year and a half.
"Laugh, Clowns, Laugh" was the title of the February 7, 1939
editorial, which, in six and one-half inches, complained of the lack
of humor in the Third Reich.

It is little more than reflective of a

qualitative trait of Goebbels and the. government in general when he
ordered an actor expelled from the profession because of some
unacceptable comment made before a German audience during a
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performance.

Goebbels is ridiculed for reacti_ng publically by

proclaimi_ng a humor contest to· offset negative public reaction.

It

is ironic that this editorial is on the humorous side of Germany's
government because it is the last Goebbels appears in before the outbreak of the Second World War on September 1, 1939.

(18:4)

By the time, "The Spiritual Weapons" was published Charles Merz
had assumed control of the Times editorial page.

In this nine inch

composition appeared on December 2, 1939, Goebbels is again quoted at
the beginning of the text and not attributed until the end.

He is

quoted as saying at one point, "Art is one of the sharpest spiritual
weapons of war."

The general theme of the editorial plays on

Goebbels contention that optimism is an essential ingredient in
successful wartime operations.

The conflict in past and present

positions is capitalized on very effectively.
rebuke to Goebbels' inconsistancy.

The close is a sharp

Asking if he realized what he was

implying at the time he made the quoted statement, the Times says,
"And if he did, would it not be the part of .wisdom for him to slip
quietly over the Swiss frontier?" (16:3)
Indignation would be the best word to describe the posture found
in. "Advice From Dr. Goebbels', published:.on March 1, 1940.

This

eight and one-half inch editorial is a searing indictment of Goebbels'
position on the rights of neutral countries to publically state their
political positions and reactions.

The Times' contention is that

proclaimed neutrality and freedom of expression are not mutually
exclusive.

They conclude that Goebbels' statements of disapproval

indicate that the.European neutrals are in jeopardy if criticism of
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the Reich is not discontinued.

The acid open to the editorial is

illustrative of the great contempt the Times: held for. Goebbels. "That
oellucid thinker, that good,. gentle, tolerant, easygoi.ng statesman
Herr Doctor Joseph Goebbels .•. "

The close is an indication of the

Ti10es 1 position of the conduct of the German government as a whole.

"But the ·truth is we can't· insult them. No one can
insult a government which is somewhere between 800
and 25,000 years behind the times in every attribute
of civilization and human. decency. It is a waste
of energy to try." (20:1)
On October 4, 1940 the Times published, "Nazi Golden Age", (22 :1)
in which it compared the classic, idylic and utopian concept of the
golden age to Goebbels' concept of one of war and conflict.

A simple

reflection, it served to illustrate the kind of approach Goebbels
took in indoctrinating the Hitler·Youth at the onset of the war.

A

brief five and one-half inch composition, the. editorial was not
without it's assertion that, "Liberty's days. of gold may yet come,
with the unanswerable thunder of guns and the whirring of
irresistable wings. "

Such melodic fare was to become more and more

prominent in the first days of the war when the allies were suffering
severe setbacks.

It is as though the.Times was indulging in a little

propaganda of its own.
In a couplet editorial under the "Topics of the Times" logo,
The Times published, "Evacuated German Children" and, "Bombs Home to
Roost", (14:4) on December 28, 1940.

Germany, it is explained in this

nine and one-half inch editorial, is now starting to experience the
impact of mass aerial

bombardment.

Goebbels trys to justify the need
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for such protective measures as the l arge- scale evacuation of
children and cites the immensity of German military operations .

The

Times compares the scale to world war one and concludes the cost is
the children. -Artic l e is emotive and rather reflective, almost without real point to be made .

I t will be a year and nine months befor e

Goebbels appears in the edi torial section again and Gennany ' s
position will have begun t o deteriorate substantially .
That this occurr ed is evi dent in the l ead to , "The Invisible
War" , publi shed on September 4 , 1942, (22:1) which read, "Somehow
the statements of Propaganda Minist er Goebbels no l onger ring with
the same sel f - confidence.
people. "

He has begun to plead with the Gennan

The editorial continues to summarize the conditions in

Gennany under heavy and growing allied bombardment .

Reference is

made to the increased penetration of British broadcasting with Dr.
Goebbels never really found himself in a position to effectively
cont~ol; even though such listening was punishabl e by death at the
time this editorial went to print .

It i s also noteworthy that

Goebbe l s was restricti ng the infonnation about bomb destriction in
the German Press and Radio and at the same time relying heavily on
bomb destruction reports from BBe for use in his own newscasting
operations.

There is a shrewd assumption on the part of the Times

conta ined here that Goebbels i s starting to become disillusioned with
Hitler 1 s ability to conduct the war.

He does mention many periods

of doubt i n hi s Diaries at this time but, as events i l l ustrate , he is
the last to leave lliitler, and then only i n death .
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By the time Goebbel s returned to the editorial page on April
20 , 1943, (22:2) the New York Times found itself in a position to
assert , "Things looked well fo:r Hitler two years ago .
look sp well now ."

They don ' t

This nine and o ne -ha l f inch e ditor ial the editors

have used to point out that the word of Dr . Goebbels has been ringing
hollow for some time , " . . . even the official propaganda sounds like
whistl ing in a cernetary ."

While only marginally :r::elevant to Goebbels,

the piece further asserts that , as an educated man , he must be feeling
very d i s ill u sioned with his Fuehrer .

Again , it is as though there

existed a personal vendetta between Goebbels and the Times editorial
staff .
Goebbels probably read the New York Times every day .

If such

was the case , he coul dn ' t have been pleased with the theme of
September 5 , 1943 ' s editorial , "Goebbel s Does His Best" (I V, 8 : 1 ).
It is a direct and devastating attack upon his somewhat worn
argument that Germany never wanted war anyway; to try and make some
justi fication for the di saster befall ing her at the time.

Goebbels '

assertions about smal l over- populated nations not sure of Germany ' s
will to survive are sounded out and refuted .

It is also in this

editorial that we have the first i nkling that the Times is ready to
specul ate about the end of the war in relation to a definite period
of time, "But Herr Goebbels is ingenious.

We shall look forward to

his review of five years of war a year hence .
he is still able and around at that time . ''

In case, that is, that

If Goebbels read the

New York Times he would have been hard putcto r ebutt the ~rguments
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put here.

He could not have known that the time-frame in which the

Times was beginning to think was not that far from the truth.
The editorial entitled, "Art is Long--", published on December
26, 1943, (IV, 8:2) is little more than an eight and one half-inch
scandal shot charging Goebbels with absconding with some famous works
of art.

The problem with this assertion is that graft is not, unfort-

unately, restricted to the German government.

The significant

element in this piece is the re-assertion that, "Time is growing
short."

The next two editorials naming Goebbels are of only marginal
relevance to him personally or politically.

The first, "Russia's

New Victories", published in the middle of March of 1944 and, "Why
the Generals Failed", published in July of the same year, merely
use short Goebbels statements to launch attacks on Germany's vastly
deteriorated position generally.

They are principly concerned with

strategic analysis of the fronts and of the military breakdown of the
Reich forces, both of which Goebbels had little to do with, actually.
He appears again on November 13, 1944 in an editorial entitled,
"The Hitler Mystery", (18:1) in which certain statements made to the
child's militia, or the 'home guard' is installed in the face of
martial collapse.

Here the substance of his statements are not even

detailed except to be called almost foolish.

The only real quote is

given toward the end of the composition where he is said to be
fishing for a possible peace feeler, "Germany, he said, will continue
to f.ight until her enemies 'are prepared to conclude a decent peace. '"
He was not actually doing anything of the kind, however, because h~s
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diaries reveal at this time period a frustrated Goebbels repeatedly
going to Hitler to ask for further.powers to institute total defence
measures in Berlin.

He had alree\dY res_igned himself to death, as had

his wife, Magda.
On December 31, 1945, six months after Goebbels' death, the Times
published an editorial entitled, "Hitler's Testament" (16:ll.

It is

a last stab at the entire Nazi ideol_ogy and again both Hitler and
Goebbels are used as spring boards for commentary on the evils of
totalitarian go~ernment.

It concludes that both Hitler and Goebbels

fell victim to their own lies and that the mark they made on history
will serve as and example and therefore not be entirely without
redeeming value.

The style is pompous, now, but then, it, in all

probability, inspired many sincere feelings on the part of the readers.
It is pointed out, however, that Goebbels was the only one to remain
with Hitler in the last hours.

In fact, although not mentioned in the

editorial, Goebbels' staff was the only one that did not flee and his
personal assistant was captured, with other staffers, in the
Propaganda Ministry, at their desks, by the Russians.
If any general comment can be made about the coverage of Goebbels
by the New York Times editorial staff, it is that they were content to
employ very grandiose language and puff themselves up quite a bit when
reacting to his arguments.

Reacti_ng is an accurate work also for,

throughout most of the war, the nendency of the editorials was very
reactionary in around 80%.of the publications.
The manner in which arguments were presented was to the greatest
possible advantage to the American interests, which, one could
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suppose, was probably very naturc1l.

In WWII the press of l\merica

had a grec1t tendency to be most tolerant with government, a posture
which was to prevail up until the .. b_eginning of the Viet Nam war.
It could also be asserted that much of the style of the'Times'
editorial :.,age was very emotive, marginally logical and much given to
pro:.,agandization.

Most papers in the country.were of such a nature at

that time.
While it would be a very difficult assumption to prove, the
supposition that the Times might, at the request of the government,
have withheld some information, juxtaposed information in the
interests of national security, and similar practices, is not beyond
the realm of belief.

This is not to say the Times might have

published any outright lies at government request, but it is not
unreasonable to assume that the Times might have cooperated with the
government for the cause of the war.

It is exceedingly probable that,

after the Viet Nam experience, the_ governmental lies, the wi thholdi_ng
of information to hide mistakes and the rest, the Times would never
indulge the government again in the fashion of WWII.
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APPENDIX II
Comprehensive Listing of Goebbels Appearances in New York Times.

1930

1933 cont .

1933 cont .

Sept. 2, 16:5
June 1, 13 : 5
Nov. 29, 1 0:4

Apr. 12, 24 : 5
Apr. 16, IV 1:4
Apr. 25, 9 :1
Apr . 28 , 9:3
Apr. 30 , 28 : 2
Apr. 30, IV 2 : 3
May 7 , 12 : 5
May 7 , 13: 2
May 10 , 10:1
May 14 , IV 4 :7
May 11, 10 : 2
May 30 , 5 : 4
J une 26 , 14 : 7
J une 29, 1:3
July 8 , 10 : 4
July 9 , 2 : 5
Aug. 18, 8 : 3
Aug . 29 , 4:4
Sept. 1, 12 : 2
Sept. 3 I 1: 1
Sept . 13 , 10:2
Sept. 1 4 , 1:3
Sept. 17 , IV 3:8
Sept. 15, 9 :1
Sept. 24 , 35 : 2
Sept . 25, 1 : 2
Sept . 25 , 6 : 5
Sept. 26, 14:1
Sept. 26, 1: 3
Sept. 27, 13: 2
Sept. 29 , 10:4
Sept . 30 , 6 : 7
Oct . 1 , IV 4:7
Oct. 9 , 14:2
Oct . 15, IV 5 : 3
Oct. 18 , 3 : 3
Oct . 21, 9 : 4
Oct . 26 , 8 : 6
Oct. 27 , 12:5
Nov. 4, 1 : 3
Nov. 19, IV 3 : 6

Nov .
Nov .
Nov .
Nov .

1931
Feb.
Mar .
Apr.
June
Nov.

6 , 9:1
22, 2:1
28 , 56:4
23 , 15:8
1 8, 6 : 2

1932
Feb . 24, 10 : 2
Apr . 16, 4:3
June 24 , 6 : 2
June 28, 5:4
Sept. 25 , II, 5 : 6
Oct. 20 , 5 : 1
Nov . 7, 1:1

1933
Mar .
Mar.
Mar .
Mar .
Mar.
Mar .
Mar .
Apr.
Apr .
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr .

1 2 , 20:4
1 4 , 13 :4
1 6, 13 :1
19, IV 1:6
20 , 14:5 ed
19, 1:2
28 , 12 : 5
1, 1: 8
1, 11:1
7 , 10 ; 3
2 , 8:4
2 , 28 : 6
4 , 12:3
12 - p.16
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18 ,
22 ,
19,
24 ,

11 : 3
10 : 5
11:2
15 : 1

1934
Jan . 16 , 12 : 3
Jan . 20 , 8:2
Jan . 22 , 14:4 ed
Jan. 21 , IX 2 : 3
Jan. 27 , 7:2
Feb . 1 2 , 17 : 3
Feb . 13, 18:4 ed
Feb . 18 , IY 2 : 8
Feb . 19, 6:2
Mar. 1 , 8 : 3
Mar . 7 , 4 : 2
Mar . 24, 7:6
Apr . 14, 8:5
Apr . 14 , 8 : 8
Apr . 1 5 , X 5 : 7
Apr . 21 , 9:4
Apr . 24 , 22:4 ed
Apr. VI p.3 Corr. 5/5 , 15:7
Apr. 27 , 10:5
Apr . 29 , IV 2:7
May 7, 9:3
May 19 , 6:3
May 9 , 1: 2
May 1 0 , 20:4 ed
May 12, 6 : 2
May 13, 30 : l
May 1 5 , 11 :5
May 13, IV 1:6
May 14 I 16:4
May 28 , 8:5
May 29 , 10:5
June 7, 10 : 2
June 13, 11 :1
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1934 cont.

1935 cont.

1936 cont.

June 13, 11:2
June 14, 11:2
June 1 5 , 5:5
June 24 , 3:3
June 25, 7 : 1
July 1, IX 3:2
July 2 , 2:3
July 6 , 1:8
July 2, 1:8
July 12, 1:5
Aug . 14, 1:2
Aug . 14, 10:l
Aug . 15, 3:7
Aug. 19, VIII 2:3
Aug . 25, 5:6
Aug . 26, 2 : 5
Aug. 28 , 7 : 1
Aug. >29 , 16:4 ed
Sept . 4 , 15:3
Sept . 17, 8:6
Oct . 3, 10:6
Oct . 9 , 6:1
Oct. 1 3 , 5:1
Oct. 14, IV 1 : 6
Oct. 15, 16:4
Oct. 26, 14:3
Nov. 1, 2:5
Nov . 6 , 23:7
Nov . 1 9 , 11: 2
Nov. 24, 7:2
Nov. 26, 4:6
Dec . 3 , 1 4:4
Dec . 30, IX 4:1
Dec . 20, IX 4:5
Dec . 5, 16:3
Dec . 9, 28:2
Dec. 7, 27:5

.Ma-r. 31, r..v

;Feb . 23 , · I.V 2 : 7
;Feb. 23 I I.V 1;2
Mar. 1 , I.V 2:4
Mar. 29 , VII p . 8
Mar . 1, IV, 6:6
Mar. 5 , 20:4 ed
Mar. 2 , 10:4
Mar. 1 1, 1 4:2
Mar . 13 , 11:1
Mar . 20, 9 : 2
Mar . 25 , 12:2
Apr. 2 I 1:2
Apr . 20 , 8 : 2
May 2, 3:1
May 24 , 31:2
May 14 , 1:4
May 18, 16:3 ed
May 24, IX 1:1
May 3 , IV 4:3
May 31 , IV 5:1
June 3 , 24:3
June 15 , 9:5
June 20 , 1 0:4
July 6, 6:2
July 12, 1:5
July 13 , 10:2
July 31, 13 : 2
Aug. 3, 14:4
Aug . 16 , V 2 : 1
Aug . 30, 1:7
Aug. 31, 3:2
Aug. 30 , 25 : 3
Sept. 1, 13:2
Sept. 11, 12:2
Sept. 11, 1:2
Sept. 12 , 1:1
Sept. 1 2 , 7:1
Sept. 26, 9:4
Sept. 1 3 , IV 4 : 5
Sept . 20 , 34:5
Sept. 21 , 10:3
Sept. 25 , 14:6
Sept. 29, 9 : 8
Oct . 4, 32:4
Oct . 25 , II 6 : 8
Oct. 27 , 24 : 4 ed
Oct . 26 , 1:4
Oct . 27 , 4:2

1935
Jan 1, 1 : 4
Jan. 7 , 14:2
Jan. 26, 13 ;4
Feb . 24, IV 4:3
Mar . 1 , 17:1
Mar. 19, 2:4
Mar. 23 , 8:4

4;3
Apr. 4, 17;5
Apr. 7, 1: 1
Apr. 7, 35:2
Apr. 14, 1:7
Apr . 15, 12:3
Apr. 28 , 5:1
May 20 , 8 : 8
May 2, 5:1
June 2 , 32:7
June 12, 9:1
June 24 , 12:5
June 25, 15:2
June 26 , 19:2
June 18 , 8:5
June 21 , 7:5
June 22 , 7:2
June 23 , 20:1
June 25, 10 : 2
June 30, 8:4
June 30 , IV 4 :7
July 24 , 1:4
July 28, IV 1:5
Aug . 5 , 1:8
Aug. 7, 18:3 ed .
Aug. 6, 16:4
Aug. 8 , 8:2
Aug. 11, IV 4:7
Aug. 25, IV 5 : 3
Aug. 17, 2:3
Aug. 22 , 1:4
Aug . 24, 7 : 1
Aug . 25, 1:3
Sept. 1 , 1 : 4
Sept . 3, 15:1
Sept. 20, 4 :1
Sept . 24, 22:4 ed
Sept . 30 , 11 :4
Nov. 16, 1 : 5
Dec. 14, 10 : 2
Dec. 29, IV 8 : 4

1936
Jan. 18, 1:3
Beb '. 11, 5:3
Feb. 16, IV 5:6
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1936 cont.

1937 cont.

1938 cont,

Oct .
Oct .
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov .
Nov .
Nov .
Nov .
Nov .
Nov .
Nov .
Dec .
Dec .
De c.

June
June
July
July

JulX 30 1 5 ; 5
Aug . 6 , 5 ; 6
Sept. 2 , 1 : 8
Sept . 11, 39 :1
Sept. 1 2, 3:2
Oct. 6 , 17:3
Oct . 19 , 1:2
Oct. 15, 2 : 2
Oct , 22 , 8:5
Dec . 1, 10:4
Dec. 16, 20:2
Dec. 4 , 42:2
Dec. 18 , IV 1 : 6
Dec. 23 , 11:5
Dec . 31, 5:5

30, 4:2
31, 8 : 2
4, 29:4
6 , 12:3
8 , IV 8 : 2 ed
8 , IV, 7 : 2
29 , IV 4:3
16, 25:5
26 , 1 : 8
28 , 1:5
29, 31 : 3
29, IV 8:4 ed.
6 , 42:2
1 7 , 17:7
22, 13 : 1

1937
Feb.
Feb.
Feb .
Mar .
Mar .
Mar .

14, VIII p . 3
20, 19:4
26 , 11:5
7, IV 1:6
1 2, 27 : 5
20, 1:4
Mar. 22 , 8:2
Mar . 26, 9: 1
Apr . 17 , 7:5
Apr. 20 , 9 : 2
Apr . 21 , 22 : 2 ed.
Apr . 26, 4:1
May 2 , 39 : 3
May 2, VIII p. 9
May 9 , 3:4
May 19, 11 :1
May 29 , 1:3
May 31, 14:2 ed .
May 30 , 1:7
May 26 , 6 :B
May 19 , 25:4
June 5 , 8:2
June 6 , 1: 3
June 22 , 1:2
June 27 , I V 12:6
June 28 , 12:6
June 7 , 4 : 1
June 9 , 24:4 ed .
June 15, 5 : 5

20, 28 : l
22, 12 ; 2
18, 3:2
31, 2:7
1,
26:1
A:U<J'.
Aug . 16, 6:3
Sept. 6 , 4 : 4
Sept. 8 , 10:4
Sept . 10 , 7 :1
Sept. 12, 38:5
Oct. 1, 5 : 3
Oct. 6 , 7:5
Oct. 7 , 20 : 5
Oct. 30, 3 :5
Nov. 6, 2 :4
Nov. 9 , 15 : 5
Nov. 26 , 2 : 6
Nov. 27 , 19:1
Dec. 12 , 53 : 7
Dec. 14 , 12 : 5
Dec . 24 , 8 : 8

1938
Jan. 31 , 1 : 6
B'eb . 5 , 1 : 8
Feb . 17 , 3 : 2
Feb. 19, 3:6
Feb . 22, 1 9 : 2
Mar. 10 , 15:2
Mar. 23 , 9:9
Mar . 30, 4 : 2
Apr. 5 , 16:3
Apr . 10, 1 : 1
Apr. 10 , 36 : 1
Apr. 11 , 1 : 8
Apr. 20 , 13 :1
May 15 , V 10:l
May 28 , 5:1
May 30 , 4:4
June 13 , 15 : 4
June 15, 1:3
June 19, 21 :1
June 20, 8 : 4
June 24 , 22 : 5
July 23, 3 : 4
July 24, 20:4

1939
Jan . 1 , 16 :1
Jan . 1 9 , 7 : 4
Jan . 21, 5:1,3
Jan. 26 , 6 : 6
Jan . 2 , 14 : 2
Jan. 1 4 , 4 : 4
Jan. 29 , 23 : 5
Jan. 3 0, 5:6
Feb. 4, 1:3
Feb . 5 , 33 : 4
Feb . 7 , 1 8:4 ed.
Feb. 19, 32 : 4
Mar . 5 , VII p.6
Mar . 6 , 1:6
Mar. 8 , 8:5
Mar. 9 , 1 2 : 4
Mar . 10, 5 : 3
Mar. 11 , 7 : 3
Apr. 16, 40 : 2
Apr. 20, 5:1
Apr. 21 , 8 : 6
May 2 , 1 0:4
May 2 , 48:3
May 3 , 22 : 4
May 4, 22:5
June 26, 3:2
July 16 , 20 : 3
Jul y 29, 3:5
Sept. 22, 4:6
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1939 cont.

1939 cont,

1941

Sept . 28, 6:2
Sept, 22, 6 : 6
Sept. 28 , 6 : 5
Oct. 9, 6 : 6
Oct. 10, 4 : 2
Oct . 1 8, 1:4
Oct . 1 9, 22 : 1 ed.
Oct. 23, 4 :1
Oct. 29, 9 : 3
Oct. 29, 4 : 6
Nov . 2 , 3:4
Nov . 6, 3:1
Nov . 9, 1:5
Nov . 13, 3 : 8
Nov . 13, 4:5
Nov. 28, 3 : 5
Dec. 2 , 1 6:3 ed.
Dec. 7, 29:8
Dec . 13 , 12 : 9
Dec . 23 , 9:1
Dec . 23, 5:6
Mar. 15, 1:7-8
Mar. 17, 8 :1, 5
Mar . 28, 7:1
Mar. 29 , 1 4 : 2
Mar. 30, 7:1

June
July
July
July
Aug.
Aug.
Aug .
Aug .

Ja.n,
Ja.n.
Jan.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Mar .
Mar.
Mar.
Apr.

Germany Fore!i:gn Radio
Feb . 26, 24: 1
Mar . 21 , 7:1
Apr . 1, 23 : 9
Apr . 7, 5 : 2,6
Apr . 2 2 , 7:1,7
Apr . 23 , 34 :1 ,3,6,8
May 5, 12:1 , 5
May 13 , 2 : 2 , 5 , 6 , 8
May 20 , 5 : 1 , 3
May 21, 14:1
May 27 , 6 : 1 , 5 , 8 , 7:2
June 9 , 36:1 , 4
June 15, 1:4
June 15, I V 5 :1,3, 6 1 8
June 18 , 1:2
June 1 9 , 1: 7, 4 : 3
June 20 , 10: 3
June 23 , 12:6
June 26, 1: 6 - 8

27 1 1 9 : 5 , 6
1 , 6 : 1.-.4
19, 7;4
29 , 3 : 5
9, 7: 2 , 4
11, 1:7,8
13, 7:3 , 4,7
16, 1:5,8

1940
Jan. 1, 11:1
Jan . 12 , 5 :1
Jan . 20 , 5 :1
Feb. 14, 4:1
Feb . 29 , 3:4
Mar . 1 , 20:1 ed .
Mar. 4 , 2:2
Mar. 5 , 3 : 3
Mar. 27 , 20:4
Apr. 9, 2 : 2
Apr. 12, 10: 6
Apr . 18 , 3:6
Apr . 20 , 4 :1
May 10 , 4:5
May 19, 34:7
May 31, 3:7
July 19, 7:2
July 28 , 17:1
July 29 , 2:7
Sept . 2 , 9:7
Sept. 3 , 3:2
Sept. 5 , 3 : 3
Sept. 30, 5:2
Oct . 1 , 6 : 5
Oct . 4 , 22 : 1 ed.
Oct . 12, 1:3
Oct . 27 , 28 : 4
Nov . 29 , 5 : 1
Dec . 2 , 2 : 6
Dec. 11, 5 :1
Dec. 12, 9 : 6
Dec. 25 , 1: 5
Dec, 28, 14: 4 ed .

1, 1 6 ; 3
6: 14:4
31 , 18:6
3 , 3:7
6, 6 :4
9 , 16:1
12 , 16:1
19, 7:6
3 , 4:7
12, 5:5
12 , 20 : 2 ed.
6 , 1: 6 , 8
May 2 , 9 : 1
May 18, VII p . l
May 22 , 3:6
June 14, 3:8
June 22, 1:8
J une 25, 3:8
July 13 , IV 4:6
July 18, 7 : 2
July 27 , 3 : 2
Aug. 1 4 , 1:2
Aug . 17, 6:1
Aug. 20 , 18 : 7
Aug. 21 , 6:4
Aug. 22 , 3 : 7
Sept. 1 , 3 : 5
oap . 3 , 2 : 5
Oct. 28 , 7 : 5
Oct . 29 , 11 : 4
Nov. 7, 1 : 5
Nov. 1 0, 3 : 3
Nov . 16, I V 4:8
Nov. 16, IV 9:3
Nov. 21 , 3:8
Nov . 10, 8 : 3
Nov. 14 , 11:2
Nov . 28, 6 : 3
Dec. 7, 39:2
Dec. 26, 8:2
Dec . 21, 1:3
Dec. 25 , 7 : 1
Dec. 31 , 16:6

160
1942

1942 cont.

Jan . 3 I 9:3
Jan. 11, 24:3
Jan . 23 , 7:2
Jan. 11, IV 4 : 7
Jan . 23 , 7:1
Jan . 16, 10 : 9
Jan . 18, VII p . 10
Feb. 7, 4 : 8
Feb. 11, 6:6
Mar. 7 , 4 : 1
Mar. 25, 10:5
Apr. 1 2, VII 28 : 2
Apr . 17, 4:8
Apr . 20, 6 : 5
May 28, 3 : 4
May 30 , 4 : 3
June 13, 7:1
June 18 , 4 : 1
June 22 , 4:3
June 22 , 6 : 5
July 1 2 , I V 5 :7
July 26 , IV 9 : 6
July 30 , 3:2
Aug . 13, 5:3
Aug . 19 , 5 : 9
Aug . 20, 7 : 2
Aug . 24 , 4 : 2
Aug. 31 , 5 : 3
Sept. 3, 4:6
Sept . 9 , 22 : 1 ed.
Sept . 13, 3:3
Sept . 18, 3 : 5
Sept . 24 , 3:5
sep p. 26, 6:1
Sept. 22, 6:1
Sept . 27 , 13 : 1
Oct. 1, 9:3
Oct . 1 9 , 1 8:5
Oct . 2, 6:3
Oct. 1 2, 5 : 8
Oct . 22 , 1 : 2
Oct . 25 , VII 35 : 1
Oct . 30, 4:3
Oct . 27, 2 ; 3
Oct . 30, 21 : 4
Nov. 19, 6:5
Nov. 22 , 32:3
Nov. 26, 1:8

Nov,
Dec.
Dec.
Dec,
Dec.
Dec.

27 I 4;7
17, 11 : 1
27 , 13 ; 2
31 , 5:7
20 , 39 : 3
23 , 3 : 5

1943
Jan. 1, 4:5
Jan. 3, 7:2
Jan. 7 I 3 : 6
Jan. 19 , 4 : 4 & 5:4
Jan . 28 , 7:4
Jan . 17 , IV 4 : 5
Jan. 21, 4 : 2
Jan . 31 , 1:6,8
Jan . 31 , 39 : 2
Feb. 1 , 3:1
Feb. 1, 4:6
Feb. 4, 3 : 3
Feb. 7' IV 3:3
Feb. 8 , 6 : 4
Feb . 13 , 5 : 6
Feb. 15, 3 : 6
Feb. 1 9 , 1:5
Feb . 21 , IV 3 :7
Feb. 25 , 4 : 6
Mar . 8, 5 :1
Mar . 13, 4:7
Mar. 14 , 5 :1
Mar. 17 , 5 : 3
Mar. 21 , 12 : 2
Mar. 29 , 4 : 4
Mar. 12, 7:2
Apr. 12, 7:2
Apr. 20, 10 : l
Apr . 20, 22 : 2 ed.
Apr. 22, 10 : 6
Apr. 23, 3 : 2
Apr. 23 , 7 : 5
Apr. 30 , 4 : 3
Apr. 16, 2 : 2
May 9 , 34 : 2
May 15 , 5 : 6
May 26 , 5:1
June 2 , 3 :1

1943 cont .
June 3, 20;1 ed.
June 6 , 26 ; 3
June 19, 4:1
June 23 , 7 : 3
June 24 , 4 : 3
June 26 , 6:5
Jun e 26 , 6:7
June 27 , 20:4
June 27, 23 :1
J uly 2 , 7 : 2
July 17 , 4:2
July 24, 2 : 2
July 14, 12:6
July 10, 3 : 5
July 18, IV 4:1
Aug. 2 , 1 : 6
Aug . 7 ' 1 : 6
Aug . 8 , IV 3:3
Aug . 10 , 4:2
Aug . 17, 4:4
Aug . 30, 4 : 4
Aug . 10, 4 : 7
Aug. 21 , 3 : 8
Aug . 19 , 5 : 5
Aug. 1 5 , IV 4:6
Aug . 20 , 3:7
Aug . 21 , 6 : 1
Aug. 27, 2 : 5
Sept . 3 , 4:6
Sept . 3 I 6 : 3
Sept. 5 , IV 8 :1 ed .
Sept. 1 2 , IV 9 : 6
Oct. 2 , 5:5
Oct. 3 ' 39 : 5
Oct . 4, 4:1
Oct . 4 ' 16:3
Oct. 5 , 29 : 2
Oct. 10, VI p.9
Oct. 17 , VI 45:3
Oct . 22 , 7 : 5
Oct . 27 , IV 9:3
Oct . 29 , 5 : 2
Nov. 1, 2 : 7
Nov . . 7 , IV 4 : 1
Nov . 7 , IV 11 : 4
Nov. 8 , 7 : 4
Nov. 21, 39:5
Nov . 29 , 9 : 2

162
1945 cont .

1946

Jun . 19, 4 :3
Jun . 26, 3:1
Feb . 3 , 1:7
Feb . 7, 6 :2
Feb. 7 , 6 : 3
Feb . 8, 9 :1
Feb. 11, VI 8 : 1
Feb. 16 , 7:1
Mar. 1, 8: 1
Mar . 6 , IV 8:1 ed .
Mar. 2 , 2:4
Mar. 9 , 3:6
Mar. 11, 29 : 1
Mar. 18 , VI p.9
Mar . 31 , 9:2
Apr. 9, 18:5
Apr . 13, 1 2 : 6
Apr . 19, 3:6
Apr . 20 , 5 :1
Apr . 21 , 3:1
Apr . 22, 1:7
Apr . 22, VI p.10
Apr. 23 I 6:6
Apr. 23 , 18 :1
Apr . 24, 4: 7
Apr. 24 , 18:1
Apr. 30 , 3:3
May 2 , 8:1
May 3 , 1: 5
May 3, 10:1
May 4, 1:8
May 7 , 5:3
May 11, 1 : 6
May 14, 3 : 1
May 16, 9 :1
May 18 , 7:6
May 6 , II 5 : 3
May 13, 8 : 3
May 20, 8 : 1
Sept. 29 , 9 :1
Sept . 30 , II 3 : 5
0op . 10, 2:7
Oct. 27, 9 : 2
Nov . 2 , 1: 1
Nov . 2 , 3:2
Dec. 30, 6 : 2
Dec . 31, 6 : 2 ,4
Dec. 31 , 16:1 ed.

Feb,
Mar,
Apr.
June
June

10 , VI 30;4
15, 11; 4
26, 6;7
9 , 33:2
10, 9 : 3

1948
Jan .
Mar .
Mar .
Mar .
Mar .
Mar .
Mar .
Mar .
Mar.
Mar .
Mar .
Mar.
Mar .
Mar.
Mar .
Mar.
Apr.

25,
14 ,
14,
15 ,
15 ,
16,
17,
18 ,
19 ,
20 ,
22 ,
23 ,
24 ,
25 ,
26 ,
27 ,
25,

43 :3
5:1
VI p . 9
1 :2
22 : 2 ed .
1:2
14 : 3
23:1
12 : 2
6:2
7:2
17 : 2
20 : 2
19:l
1 5:1
4:2
VII p.l
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